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I.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
A.  Traditional Publicity and Conference Recommendation 73-1 
 
In June 1973, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) adopted 
Recommendation No. 73-1, Adverse Agency Publicity. 1  The Recommendation 
responded to several well-known incidents in which a press release or other agency 
announcement caused significant damage to a product, company, or even an entire 
industry. ACUS called for each agency to adopt published rules that “balance the need 
for adequately serving the public interest and the need for adequately protecting persons 
affected by adverse agency publicity.”2 These rules, according to the recommendation, 
should require that publicity (1) be accurate and not disparaging, (2) announce 
investigations and other pending actions only in carefully prescribed circumstances, (3) 
fulfill an authorized purpose, (4) disclose when any information has a limited basis and 
give parties advanced notice when practicable, and (5) be corrected or retracted when 
erroneous or misleading. 3  By the late 1970s, only three agencies had created such 
rulesthe Federal Power Commission (FPC), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 4  Nine other 
agencies claimed that their internal procedures complied with the “spirit” of 
Recommendation 73-1, though they did not adopt rules. 5  Two agencies, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), took the position that their practices accorded with the Recommendation 73-1, 
but objected to some of the recommendations and otherwise refused to implement the 
recommendation.6 Implementation by other agencies was undetermined at the time. 
 
Decades later, I renewed the call for standards after finding that many of the same risks 
reported by Professor Ernest Gellhorn still persisted.7 Agency announcements can be 
essential to protect consumers and allow consumers to make smarter, more informed 
decisions. And agencies are often authorized, or even required, by statute to issue 
publicity. However, like agencies in the 1960s and 1970s, modern agencies occasionally 
issue publicity that is inaccurate, misleading, premature, excessive, or used to sanction 
regulated parties rather than inform the public. Moreover, like Gellhorn, I found that 
agency practices were not subject to many meaningful external constraints by courts or 
by Congress, though many agencies themselves have adopted internal procedures 
governing their practices. 
1 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973); codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1(a). 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.6, 1.36; SEC Administrative Regulations §§ 161 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. pt. 17. 
5 Letter from G. William Frick, EPA General Counsel, to Robert A. Anthony, ACUS Chairman, of 
June 9, 1977 (on file with ACUS); Letter from Marcus A. Rowden, NRC Chairman, to Robert A. Anthony, 
ACUS Chairman (May 31, 1977) (on file with ACUS). 
6 Id. at 27. 
7 Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1371 (2011); Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380 
(1973). 
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B.  Modern Challenges 
 
My research also identified a number of challenges posed by modern agency publicity. 
Though agencies continue to issue traditional press releases, agencies now also rely 
heavily on modern, Internet-based disclosures. Today, agencies publish massive amounts 
of adverse information about regulated parties or products on their web sites, and 
increasingly use social media and searchable online databases to amplify this information. 
Encouraged by recent “open government” initiatives, 8  agencies use information 
disclosure not just to enhance government transparency, but to pursue regulatory aims. 
Thus, my research finds that agencies have many more ways and perhaps more incentives 
to issue publicity than in 1973. I also find that modern forms of publicity are, in some 
instances, written, presented, and disseminated in ways that could increase the risk that 
audiences will misinterpret the information. Moreover, hyper-responsive capital markets 
now respond more swiftly and perhaps more hastily to agency announcements, regardless 
of whether the information is accurate or interpreted correctly. Very few statutes address 
modern agency disclosures, and it is unclear how laws like the Information Quality Act 
(IQA)9 might apply. As such, old problems with agency publicity are occurring in new 
forms. 
 
C.  Methodology 
 
The findings and recommendations in this Report are the product of a methodology 
developed in conjunction with Conference staff. The foundation is my 2011 article, 
Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era,10 which itself owes 
much to Gellhorn’s 1973 study.11 Added to this foundation was the following research: 
 
•  A literature review for articles published since my 2011 article.  
•  A review of Conference files related to Recommendation 73-1. 
• A survey of federal judicial opinions involving challenges to agency publicity. 
My 2011 article identified 26 relevant opinions since 1973. 12  Appendix C, 
attached, includes a list of 33 such opinions published between 1974 and 2014, 
representing 30 unique cases. The chart features a description of the relevant facts 
and holdings in each case.  
•  A survey of agency databases that contain negative information about identified 
products or parties, compiled with the help of Conference staff, at Appendix E. 
•  A survey of agency publicity policies and practices, culled from the literature, 
from case law, and from agency publications and web sites. 
8 See, e.g., Presidential Documents, Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 4683, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
9 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001), codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516. 
10 Cortez, supra note 7. 
11 Gellhorn, supra note 7. 
12 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1375. 
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• Detailed case studies of three agencies, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB).  
• Interviews of 18 individuals, including officials from all three agencies, and 
representatives from both industry and consumer groups, as listed in Appendix B.  
•  A survey of agency guidelines promulgated pursuant to OMB’s guidelines 
implementing the Information Quality Act (IQA), compiled with the help of 
Conference staff, attached as Appendix G. 
 
Yet, despite these efforts, we were not able to survey all agencies or all publicity 
practices. The sheer number of agencies and the number and complexity of the issues 
prohibit a comprehensive survey. The three case studies were chosen to represent a range 
of agency practices, given their discrete regulatory missions. Of course, these agencies 
may not capture the full range of practices by all agencies. We did survey a much broader 
range of agencies wherever practicable. For example, Appendix E (Sample of Agency 
Databases) and Appendix G (Agency IQA Guidelines) were created after surveying 
nearly all federal agencies.  
 
D.  Findings 
 
From this research emerge several key findings that inform the recommendations below: 
 
Publicity is more voluminous and varied now. Although agencies still rely on press 
releases and other traditional forms of publicity, the volume of such announcements is 
dwarfed by the volume of information about regulated parties that agencies publish 
online, using their web sites, social media, searchable databases, and other electronic 
means. In fact, the use of massive, searchable, online databases has become increasingly 
popular in recent years, and may soon eclipse other forms of disclosure as the preferred 
tool for agencies. Thus, what I call “modern publicity” tends to be written, presented, and 
disseminated in ways that could magnify the issues associated with traditional publicity. 
 
Agency rationales have evolved. Although agencies still use publicity to inform and warn 
the public, and infrequently to sanction a regulated party, agency rationales have evolved. 
Both agencies and open government initiatives invoke transparency as a dominant 
justification. Some agencies even cite the First Amendment concept of “the marketplace 
of ideas” as a justification for broad disclosures. Thus, agencies today seem to use 
modern forms of publicity less as a targeted sanction and more as a diffuse tool to 
encourage industry-wide compliance and achieve other regulatory aims. The burdens of 
disclosure tend to be much more marbled and less concentrated on a specific party. 
 
Challenges have evolved. Modern publicity still raises the same concerns as in 1973. 
Although not frequently abused, agency publicity still can be premature, excessive, 
misleading, inaccurate, or used in coercive ways. Today, modern publicity is more 
voluminous, more varied, and more likely to be misprocessed by Internet audiences, 
including capital markets. Thus, as information disclosure has become a preferred 
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method among agencies, it has also become more difficult to manage. Many agencies 
must maintain multiple internal organizations dedicated to public affairs, media relations, 
social media, and FOIA. Many also maintain Chief Information Officers (CIOs).13 Given 
emerging agency capabilities, and given the longstanding concerns with agency publicity, 
it is more important than ever for agencies to maintain clear policies and procedures. 
 
Agency practices. My research shows that agencies seem to be sensitive to the power of 
agency publicity and the need to ensure accuracy. The three agencies examined all have 
multiple layers of review and approval for traditional announcements, and these layers 
are designed to ensure accuracy above all else. Not all agencies publish their internal 
policies and procedures, however. Agency practices vary on announcing investigations, 
complaints, and other pending agency actions, though most agencies acknowledge the 
problems with announcing that an agency has initiated an investigation (as opposed to 
concluding one). Finally, agencies report receiving few objections to their press releases 
or similar announcements, though perhaps this is due to the lack of clear procedures for 
registering objections. (Moreover, instances rarely are documented by the media or via 
litigation, but off-the-record conversations indicate that regulated parties still view some 
agency announcements as problematic or unfair.) Most agencies do not have clear 
procedures for requesting corrections or retractions to publicity, for example. 
 
Informal customs predominate. Although some agencies have robust written policies and 
procedures governing their publicity practices, other agencies rely on informal custom 
and tradition. However, informal customs can break down, and even agencies staffed 
with professionals of immense goodwill can benefit from clear written policies and 
procedures. Moreover, many agencies fail to publish their policies or otherwise explain 
how the subjects of publicity can seek recourse. Again, these problems predate (and 
partially motivated) Recommendation 73-1. There seem to be few written policies and 
procedures governing agency databases (with the notable exception of the CFPB’s 
Consumer Complaint Database), even if the database is authorized by statute. Moreover, 
although agency use of social media is subject to dozens of federal guidelines published 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services 
Administration (GSA),14 these guidelines largely ignore the longstanding problems posed 
by agency publicity, focusing instead on privacy, security, and technical considerations. 
 
E.  Recommendations for Reform 
 
I considered recommendations directed to all three branchesexecutive, legislative, and 
judicial. Most important are the recommendations to agencies. I urge agencies to make 
their publicity practices more transparent and to conform not only to existing law, but 
also to principles of good governance. The recommendations to Congress are mostly to 
13 See CIO.gov, Members, https://cio.gov/about/members/ (displaying almost 50 different agency Chief 
Information Officers (CIOs) that are members of the U.S. Chief Information Officer and Federal CIO 
Council, established by Executive Order 13011 and codified by the E-Government Act of 2002) (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2015). 
14 General Services Administration, DigitalGov, Checklist of Requirements for Federal Websites and 
Digital Services, http://www.digitalgov.gov/resources/checklist-of-requirements-for-federal-digital-
services/ (last visited June 11, 2015). 
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clarify existing law, particularly the scope of the Information Quality Act. Finally, after 
much careful thought, and a change of opinion,15 I do not recommend judicial review of 
agency publicity absent the exceptional circumstances already recognized by courts.  
 
Improving agency practices. Several groups, both in and out of agencies, said they would 
support the Conference recommending best practices for agencies. 16  Based on my 
research, and based on these discussions, I recommend the following ten best practices: 
 
1.  Written policies. Agencies should adopt written policies that address the content of agency 
announcements and the procedures for issuing them. 
2.  Publication of policies. Agencies should publish their written policies online. 
3.  Advanced notice. Agencies should give advanced notice to subjects identified in publicity, 
but only when the subject is not already aware of an ongoing agency action, unless such 
notice would be impracticable or inconsistent with the nature of the proceeding. 
4.  Corrections and retractions. Agencies should adopt procedures for correcting and retracting 
materially inaccurate statements, subject to exceptions in the public interest. 
5.  Publicizing investigations, complaints, and other preliminary actions. Agencies should not 
publicize investigations except in rare circumstances as required by the public interest, and 
should publicize complaints and other preliminary actions only with a clear explanation that 
the action is tentative and non-final. 
6.  Capital market reactions. Agencies should consider the potential capital market reactions to 
their announcements and should, when practicable and subject to exceptions in the public 
interest, try to minimize potential capital market shocks. 
7.  Social media. Agencies should incorporate into their social media policies best practices and 
procedures that apply to traditional types of agency publicity, such as clear lines of 
responsibility for publishing information via agency accounts and safeguards to ensure the 
accuracy of statements. 
8.  Database disclosures. Agencies should adopt written policies governing online databases 
that contain adverse information about identified parties. Those policies should ensure that 
(i) the data are accurate, (ii) that users are informed of the source(s), context, and any 
limitations of the data, and (iii) that subjects are given the chance to post responses or 
request corrections or retractions, subject to reasonable exceptions in the public interest. 
9.  Clarifying the Information Quality Act. The OMB should clarify that the Information 
Quality Act applies to new substantive information in press releases that is not covered by 
previous information dissemination subject to the Act. The OMB should also consider 
updating its guidelines to account for the different types of databases published by agencies. 
10.  Fielding objections. Agencies that are not subject to the Information Quality Act, and do not 
otherwise have post-publication procedures for requesting corrections to information should 
direct objections to the agency’s announcement to the Ombudsman or Inspector General, as 
appropriate. 
15 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1441-53 (arguing for judicial review of agency publicity). 
16 See, e.g., Interview with Sean Moulton, Director, Open Government Policy, and Scott Klinger, 
Director, Revenue and Spending Policies, Center for Effective Government (formerly OMB Watch) (May 
27, 2015); Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel (May 27, 2015).  
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Statutory reforms. Due to the challenges of legislating agency-by-agency, I recommend 
that Congress consider amending the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or the 
Information Quality Act (IQA) to require agencies to publish written procedures 
governing their use of publicity, including procedures tailored to social media, online 
databases, and other new forms of agency disclosure. 
 
Judicial review reforms. Given significant doctrinal and practical barriers to meaningful 
judicial review, I do not recommend judicial review of agency publicity outside the 
“compelling” circumstances envisioned (but yet to be encountered) by courts. 
 
*  *  * 
  
II.  TRADITIONAL PUBLICITY AND RECOMMENDATION 73-1 
 
At the June 1973 Plenary Session of the Administrative Conference, the Conference 
adopted Recommendation 73-1, Adverse Agency Publicity. 17  The recommendation 
responded to several well-known incidents in which a federal agency issued a press 
release or other public announcement that caused significant harm to the product, 
company, or industry identified. In this part, I briefly revisit why agencies issue publicity, 
why such publicity can be problematic, and what the Conference recommended in 1973. 
But first, I consider the scope of what counts as “agency publicity.”  
 
A.  Defining “Agency Publicity” 
 
Recommendation 73-1 defined “adverse agency publicity” as “statements made by an 
agency or its personnel which invite public attention to an agency’s action or policy and 
which may adversely affect persons identified therein.”18 The Conference distinguished 
such publicity “from the mere decision to make records available to the public rather than 
preserve their confidentiality,” as the latter is governed by the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA).19  
 
Of course, the Conference drew this distinction well before agencies created public web 
sites that contain voluminous materials about regulated parties.20 Today, agencies draw 
attention to their online materials to varying degrees. The most salient documents usually 
are accompanied by agency press releases and more traditional announcements. However, 
even when agencies “passively” post information to their web sites, this information can 
be picked up quickly by the media, the trade press, industry lawyers, and by 
bloggersmaking the distinction between “actively” publicizing information and 
“passively” releasing it more murky.21 The distinction is blurred further by recent “open 
17 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973); codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1(a). 
18 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1(a); 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
19  Id.; Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
20 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1392-93 (citing federal laws that required and encourages agencies to post 
documents and other information online). 
21 Id. at 1438-39. Note also that the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between active and passive 
disclosures of information by the CPSC under the Consumer Product Safety Act. CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, 
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government” and “smart disclosure” initiatives, which encourage agencies to publish 
large amounts of information online, including large datasets about regulated parties. 
 
However, there remains a meaningful distinction between information that agencies 
believe “to be true and that the public should rely on,” and information released by 
agencies without any express or implicit endorsement. 22  For example, information 
released in response to a FOIA request does not carry the same “government imprimatur 
on the document” as an affirmative statement by the agency.23  
 
Although my previous research focused on information that the government specifically 
endorses in some way and takes some affirmative step to publicize, 24  this Report 
considers both discrete public announcements identifying a particular product and/or 
company, and modern agency databases that release large swaths of information about 
multiple products and/or companies. 
 
B.  Why Agencies Issue Publicity 
 
Agencies have several motivations for issuing adverse publicity, and these motivations 
have not changed much since Ernest Gellhorn’s study was published in 1973.25 The three 
primary agency motivations are to inform, to warn, or to sanction.  
 
1. To Inform or Warn 
 
Agency use of publicity to inform or warn the public is relatively common and 
noncontroversial. Recommendation 73-1 emphasized that agency publicity is often 
necessary “to warn of a danger to public health or safety or a threat of significant 
economic harm, or to serve other legitimate public purposes.”26 Indeed, most agencies 
must inform or warn the public, often by statutory mandate. For example, the CPSC must 
“protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury” and “assist consumers in 
evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products.” 27 The FDA must alert the 
public to an “imminent danger to health, or gross deception of the consumer.”28 The FTC 
is given discretion to “make public” information obtained by it “in the public interest” 
and to publish its reports and decisions “as may be best adapted for public information 
and use,”29 which has long been interpreted to authorize news releases.30 Congress even 
authorizes the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to publicize complaints made 
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 107-08 (1980). 
22 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1439 (citing CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 107). 
23 Id. (citing Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 585 F.2d 1382, 1388 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
24 Id. 
25 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1381. 
26 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1(a); 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
27 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b).  
28 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 375(b). 
29 15 U.S.C. § 46(f). 
30 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1968); FTC v. 
Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Utah 1997). 
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against invention promoters.31 In fact, information disclosure may be a raison d’être for 
the SEC.32 Agencies also defend their use of publicity as necessary to prevent rumors or 
confusion and to ensure that media coverage is accurate.33 In my recent interviews with 
officials from the CFPB, FDA, and FTC, the agencies cited similar justifications.34 
 
These uses confer clear public benefits and must not be taken for granted. Recent 
initiatives promoting “open government” and “smart disclosure” are only the most recent 
manifestations of what most people expect of federal agencies.  
 
2. To Pressure or Sanction 
 
More controversially, agencies sometimes use publicity to pressure or sanction alleged 
regulatory violators. As Gellhorn noted, publicity can serve as a form of sanction 
(intended or not) when it punishes, deters, or coerces the parties identified therein.35 The 
effect can be severe on companies sensitive to public disapproval, particularly publicly-
traded companies.36 Indeed, because agency announcements can have such a quick and 
dramatic effect on company stock prices, the threat of publicity has been referred to as a 
“guerilla” tactic, “arm-twisting,” or a lesser form of “blackmail.”37 Long ago, the SEC 
and other agencies used to be notorious for sanctioning companies via publicity.38  
 
Perhaps more commonly, agencies sometimes use publicity not as a standalone sanction, 
but as an extrastatutory method to amplify sanctions.39 Publicity can be a convenient, 
low-cost way to enhance sanctions, pressure targets into compliance or settlement, or 
make up for limited statutory enforcement authority or even difficulties in proving 
violations. 40  It is not unusual for enforcement agencies, for example, to publicize 
investigations, complaints, or successful settlements or judgments. In 1973, the 
Conference encouraged agencies not to use publicity when it is “excessive or it serves no 
31 Inventors’ Rights Act of 1999, codified at 35 U.S.C. 297(d). PTO’s implementing regulations are at 
37 C.F.R. § 4.1.  
32 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1394. 
33 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1379 (citing SEC Office of Inspector Gen., Report of Investigation No. OIG-
534: Allegations of Improper Coordination Between the SEC and Other Governmental Entities Concerning 
the SEC’s Enforcement Action Against Goldman Sachs & Co. 62 (Sep. 30, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/oig-534.pdf; FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 
12,436, 12,439 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2)). 
34 Interview with Officials in the FTC’s Office of Public Affairs (May 27, 2015); Interview with 
Jennifer Howard, Assistant Director, CFPB Office of Communications (May 28, 2015); Interview with 
Heidi Rebello, Acting Assistant Commissioner for Media Affairs, FDA Office of External Affairs (August 
5, 2015).  
35 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1383.  
36 Id.; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1379. 
37 James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s Expanded Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact 
Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 836 (2002); Lars Noah, Administrative 
Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 874. 
38 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1406, n.107. 
39 Gellhorn, Noah, and I all pursue this issue. See Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1398-1401; Noah, supra 
note 37, at 876; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1379. 
40 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1379; Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1398-99 (citing the EEOC as an early 
example, which has a “broad mandate and limited enforcement powers”). 
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authorized agency purpose.” 41  As I discuss below, 42  modern agencies may still find 
publicity to be efficient and attractive compared to other, more formal actions. 
 
C.  Problematic Publicity 
 
Recommendation 73-1 observed that “adverse agency publicity is undesirable when it is 
erroneous, misleading or excessive or it serves no authorized agency purpose.” 43 
Gellhorn documented extensively these problems in his 1973 report, and my 2011 article 
found that many of the same problems remain.44 The core problems fall into four general 
categories. 
 
1. Premature Publicity 
 
Publicity can be premature, such as when an agency publicizes that it has begun 
investigating a party without also clarifying that the allegations have not been proven or 
fully adjudicated. Since 1973, numerous parties have sued agencies for publicizing 
investigations or complaints (though none of the suits have been successful).45  
 
Congressional statutes and White House directives have not been consistent on whether 
agencies should publicize investigations and complaints. On one hand, Congress has 
specifically authorized agencies to publicize complaints against certain parties, 46 and 
recent “open government” initiatives by the White House have led several agencies to 
create online databases of consumer complaints. 47  On the other hand, Congress has 
banned other agencies from publicizing their investigations because it decided that 
publicity in those circumstances may be premature and unfair.48 
 
Second, many agencies must also alert the public to health or consumer risks in the face 
of incomplete information and scientific uncertainty. But even these announcements can 
be premature.49 For example, in 2008 the FDA and Centers for Disease Control and 
41 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1(a); 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973).  
42 See Part III.B.1, infra (“More Agency Incentives to Use Adverse Publicity”). 
43 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1(a); 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
44 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1380-88. 
45 In Appendix C (Table of Federal Cases, 1974-2014), see Wilson v. McHugh, 842 F. Supp. 2d 310 
(D.D.C. 2012); Barry v. SEC, 2012 WL 760456 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 
357 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2004); Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 833 (S.D. Tex. 2000); FTC v. Freecom 
Comm., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Utah 1997); First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. SEC, 553 F. Supp. 205 
(D.N.J. 1982); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1980 WL 108 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Trans World Accounts, Inc. 
v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Relco, Inc. v. CPSC, 391 F. Supp. 841 (S.D. Tex. 
1975). 
46 The Inventors’ Rights Act of 1999 authorizes the PTO to publicize complaints against invention 
submission promoters. 
47 See Part II.D.5, infra (describing the CFPB’s database of consumer complaints against certain 
consumer finance companies, and OSHA’s proposal to publish workplace injury records). 
48 The Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits the FEC from publicizing investigations for campaign 
finance violations. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a); see also Common Cause v. FEC, 83 F.R.D. 410, 411 (D.D.C. 1979) 
(citing the legislative history to 2 U.S.C. § 437). 
49 Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), Conference Recommendation 73-1 ¶ 3 
(adopted June 8, 1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 16,389 (Jun. 27, 1973); 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1 (recommending that 
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Prevention (CDC) incorrectly identified tomatoes as the source of a salmonella outbreak, 
costing the tomato industry an estimated $200 million.50 More broadly, my 2011 article 
surveyed 1,542 FDA “press announcements” released between 2004 and 2010, finding 
that 74% of the announcements that identified a specific product or party and were 
adverse in some way also announced a pending or preliminary determination. 
Undoubtedly, many of these announcements were necessary to protect public health, and 
agencies like FDA should not be deterred from warning the public. But because 
premature publicity can be incredibly damaging, it is worth considering procedural 
protections that limit the risk of premature publicity. 
 
2. Excessive Publicity 
 
Publicity can be excessive when an agency uses unnecessary or pejorative language, or 
goes beyond factual reporting. The most commonly cited example is the infamous 1959 
press conference during which the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW, 
the precursor to HHS) warned the public to not eat potentially-carcinogenic cranberries, 
punctuating the statement by noting that he, personally, would be avoiding cranberries 
that Thanksgiving. 51  The Secretary failed to clarify that only cranberries from 
Washington and Oregon might be unsafe, costing the industry $21.5 million in lost 
surplus that year$8.5 million of which was indemnified by a private bill in Congress.52 
 
Recommendation 73-1 directed agencies to limit adverse publicity to factual content that 
is accurate and does not contain disparaging terminology.53  
 
3. Publicity as a Sanction 
 
There is also a long history of agencies using publicity to punish or pressure alleged 
regulatory violators. 54  Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has suggested repeatedly that agency 
publicity is only reviewable under the APA if it is intended to penalize or sanction the 
target, or is false. 55  The legislative history to the APA includes a House Report 
suggesting that the unauthorized use of adverse publicity as a sanction was viewed as a 
adverse publicity, except in certain limited circumstances described in paragraph 2, “should issue only after 
the agency has taken reasonable precautions to assure that the information stated is accurate and that the 
publicity fulfills an authorized purpose.”). 
50 Denis G. Maki, Coming to Grips with Foodborne InfectionPeanut Butter, Peppers, and 
Nationwide Salmonella Outbreaks, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949 (2009). 
51 Gellhorn, supra note 7. 
52 Id. at 1409-10 n.118. 
53 Recommendation 73-1, supra note 2, at ¶ 1. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973), codified at 1 C.F.R. 
§ 305.73-1(a).  
54 The example cited in a 1941 report of the Attorney General’s Commission on Administrative 
Procedures alleged that the Federal Alcohol Administration abused its power by threatening to issue 
adverse publicity as an extra-legal sanction “even when the validity of its dictates was not free from doubt.” 
FINAL REPORT OF THE ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM’N ON ADMIN. PROCEDURES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 135 (1941). 
Lars Noah also examined the use of publicity as an extra-statutory tactic.  See Noah, supra note 37. 
55 See, e.g., Industrial Safety Equipment Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
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“troublesome subject” at the time.56 In several cases, parties have alleged that an agency 
used publicity to sanction them,57 but courts have yet to sustain such a challenge.  
 
Despite the dearth of published judicial opinions on this issue, there are several notable 
examples of agency publicity causing significant damage. In 2003, the FDA publicly 
reprimanded a company for misrepresenting the benefits and risks of its cancer drug, but 
did not inform the company of its objections before publishing them.58 The company’s 
stock price reportedly dropped 25% within hours of trading.59 The 1959 cranberry scare 
cost the industry $21.5 million, and became known throughout the industry as “Black 
Monday.” 60 More recent incidents have been even more costly. In 2008, the tomato 
industry lost $200 million after press releases by the FDA and CDC incorrectly identified 
tomatoes rather than peppers as the source of a salmonella outbreak.61 Publicly available 
documents suggest that the FDA and CDC were simply responding to a public health 
crisis without intending to sanction the industry. Nevertheless, the episode demonstrates 
that the damage from agency publicity can be unavoidably indeterminate and almost 
impossible to calibrate.  
 
Because it is difficult to determine agency motivations, it is important that agencies not 
devise novel uses for press releases beyond what is contemplated by statute.62  
 
4. Inaccurate Publicity 
 
Finally, agency announcements can be problematic when they are inaccurate, as 
demonstrated by the 2008 FDA and CDC salmonella press releases,63 or by the series of 
inaccurate product safety warnings by the CPSC that led Congress to amend the 
Consumer Product Safety Act in 1981.64 Recommendation 73-1 urged agencies to issue 
retractions or corrections in such cases. 65  In judicial challenges to agency publicity, 
56 H.Rep. No. 79-1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (House of Representatives Report on the APA). 
57 Barry v. SEC, 2012 WL 760456 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 
2005); Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2004); Industrial Safety Equipment 
Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
58 FDA, Talk Paper T03-18: FDA Warns Public About Misrepresentations in Marketing Claims About 
Drug to Treat Cancer (Mar. 14, 2003). Typically, before the FDA publishes a Warning Letter or similar 
public notice of alleged regulatory violations, the FDA will contact the party privately to offer a chance to 
come into compliance. The lack of prior notice may increase the punitive impact of adverse publicity, or 
perhaps reveal the agency’s punitive intent. 
59 William W. Vodra, Nathan G. Cortez, & David E. Korn, The Food and Drug Administration’s 
Evolving Regulation of Press Releases: Limits and Challenges, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 249 (2006); 
FDA Responds in Kind to SuperGen: Talk Paper Answers Press Release, “THE PINK SHEET,” Mar. 17, 
2003, at 7. 
60 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1408, 1409-10, n.118. 
61 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1381-82; Denis G. Maki, Coming to Grips with Foodborne 
InfectionPeanut Butter, Peppers, and Nationwide Salmonella Outbreak, 360 N. ENG. J. MED. 949 (2009). 
62 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1383, 1419-20. 
63 Maki, supra note 61. 
64 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 703 (1981) (amending the 
Consumer Product Safety Act); see also James T. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites: Exploring 
Remedies for Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 542-43 (2003). 
65 Recommendation 73-1, supra note 1, at ¶ 5. 
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parties often argue that the announcements were inaccurate, perhaps encouraged by the 
D.C. Circuit’s suggestion in Industrial Safety Equipment that agency publicity might be 
reviewable if it is false. 66  Nevertheless, in several cases evaluating the accuracy of 
agency press releases, courts largely find them to be truthful and not misleading. 67 
Moreover, my review of agency practices finds that agencies in general are very careful 
to ensure the accuracy of their announcements, and that most inaccuracies seem to result 
from good faith mistakes by agencies that must inform or warn the public with imperfect 
information. Still, such mistakes can be particularly costly. 
 
D.  Recommendation 73-1 
 
In light of such concerns, the Conference recommended in 1973 that agencies publish 
written rules that contain minimum standards for issuing publicity, and that such rules 
apply to “investigatory, rulemaking and agency adjudicatory processes as well as 
informal agency actions.”68 In adopting such rules, the Conference recommended that 
“each agency should balance the need for adequately serving the public interest and the 
need for adequately protecting persons affected by adverse agency publicity.” 69  The 
Conference recommended five standards: 
 
1. Content standards. The Conference recommended that agency announcements be 
factual and accurate, and avoid using “disparaging terminology.”70 
 
2. Investigations, complaints, and other preliminary actions. The Conference 
recommended that agencies issue publicity announcing investigations or pending trial-
type proceedings only in limited circumstances, and according to three criteria. First, 
agencies should use publicity to warn the public of a significant risk to public health or 
substantial economic harm, unless the party responsible immediately discontinues the 
offending practice. 71  Second, agencies should announce preliminary actions when 
necessary to notify parties that might be affected or desire to participate in the proceeding. 
And third, agencies should announce preliminary actions when the information is already 
available to the public or subject to media publicity and the agency’s purpose is to “foster 
agency efficiency, public understanding, or the accuracy of news coverage.”72 
 
3. Authorized purpose. The Conference also recommended that announcements that do 
not qualify under the three criteria above “should issue only after the agency has taken 
66 Industrial Safety Equipment Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
67 See, e.g., Harkonen v. Dep’t of Justice, 2012 WL 6019571 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Wilson v. McHugh, 
842 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.D.C. 2012); United States v. 52,823 Children’s Dolls, More or Less, 1989 WL 
140250 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
68 Recommendation 73-1, supra note 1. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. Note, however, that this specific recommendation was criticized as a form of back-room 
blackmail, viewed unfavorably after the Watergate scandal. See, e.g., Stanley E. Cohen, Curbs on 
Regulatory Press Releases – Would They Hurt or Help Businesses?, ADVERTISING AGE (June 18, 1973) (on 
file with ACUS).  
72 Recommendation 73-1, supra note 1. 
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reasonable precautions to assure that the information stated is accurate and that the 
publicity fulfills an authorized purpose.”73  
 
4. Advanced notice. The Conference recommended that agencies should “prominently” 
disclose when the information in agency publicity has a limited basis. Moreover, 
respondents or prospective respondents in agency actions should be given advanced 
notice of agency publicity and a reasonable opportunity to prepare a response “if 
practicable and consistent with the nature of the proceeding.”74  
 
5. Corrections and retractions. Finally, the Conference recommended that any person 
named in an agency announcement that is “shown to be erroneous or misleading” should 
be allowed to request a correction or retraction, and that such correction or retraction be 
issued “in the same manner (or as close thereto as feasible) as that by which the original 
publicity was disseminated.”75  
 
These five standards, occupying less than a page in the Federal Register, represented a 
much narrower version of the detailed standards recommended by Professor Gellhorn in 
his report and accompanying law review articlewhich recommended, among other 
things, judicial review and several statutory amendments. 76  Nevertheless, these five 
standards were not widely implemented by agencies. 
 
E.  Implementation of Recommendation 73-1 
 
Less than a month after the Conference adopted Recommendation 73-1, ACUS Chairman 
Antonin Scalia defended it against criticisms in the media, writing: 
 
[I]t has always seemed to me the most valuable role of wise men to counsel that 
side of a difficult issue that is currently ignored in the heat of popular concern…. 
If there is such a thing as news suppression, there is also such a thing as “trial by 
press release.”77 
 
Only the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) 
and SEC promulgated regulations in response to Recommendation 73-1.78 Nine other 
agencies took the position that, though they had not adopted formal rules implementing 
the recommendation, they felt that their procedures embodied the spirit of the 
recommendation.  For instance, the FTC pointed to its 1972 Public Information Policy 




76 See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 7. 
77 Letter from Antonin Scalia to Editor, Advertising Age, of June 29, 1973. 
78 Letter from John N. Nassikas, Federal Power Commission Chairman, to Antonin Scalia, ACUS 
Chairman, of Sep. 24, 1973 (on file with ACUS); Letter from Philip A. Loomis, Jr., SEC Commissioner, to 
John F. Cushman, ACUS Executive Director, of Jul. 22, 1974 (on file with ACUS). 
79 Letter from Charles A. Tobin, FTC Secretary, to Antonin Scalia, ACUS Chairman, of Jan. 8, 1974 
(on file with ACUS). 
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inquiry, EPA stated that its informal procedure was adequate in dealing with the concerns 
of the Recommendation but said it would not incorporate the principles of the 
Recommendation in its published regulation;80 the NRC opposed the recommendation 
that agencies balance public and private interests before publicity is released.81 
 
Implementation by twelve additional agencies either was undetermined or not applicable, 
the latter because the agencies did not issue adverse publicity. 82 The CPSC and ITC 
reported in that they were drafting rules to implement the recommendation,83 although 
Congress in 1982 addressed CPSC publicity practices by statute,84 which the CPSC then 
implemented by rule.85  
 
Both the FDA and its then parent agency (HEW) initially disputed parts of 
Recommendation 73-1, but HEW subsequently promulgated a rule titled Release of 
Adverse Information to News Media in 1976,86 and the FDA proposed its own rule in 
197787 (although it was never finalized).88 Today, FDA generally follows the HHS rule 
originally promulgated by HEW.89  
 
The three case studies below demonstrate that agencies generally follow the principles of 
balance and fairness embodied in Recommendation 73-1, though perhaps not the full 
contours of the recommendation. 
 
III.  MODERN PUBLICITY 
 
Contemporary agency “publicity” seems to be much more voluminous and varied than in 
1973. Although agencies continue to issue press releases and other traditional forms of 
publicity, agencies now rely heavily on modern modes of communication, virtually all 
related to Internet platforms. Indeed, a primary motivation for revisiting 
Recommendation 73-1 and Professor Gellhorn’s work was to reexamine the issues raised 
by agency publicity in light of modern modes of communication. 
 
My research finds that in the four decades since Recommendation 73-1, five interrelated 
developments may compound the potential problems with agency publicity: (1) modern 
80 Letter from Robert V. Zener, EPA Acting Deputy General Counsel, to Antonin Scalia, ACUS 
Chairman, of Oct. 2, 1973 (on file with ACUS). 
81 Letter from James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission, to John F. Cushman, 
ACUS Executive Director, of Apr. 13, 1973 (on file with ACUS). 
82 Correspondence on file with ACUS.  
83 Letter from Michael A. Brown, CPSC Acting General Counsel, to Antonin Scalia, ACUS Chairman, 
of Sep. 12, 1973 (on file with ACUS). 
84 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b). 
85 16 C.F.R. part 1101. 
86 HEW, Release of Information to News Media, 41 Fed. Reg. 2 (Jan. 2, 1976), codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
17. 
87 FDA, Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,440-41 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).  
88 FDA, Withdrawal of Certain Pre-1986 Proposed Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440, 67,446 (Dec. 30, 1991). 
89 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34; James T. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration § 
22.41 (3d ed. 2010). 
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agencies have many more ways to issue publicity and disseminate information than in the 
1970s; (2) modern agencies likely have even more incentives now to use information as a 
regulatory tool and eschew more formal enforcement actions; (3) new media make it 
easier for audiences to misinterpret or mischaracterize agency announcements; (4) hyper-
responsive capital markets now process agency announcements more swiftly and perhaps 
more hastily, multiplying the potential damage; and (5) Congress and the White House 
have specifically considered some agency publication practices, particularly through the 
Information Quality Act (IQA). This part considers these five developments in turn. 
 
A.  More Ways to Issue Publicity 
 
For at least the last 15 years, modern agencies have relied heavily on their web sites to 
disseminate information to the public. More recently, agencies also have begun to use 
social media services like Twitter to communicate with the public. And, perhaps even 
more recently, agencies have begun to publish large online databases on their web sites, 
making large swaths of potentially adverse information about private parties available in 
public, searchable, sortable, and machine-readable formats. These three practices raise 
many of the same issues as traditional publicity, as well as some novel ones. Today, 
many agencies seem to use online information disclosure not just to increase government 
transparency, but to pursue regulatory aims.90 As a former General Counsel for the EPA 
explained, “Information … can be a supplement, sometimes even an alternative, to 
regulation. When broadly available, information can change behavior.”91 
 
1. Agency Websites 
 
The most significant point of departure from 1973 is that virtually all modern agencies 
operate their own web sites, 92  which endow agencies with a platform to publish 
information about the thousands of actions or decisions they make each week. 93 For 
example, agency web sites often publish licensing applications, company reports, product 
complaints, notices of alleged violations (and company responses), documents obtained 
during agency investigations, settlement agreements, and other potentially negative 
information that identifies a specific product or company.94 In fact, press releases and 
other traditional announcements by agencies may represent a small fraction of the 
adverse information that an agency publishes.95 The information published may come 
from regulated parties, competitors, consumers, or from the government itself.96 Agency 
90 James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality ActAntiregulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions? 
12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 527 (2002-03). 
91 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 36 (July/August 1998); Conrad, 
supra note 90, at 527. 
92 The federal government website, USA.gov, lists a master index of U.S. government departments and 
agencies, with links to their web sites. USA.gov, A-Z Index of U.S. Government Departments and 
Agencies, http://www.usa.gov/directory/federal/ (last visited June 10, 2015); Conrad, supra note 90, at 526. 
93 James O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites: Exploring Remedies for Federal Internet 
Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 508 (2003). 
94 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1392-93. 
95 Id. at 1393; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, at 507. 
96 Conrad, supra note 90, at 528-29. 
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web sites thus allow regulators to “publish a staggering amount of freestanding 
information about companies that is not disclosed as part of rulemaking.” 97  As one 
observer notes, “[v]irtually all new documents released publicly by federal agencies, and 
many historic documents, are now available on their web sites.” 98  Not all of this 
information is actively publicized by agencies in the way that a traditional press release 
would be publicized, and agencies seem to draw public attention to these materials to 
varying degrees. Thus, it can be hard to generalize about information agencies post online. 
 
As commonplace as agency web sites are today, two statutes helped move the trend. In 
1996, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments required agencies to 
create “electronic reading rooms” to make public important documents, including those 
frequently requested or likely to be requested by FOIA. 99  And in 2002, the E-
Government Act required agencies to solicit and accept public comments online during 
rulemaking. 100 Agencies have been further encouraged to use their web sites by the 
Obama Administration. The day after President Obama took office in 2009, he published 
a Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, calling for the heads of 
departments and agencies to “harness new technologies to put information about their 
decisions online and readily available to the public.”101 Thus, agency use of web sites is a 
well-entrenched and probably underexamined phenomenon.102 
 
2. Social Media 
 
Second, modern agencies have embraced social media to communicate with the public. 
Some of the more frequently used platforms are Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr. 
For example, the EPA’s main web page features a “Connect with EPA” section, which 
includes links to the agency’s blogs, Twitter profiles, Facebook pages, YouTube page, 
Flickr stream, and Pinterest page.103 A page displaying all EPA social media includes 34 
unique Twitter accounts, 31 Facebook profiles, nine blogs, two discussion forums, one 
YouTube channel, one Flickr photo stream, one Google+ profile, one Instagram feed, one 
Foursquare page, and links to EPA podcasts and RSS feeds.104 Other agencies also have 
multiple profiles with services like Twitter and Facebook.105 By contrast, a newer agency 
like the CFPB has comparatively fewer social media pages.106 
97 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1392 (citing Conrad, supra note 90, at 526). 
98 Conrad, supra note 90, at 527. 
99 Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552; Cortez, supra note 7, at 
1392. 
100 Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 206, 116 Stat. 2899, 2915-16 (2002). 
101 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 8. Note that later, the Obama 
Administration limited the scope of this directive to executive agencies rather than independent agencies. 
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
102 A few scholars, notably James O’Reilly, have written on agency use of web sites. See, e.g., 
O’Reilly, supra note 64; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Web Sites, supra note 37; Conrad, supra note 90; 
Cortez, supra note 7. 
103 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov (last visited Dec. 15, 2014). This page 
does not include a link to the EPA’s Pinterest page (https://www.pinterest.com/epagov/).  
104 EPA, Social Media, http://www2.epa.gov/home/social-media.  
105 See, e.g., FDA, Interactive Media, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/InteractiveMedia/default.htm 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2014); FTC, Stay Connected, https://www.ftc.gov/stay-connected (last visited Dec. 15, 
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Social media differ in important ways from traditional print and broadcast media. For 
example, they are much more interactive and generally produce information in much 
shorter bursts. Twitter, for example, is famous for its 140-character (not word) limit. 
Social media platforms also tend to encourage users to rely on images and short videos 
rather than long text-based documents. These features seem designed to maximize quick 
consumption and wide disseminationencouraging users to forward, share, repost, 
retweet, and “like” posts. As such, agency social media announcements tend to be highly 
condensed, with less room to explain the nuance of complex regulatory actions. 107 
Although most social media allow links to full text documents, it is not clear how 
frequently readers follow these links.  
 
Another departure point for social media is the volume and variety of platforms. The 
federal web site USA.gov lists 21 different social media services used by the federal 
government.108 And many of these services perform very different functions. Flickr is a 
photo-sharing service.109 Foursquare is a map-based social network.110 YouTube hosts 
videos.111 Instagram is a photo-based social network.112 Disqus is an online discussion 
feature added to web pages.113 Although not all of these services are used to publish 
adverse information, some of them are. For example, many agencies use Twitter to 
announce enforcement actions, product recalls, and other alerts.114 Social media allow 
agencies to communicate with the public more quickly and more casually than ever.115 
 
3. Agency Databases 
 
A third new tool for agencies since 1973 is the use of searchable online databases. 
2014);  
106 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (under “Stay Connected” 
heading, listing just one profile under Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr) (last visited Dec. 15, 2014). 
Note, however, that the CFPB’s Office of Servicemember Affairs maintains its own Twitter and Facebook 
accounts. See CFPB, Office of Servicemember Affairs, Information for Servicemembers, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/servicemembers/ (last visited Sep. 9, 2015) (listed under “Connect with 
Us”). 
107 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1394. 
108 The federal web site USA.gov lists the following 21 social media services used by the federal 
government: Blip; Disqus; Facebook; Flickr; Foursquare; Github; Google+; IdeaScale; LinkedIn; Meetup; 
Myspace; Posterous; Scribd; Slideshare; Socrata; Tumblr; Twitter; Uservoice; Ustream; Vimeo; and 
Youtube. USA.gov, Federal Government Social Media Registry, https://www.usa.gov/verify-social-media 
(last visited July 28, 2015). 
109 FDA, Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/photos/fdaphotos/.  
110 EPA, Foursquare, http://foursquare.com/epagov.  
111 CFPB, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/user/cfpbvideo.  
112 U.S. Department of Labor, Instagram, http://instagram.com/USDOL.  
113 Disqus, http://disqus.com/.  
114 In July 2010, the SEC tweeted that Goldman Sachs had agreed to pay $550 million to settle charges 
against it, with a link to the SEC press release. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 
Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (Jul. 15, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm. The FDA has several Twitter feeds dedicated to recalls 
of drugs, devices, and tobacco products. Cortez, supra note 7, at 1394. 
115 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1394. 
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Federal agencies now maintain perhaps thousands of searchable online databasesan 
undetermined portion of which contain potentially negative information about named 
products or parties. The precise number of such databases is not clear. The General 
Services Administration (GSA) runs the federal web site Data.gov, which links to many 
of these databases. Currently, Data.gov lists 174 different federal, state, and local public 
organizations that publish “datasets” online.116 And many of these organizations publish 
hundreds of datasets each. For example, the Department of Homeland Security is credited 
with 312 datasets, while the Department of Education is credited with 277 datasets.117 
Other agencies, like the CFPB, are credited with very few datasets, although they are 
high-profile ones.118 
 
The databases of concern to this project are those that contain potentially negative 
information about an identified private product, person, or firm. Appendix E highlights 
some of the more notable agency databases of this sort, explaining their purpose(s), any 
statutory authorization they can claim, and any relevant litigation. For example, the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) publishes databases with quality 
ratings of Medicare physicians, hospitals, and nursing homes, including rates of 
complications and death, and aggregated patient surveys. 119  The CFPB publishes 
consumer complaints against banks and other financial institutions, with detailed 
information about the nature of the complaint and the company’s response.120 The CPSC 
publishes a searchable database of product safety problems and recalls,121 while the FDA 
publishes similar databases containing reports of safety problems with drugs and medical 
devices.122 As Appendix E shows, several agencies now operate such databases. And 
more are planned. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) proposes 
to publish workplace injury records online.123  
 
The use of databases as a regulatory toolto change behavioris not entirely new. Their 
use may date back to 1986, when Congress required the EPA to establish a Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) to track chemical releases by facilities nationwide.124 The Act required 
116 Data.gov, Organizations, http://catalog.data.gov/organization (last visited June 11, 2015). Note that 
the list of datasets seems to be incomplete, as it excludes datasets from agencies like the FDA, which 
publishes multiple adverse event product databases. See Appendix E: Sample of Agency Databases. 
117 Id. (last visited June 11, 2015). 
118 Data.gov, Organizations, CFPB, http://catalog.data.gov/organization/cfpb-gov (last visited June 11, 
2015). 
119 See, e.g., Medicare.gov, Hospital Compare, http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/search.html 
(last visited June 11, 2015). 
120 CFPB, Consumer Complaint Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/. See 
also Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall, & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the 
CFPB’s Consumer Complaints (draft), http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/CFPB%20paper%20v10.pdf.  
121 CPSC, SaferProducts.gov, http://www.saferproducts.gov/Default.aspx (last visited June 11, 2015). 
122 See, e.g., FDA, Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) Database, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/ReportingA
dverseEvents/ucm127891.htm.  
123 Jenna Greene, OSHA’s Proposed Database Draws Fire, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202639865807/OSHA's-Proposed-Database-Draws-Fire. 
124 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499 Subtitle A, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050. 
 18  
                                                 
the EPA to maintain the information “in a computer data base … accessible to any 
person.” 125  TRI has been applauded for having a “significant impact on firm-level 
emissions” and inspiring similar disclosure efforts in the United States and globally.126  
 
Interest in using databases for regulatory ends was renewed by the Obama Administration, 
which has pushed “open government,” “smart disclosure,” and “open data” initiatives.127 
One of President Obama first’s official acts in office was to direct executive departments 
and agencies to “harness new technologies to put information about their decisions online 
and readily available to the public.” 128 The site Data.gov both is a product of these 
initiatives and showcases their massive scope. 
 
Agencies’ widespread use of databases may blur the traditional distinction between 
“actively” publicizing negative information and “passively” releasing it. 
Recommendation 73-1 was careful to distinguish agency statements that “invite public 
attention … from the mere decision to make records available to the public rather than 
preserve their confidentiality,”129 as those decisions are governed by FOIA. Similarly, my 
2011 article purposefully excluded “reverse FOIA” cases in which private parties sued to 
prevent agencies from releasing certain information.130 Although my article observed that 
the distinction between active publicity and more passively releasing information was a 
less meaningful one than in 1973, 131  I found that most courts conclude that FOIA 
responses by agencies do not carry the same “government imprimatur on the document” 
as affirmative statements by agencies.132 However, in a recent case, a district court found 
that a product safety report posted in the CPSC’s SaferProducts.gov database “bears the 
Government’s stamp of approval through its publication on an official website that, by its 
terms, is a repository of reports regarding ‘unsafe products.’”133 The court sustained the 
anonymous company’s challenge, finding that posting a “materially inaccurate” report on 
SaferProducts.gov was not only “final agency action” under the APA, but also arbitrary 
and capricious and in violation of the CPSC’s own database regulations.134  
 
125 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j); Conrad, supra note 90, at 527. 
126 Mark A. Cohen & W. Kip Viscusi, The Role of Information Disclosure in Climate Mitigation Policy, 
3 (4) CLIMATE CHANGE ECON. 1250020-1, 1250020-2 (2012); Interview with Sean Moulton & Scott 
Klinger, supra note 16. 
127 See, e.g., Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 8; Executive Office of 
the President, National Science and Technology Council, Smart Disclosure and Consumer Decisionmaking: 
Report of the Task Force on Smart Disclosure (May 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/report_of_the_task_force_on_smart_disclosu
re.pdf.  
128 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 8. Note that later, the Obama 
Administration limited the scope of this directive to executive agencies rather than independent agencies. 
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
129 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1(a); 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
130 Cortez, supra, note 7, at 1439. 
131 Id.  
132 Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 585 F.2d 1382, 1388 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the 
Consumer Product Safety Act’s disclosure procedures did not apply to proactive disclosures pursuant to 
FOIA requests). 
133 Company Doe v. Tenenbaum, 900 F. Supp. 2d 572, 597 (D. Md. 2012). 
134 Id. 
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An important point is that different agency databases may be populated by different data 
sources, 135  requiring different standards. For example, there is a reduced risk of 
publishing inaccurate information if it comes directly from the party identified, as in the 
case of the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). In contrast, the CFPB’s Consumer 
Complaint Database includes information reported by consumers, which is sometimes 
disputed by companies. As such, the CFPB gives the companies identified in complaints 
the opportunity to verify a commercial relationship with the complainant and publish a 
response.136 Other databases include information generated by agencies as part of their 
regulatory responsibilities. For example, OSHA maintains a database of agency 
enforcement inspections, searchable by establishment.137 Similarly, the FDA maintains a 
database of Warning Letters, searchable by company, subject, and the like. 138 
Information in these databases also is often preliminary and/or disputed. Finally, some 
databases compile information from a variety of sources. Medicare’s Physician Compare, 
Hospital Compare, and Nursing Home Compare web sites allow users to sift through a 
massive, searchable database of publicly- and privately-generated information about 
Medicare providers.139 In short, although the traditional problems with agency publicity 
apply to agency databases, mitigating these problems may require responses that are 
highly tailored depending on the type of database. 
 
Perhaps a model for operating modern agency databases is the CPSC’s site, 
SaferProducts.gov, which features a searchable database of consumer product safety 
incident reports.140 In 2008, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement 
Act,141 which required the CPSC to establish on its web site a searchable product safety 
database.142 The Act required the database to include “reports of harm relating to the use 
of consumer products” as reported by consumers, state and local governments, and by 
other parties. 143  Each report must describe the product or substance, identify the 
manufacturer or labeler, describe the harm relating to the product or substance, and report 
any corrective actions taken.144 The statute requires the Commission to “provide clear 
and conspicuous notice to users of the database that the Commission does not guarantee 
the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the contents of the database.”145 The statute 
135 See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 90, at 528. 
136 See, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Part IV.C, infra. 
137 OSHA, Establishment Search Page, https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.html (last visited 
June 12, 2015); Conrad, supra note 90, at 528. 
138 FDA, Warning Letters, 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last visited June 12, 2015). 
139 See Appendix E: Samples of Agency Databases. 
140 Search Recalls and Reports, http://www.saferproducts.gov/Search/default.aspx (last visited 
September 18, 2015)  
141 Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
142 CPSIA § 212; 15 U.S.C. § 2055a. 
143 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(1)(A).  
144 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b). 
145 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5). The web site (SaferProducts.gov) includes a disclaimer that “CPSC does 
not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the contents of the Publicly Available Consumer 
Product Safety Information Database on SaferProducts.gov, particularly with respect to information 
submitted by people outside of CPSC.” See SaferProducts.gov, http://www.saferproducts.gov (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2014). Note that the court in Company Doe v. Tenenbaum called this “boilerplate” that “would not 
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also includes procedural requirements. For example, the Commission “shall” provide 
manufacturers or labelers the chance to comment on reports, and request that these 
comments be included in the report. 146  It also requires the Commission to consider 
objections that the information in a report is “materially inaccurate,” though the Act 
allows the Commission to determine when information meets that standard. 147  In 
implementing regulations, the Commission defines “materially inaccurate” information 
as information “that is false or misleading, and which is so substantial and important as to 
affect a reasonable consumer’s decision making about the product.”148 In 2012, as noted 
above, a federal court held that the Commission failed to follow its own regulations in 
posting “materially inaccurate” information on the site.149  
 
As agencies rely more on databases for regulatory purposes, SaferProducts.gov might 
serve as a model. The database is authorized by statute. The Commission takes pains to 
notify users that it does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of the information 
published. And there are clear standards and procedures, published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, that give companies the opportunity to comment on reports or object to them, 
guided by robust standards (“materially inaccurate”). 
 
B.  More Agency Incentives to Use Publicity 
 
Agencies today may have more incentives to rely on adverse publicity than agencies in 
the early 1970s. At that time, most agencies were beginning to rely more on rulemaking 
and less on case-by-case adjudication.150 As agencies began to use rulemaking to respond 
to problems of greater scope and complexity, the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches gradually imposed various procedural checks and balances on agency 
rulemaking, which progressively “ossified” the process and burdened rulemaking 
initiatives.151 Although agencies have long relied on informal methods beyond traditional 
rulemaking and adjudication, 152  the ossification of rulemaking and increasingly 
aggressive judicial review led agencies with finite resources and expanding 
interest an ordinary consumer.” 900 F. Supp. 2d at 598. 
146 15 U.S.C. § 2055(c)(2). 
147 15 U.S.C. § 2055(c)(4). 
148 16 C.F.R. § 1102.26(a)(1). 
149 Tenenbaum, 900 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D. Md. 2012). 
150 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1398-99 
(2004). 
151 There is quite a large literature on the ossification of rulemaking. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & 
David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety, (Harvard 1990); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: 
The Hard Look Doctrine and the Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 
1994 WIS. L. REV. 763; Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking OssificationA Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 
453 (1995); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 
(1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial 
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial 
Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61 (1997). 
152 Noah, supra note 37, at 874. 
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responsibilities to develop an arsenal of informal tools not specifically authorized by 
statute and not subject to judicial review.153  
 
Although much attention has been focused on agencies’ increased use of guidance 
documents,154 adverse publicity emerged as one of the most efficient and effective forms 
of extrastatutory “arm-twisting” that agencies could deploy.155 Even agencies with robust 
statutory enforcement authority find adverse publicity (or simply the threat of it) to be 
more effective than formal enforcement actions that typically require “cumbersome 
judicial proceedings.” 156  Thus, agencies struggling with resource constraints and/or 
increased regulatory burdens may find that issuing publicity is particularly convenient 
and effective compared to traditional statutory tools.157 
 
The basic calculus that makes publicity attractive to agencieslow marginal cost of 
publication and almost immediate benefits in the form of increased complianceremains 
applicable today. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, agencies continue to make 
announcements that raise objections from targets. One notable example is the Department 
of Education, which in 2014 published a list of 55 U.S. colleges and universities that it 
was investigating for inadequately handling sexual assault allegations.158 The Department 
emphasized that the comprehensive list represented a shift from earlier agency practices, 
when the Department would publicly confirm investigations but not publicize a list of 
them.159 The press release quotes a Department official “to make it clear that a college or 
university’s appearance on this list and being the subject of a Title IX investigation in no 
way indicates at this stage that the college or university is violating or has violated the 
law.” 160  Page views for the press release were “unprecedented” according to the 
Department, setting an all-time record for visits to the Department’s web site and social 
media views.161 Finally, in March 2015, the Department published a list of 556 colleges 
and universities that did not meet the Department’s “financial responsibility test,”162 
153 Id.at 875; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1391. 
154 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468-71 
(1992); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (2000); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398 (2007). Indeed, the House Committee on Government 
Reform investigated the use and potential abuse of guidance documents by agencies. COMM. ON GOV’T 
REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H. REP. NO. 106-1009 (2000). 
155 Noah, supra note 37, at 874. Noah defines “arm-twisting” as “a threat by an agency to impose a 
sanction or withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging ‘voluntary’ compliance with a request that the 
agency could not impose directly on a regulated entity.”  
156 Id.at 888-89; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1391-92. 
157 I posit that there is a connection between increased agency responsibilities under stagnant budgets 
and the use of relatively low-cost tools like adverse publicity. Testing the causal connection empirically, 
however, may be difficult without a control or a baseline. 
158 DOE, Press Release, U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions 
with Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations (May 1, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education-institutions-open-title-i (last visited June 
10, 2015); Michael Stratford, The Government’s New List, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 2, 2014).  
159 DOE, supra note 158. 
160 Id. (quoting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Catherine E. Lhamon). 
161 Stratford, supra note 158. 
162 Department of Education, Heightened Cash Monitoring, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-
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which raised objections that the Department was using a “shaming technique” and had 
publicly “accused innocent schools of violations and failed to correct its mistakes.”163 
(Note, importantly, that the Department had been criticized for keeping the list of 
colleges “secret” and may have been required to release the information under FOIA.164) 
The Undersecretary of Education responded that the potential risks to institutions were 
outweighed by the benefits of releasing the information to students and their families.165  
 
C.  More Opportunities to Misinterpret Publicity 
 
A third reason for updating Recommendation 73-1 is to consider how audiences consume 
modern agency publicity. My research found that newer forms of publicity are written, 
presented, and disseminated in a way that potentially increases the risk that audiences 
will misinterpret the agency’s announcement. 
 
To be sure, the traditional agency press releasedrafted carefully by public affairs 
professionals, vetted through various levels of agency and perhaps even legal review, and 
sent directly to a curated list of media recipientsstill seems to be standard practice at 
most agencies. 166 But even this traditional practice has been transformed by modern 
media. For example, in addition to sending a traditional press release to a list of recipients, 
an agency might also publish multiple versions on its web site and write very short blurbs 
about it on social media platforms. Again, the information release is more voluminous 
and varied than in 1973, increasing the risk that at least some important facts or nuances 
will be lost in translation somewhere along the way. 
 
Social media in particular increase the risk that audiences will misread, misunderstand, or 
mischaracterize agency announcements. Again, most social media are designed to 
generate information that can be consumed quickly and shared widely. The best example 
is Twitter, which limits each “tweet” to 140 characters, inclusive of characters used in 
hyperlinks. Thus, a tweet is more akin to a newspaper headline than the body of the 
article. For example, the SEC recently used its “SEC Enforcement” account on Twitter to 
announce an enforcement proceeding to its followers:167 
 
center/school/hcm (click on “List of Institutions on HCM as of March 1, 2015”) (last visited June 10, 2015). 
163 Claudio Sanchez, The Opposite of the Dean’s List, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/ed/2015/04/01/396681248/the-opposite-of-the-deans-list.  
164 See, e.g., Michael Stratford, U.S. Keeps Scrutiny of Risky Colleges Secret, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 
26, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/26/education-dept-keeps-secret-names-colleges-
found-be-risky-students-taxpayers.  
165 Id. (citing discussion with Undersecretary Ted Mitchell). 
166 Interview with Officials from FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34; Interview with Heidi 
Rebello, supra note 34; Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
167 SEC Enforcement, Twitter (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://twitter.com/SEC_Enforcement/status/544901298991419392 (“Admin Proceeding: Paul J. Pollack 
and Montgomery Street Research, LLC http://ow.ly/2SaAfb”).  
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The hyperlink loads a PDF document of a cease-and-desist order filed by the SEC 
alleging certain violations of the Securities Exchange Act. The 92-character 
announcement on Twitter displays the name of a person and his company 
prominently. The only context it gives is the phrase “Admin Proceeding,” which may 
not be familiar to many readers. However, being posted on the SEC Enforcement 
account, it is clear that Mr. Pollack and Montgomery Street Research are the targets 
of SEC enforcement, though the tweet itself does not clarify whether the charges have 
been proven or are contested. The post was “retweeted” once and “favorited” once by 
different Twitter users. There were 4,013 posts on the SEC Enforcement Twitter feed as 
of June 11, 2015, and my review of the last six months suggests that the vast majority 
were of this nature. 
 
Social media also make it very easy for users to repeat and share the information. Agency 
Twitter accounts often have thousands or even hundreds of thousands of followers, 
including reporters for the lay media and trade press. For example, the SEC Enforcement 
feed had 5,124 followers on June 11, 2015.168 But this was dwarfed by the EPA’s main 
Twitter account, which had roughly 251,000 followers as of December 16, 2014.169 
 
Another interesting problem not present in 1973 is the risk of audiences’ not 
understanding whether a federal agency owns a certain social media profile and thus is 
responsible for authoring its content. For example, my 2011 article found examples of 
private citizens creating profiles or pages with federal agency names on Facebook and 
Twitter.170 These services now verify accounts for public figures and institutions like 
federal agencies, usually by displaying a blue or green check mark. But non-government 
users still appear to be creating social media profiles for agencies.171 Twitter seems to be 
particularly problematic. The Twitter profile “@FDAWarning” appears to be run by a 
non-agency source.172 In fact, the federal web site USA.gov now offers a site that allows 
users to verify federal government social media accounts.173 It is not clear how many 
168 SEC Enforcement, Twitter, https://twitter.com/sec_enforcement (last visited June 11, 2015). 
169 See EPA, Twitter, https://twitter.com/epa (last visited Dec. 16, 2014). Of course, not all of these 
followers are human usersmany are automated accounts, or “Twitter bots.” See, e.g., Rob Dubbin, The 
Rise of Twitter Bots, NEW YORKER (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-rise-of-
twitter-bots.  
170 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1395 (finding a Facebook page for the FDA that was not being run by the 
FDA). 
171 For example, a recent search found a Facebook profile for the SEC that does not appear to be 
maintained by the SEC. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Facebook, 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/US-Securities-and-Exchange-Commission/109531262399131# (last 
visited Dec. 16, 2014). 
172 FDA Warning, Twitter, https://twitter.com/FDAWarning (last visited Dec. 16, 2014). 
173 USA.gov, Verify U.S. Federal Government Social Media Accounts, 
http://www.usa.gov/Contact/verify-social-media.shtml (last visited Dec. 16, 2014). 
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non-agency sources operate social media profiles with agency names in the title, and 
whether the followers, subscribers, or audience for these announcements appreciate the 
difference. 
 
My non-exhaustive review finds scattered policies governing social media practices, but 
most such policies are silent on potential problems caused by adverse agency publicity. 
The General Services Administration (GSA) runs a web site, www.digitalgov.gov, that 
serves as a resource for federal agencies operating web sites and social media accounts. 
The site includes a helpful and quite lengthy list of laws, regulations, and policies that 
govern “federal public web sites and digital services,” including FOIA, the IQA, and 
various OMB memoranda. 174 Although the GSA does not seem to impose any hard 
requirements on federal agenciesrelying instead of OMB directives and other 
sourcesit seems to be an appropriate vehicle for disseminating best practices. 
 
D.  Hyper-Responsive Capital Markets 
 
A fourth reason for updating Recommendation 73-1 is to reconsider agency publicity 
practices in light of modern capital markets. Internet-powered capital markets seem to 
respond more swiftly and perhaps more hastily to agency announcements, multiplying the 
magnitude for potential damage to company reputation and stock price, thus reducing 
agencies’ margin for error. As my 2011 article demonstrated, company stock prices 
respond rapidly to new information, regardless of whether that information is accurate or 
interpreted correctly.175 
 
Although instances of stock price drops in response to agency announcements rarely are 
reported in the media or subject to litigation, a few examples demonstrate the stakes. 
Perhaps the most notable recent example of capital markets over-responding to inaccurate 
information is the Bloomberg News fiasco with United Airlines. In 2008, Bloomberg’s 
financial news service mistakenly republished an old 2002 story announcing that United 
would be filing for bankruptcy.176 That day, United stock lost 76% of its value (roughly 
$1 billion) in just over thirty minutes before trading was suspended by NASDAQ.177 
Bloomberg had apparently relied on third-party content providers to find current news on 
publicly-traded companies, and one such provider had reposted the old 2002 story after 
174 DigitalGov, supra note 11. The site refers repeatedly to the May 2012 Digital Government Strategy 
released by the White House. Digital Government: Building a 21st Century Platform to Better Serve the 
American People, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/egov/digital-government/digital-
government.html (last visited June 11, 2015). 
175 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1396. The “efficient market hypothesis” (EMH) posits that securities prices 
rapidly reflect all available information without bias, meaning that stock prices rapidly respond to public 
information. Id., at 1397-98 (citing the EMH literature). Indeed, “event studies” use econometrics to 
measure how stock prices respond to certain events, such as corporate or legal announcements, or proposed 
regulatory actions. Id. at 1397-98 (citing Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: 
Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141, 144 (2002)). 
176 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1396. 
177 Id. (citing Frank Ahrens, 2002’s News, Yesterday’s Sell-Off, Wash. Post, Sep. 9, 2008, at A1; Carlos 
Carvalho, Nicholas Klagge, & Emanuel Moench, The Persistent Effects of a False News Shock: Fed. 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 374, at 1 (revised June 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408169).  
 25  
                                                 
searching for United on Google.178 Notably, Bloomberg posted a quick correction just 15 
minutes later.179 Although United stock largely rebounded, the news shock persisted for 
days as United stock traded lower than before the incident.180  
 
My research found some examples of stock price responses to agency announcements, 
although again, news reports seem to be rare. For example, one company lost 35% of its 
stock value a day after the FDA publicized manufacturing violations, leading the 
company to suspend manufacturing and lay off 350 employees.181 Another company lost 
25% of its stock value within hours of an FDA announcement that publicized the FDA’s 
objections to the company’s own press release.182 This announcement was notable in that 
the FDA reportedly did not notify the company of its objections beforehand and 
considered the approach a novel way to address industry conduct.183 Finally, Goldman 
Sachs suffered “the biggest one-day decline in its stock in over a year” after the SEC 
announced charges against the company,184 despite the SEC’s efforts to temper the media 
and market reaction by making the announcement on a Friday and combining it with a 
second announcement.185 
 
These incidents demonstrate that “the market apparently reacts to a headline as much as 
anything else.”186 Responding to this general problem, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) asked the SEC either to give it advanced notice of major enforcement 
announcements or announce them during non-trading hours, so as to minimize the news 
shock.187 But the SEC denied the request on the grounds that leaks might compromise the 
effort and that announcements with a major impact on trading would be rare.188 However, 
our research found at least one agency, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), with a policy that prohibits agency employees from releasing “market sensitive” 
informationinformation that “may have stock or bond market implications”unless 
properly authorized.189 The CMS “Employee Nondisclosure Policy” recommends that the 
178 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1396 (citing Ahrens, supra note 177). 
179 Id. (citing CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 177). 
180 Id. (citing CARVALHO ET AL., supra note 177). 
181 Id. at 1404 (citing James G. Dickinson, Publicity as Punishment, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC 
INDUSTRY 24 (Jan. 1992); O’REILLY, supra note 89, at § 22.42). 
182 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1404-05 (citing FDA, Talk Paper T03-18: FDA Warns Public About 
Misrepresentations in Marketing Claims About Drug to Treat Cancer (Mar. 14, 2003); William W. Vodra, 
Nathan G. Cortez, & David E. Korn, The Food and Drug Administration’s Evolving Regulation of Press 
Releases: Limits and Challenges, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 623, 649 (2006); FDA Responds in Kind to 
SuperGen: Talk Paper Answers Press Release, “THE PINK SHEET,” Mar. 17, 2003 at 7). 
183 Id. at 1404-05. 
184 Id. at 1424 (quoting SEC OIG, supra note 33, at 65). 
185 Id. (citing SEC OIG, supra note 33, at 49, 51, 55). 
186 Id. at 1396 (citing Ahrens, supra note 177). 
187 Id. at 1396-97 (citing SEC Office of Inspector Gen., Report of Investigation No. OIG-534: 
Allegations of Improper Coordination Between the SEC and Other Governmental Entities Concerning the 
SEC’s Enforcement Action Against Goldman Sachs & Co. 62 (Sep. 30, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/oig-534.pdf).  
188 Id. at 1397 n.151 (citing SEC OIG, supra note 33, at 65-71). 
189 Memorandum on Employee Nondisclosure Policy from James Webber, Director, Office of 
Operations Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to “All CMS Employees” of Sep. 7, 
2010 (on file with author). 
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even when properly authorized, release of market-sensitive information be performed 
only during non-trading hours to “err on the side of caution.”190  
 
Roughly a year later, media reports suggested that CMS had failed to adhere to this 
policy.191 In February 2011, CMS sent a memorandum during trading hours to roughly 
6,500 private insurers that operate Medicare Advantage Plans.192 The memo announced 
that CMS would rethink its plan to increase government audits of the Medicare payments 
to these insurers, which might result in massive repayments from the insurers to the 
government. Shortly after an investment analyst flagged the memo, stock prices for the 
publicly-traded companies shot up, creating billions in new equity for the companies.193 
CMS officials called the announcement “routine,” but the analyst emphasized that CMS 
rarely announces major changes outside of publishing proposed and final rules in the 
Federal Register.194 In the face of media scrutiny, a CMS spokesman defended the memo 
as a “standard communication,” noting that the agency “can’t control how people react to 
a memo like this.”195 This episode highlights, again, how quickly capital markets can 
react to agency announcements, and how even written agency policies like CMS’s may 
not prevent all lapses. Still, it is not clear how often stock prices change dramatically in 
response to agency announcements, as reports of such instances remain rare. 
 
E.  Information/Data Quality Act 
 
Finally, agency practices are also worth revisiting since 1973 in light of congressional 
action, particularly the Information Quality Act of 2001, sometimes referred to as the 
Data Quality Act.196 The Act required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to 
issue government-wide guidelines for “ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, 
utility, and integrity of information … disseminated by the government.” 197  It also 
required the OMB to “establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to 
seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency” 
that does not meet those standards. 198  In 2002, the OMB finalized guidelines 
190 Id. The 2010 memorandum discusses making disclosures during non-trading hours, but the attached 
CMS Employee Nondisclosure Policy is largely silent on this specific issue, focusing instead on employee 
disclosure of non-public information more generally. The CMS memorandum and policy came to light after 
the Center for Public Integrity sued CMS in 2014 for failing to respond to a FOIA request for documents 
relating to the Medicare Advantage Program. Complaint, Center for Public Integrity v. HHS, Civil Action 
No. 14-887 (D.D.C., May 27, 2014). 
191 Fred Schulte, How Medicare Advantage Investors Profited from Loose Government Lips, NPR 
NEWS (May 19, 2015). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. (quoting first a statement by CMS officials, and then the bank analyst that highlighted the CMS 
memo). 
195 Id. (quoting Aaron Albright from CMS). 
196 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001); 44 U.S.C. § 3516. 
197 Id. The Information Quality Act built on earlier requirements in the Paperwork Reduction Act that 
addressed information dissemination. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 
163, 168. 
198 Id. 
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implementing the Act,199 followed by agencies’ issuing their own guidelines.200 
 
However, since 2001 it has been unclear whether “press releases” and similar agency 
announcements are subject to the Information Quality Act and OMB guidelines. On one 
hand, the Act itself does not exempt press releases. The Act states broadly that the OMB 
guidelines should “apply to Federal agency dissemination of public information, 
regardless of the form or format in which such information is disseminated.”201 On the 
other hand, OMB’s final guidelines specifically exclude “press releases” from the 
definition of “dissemination” (defined broadly as “agency initiated or sponsored 
distribution of information to the public”).202 The exemption for “press releases” was not 
included in the OMB’s proposed guidelines; it first appeared in the OMB’s interim final 
guidelines, without explanation.203  
 
A further complication is that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
seemed to support individual agency guidelines that narrowed the OMB’s exemption for 
press releases to only those releases that are based on a precursor document that is itself 
subject to the Act.204 For example, the EPA’s guidelines exempt only press releases and 
other communications that announce or give public notice of information that EPA had 
already disseminated elsewhere.205 Similarly, OIRA seemed to view favorably a similar 
approach by HHS and FDA that exempts press releases from their Information Quality 
Act guidelines unless the press release contains new substantive information not covered 
by previous information dissemination subject to the Act.206 Several other agencies have 
drafted their own IQA guidelines to narrow the OMB’s exemption for “press releases.” 
Appendix G surveys 42 different agency IQA guidelines, finding that most agencies 
significantly narrow the OMB’s exemption for press releases in this way: 
 
Guidelines narrow the OMB’s exemption for press releases: 23 
Guidelines adopt the OMB’s broad exemption for press releases: 11 
Guidelines are unclear or do not address press releases directly: 5 
Guidelines conflict on whether the broad or narrow exemption applies:     3  
TOTAL 42 
 
199 66 Fed. Reg. 34489 (Jun. 28, 2001) (proposed guidelines); 66 Fed. Reg. 49718 (Sep. 28, 2001); 67 
Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
200 OMB, Agency Information Quality Guidelines, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_agency_info_quality_links/ (last visited June 15, 2015). 
201 44 U.S.C. § 3504(d)(1). 
202 67 Fed. Reg. at 8460.  
203 See, OMB, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity 
of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, Final Guidelines, with Request for Comments, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 49718, 49725 (Sep. 28, 2001). 
204 Memorandum for President’s Management Council, Agency Draft Information Quality Guidelines, 
from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), dated June 10, 2002, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/iqg_comments.pdf (last visited June 12, 2015). 
Attached to this Memorandum is a document titled “OIRA Review of Information Quality Guidelines 
Drafted by Agencies,” also dated June 10, 2002. 
205 Id. at 4. 
206 Id. at 17. 
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According to an OIRA memorandum to agencies issued in 2002, narrowing the 
exemption for press releases in this way “avoids creating an incentive to misuse press 
releases to circumvent information quality standards.”207 Thus, OIRA seemed to approve 
of agencies’ narrowing the exemption for press releases. However, some agencies appear 
to be applying the press release exemption broadly, not narrowly. 208  Although the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH)’s National Toxicology Program (NTP) previously 
agreed to correct a press release and fact sheet posted on the NTP’s web site,209 that same 
year, the NIH refused to consider the substance underlying a similar request by the Salt 
Institute because the NIH’s Information Quality Guidelines exempt press releasesthe 
broad reading.210 
 
In contrast to press releases, it would seem on first glance that agency databases clearly 
would be covered by the Information Quality Act and OMB guidelines. Indeed, the Act 
seems designed for things like agency databases. Yet, as with press releases, the Act’s 
application to databases is unclear, and probably varies by database. Again, the broad 
wording of the Act states that the OMB guidelines should apply to agency “dissemination 
of public information, regardless of the form or format.”211 And the OMB guidelines 
define “information” as “any communication or representation of knowledge such as 
facts or data, in any medium or form,” 212  including “information that an agency 
disseminates from a web page.”213  
 
However, the OMB excludes from coverage “opinions, where the agency’s presentation 
makes it clear that what is being offered is someone’s opinion rather than fact or the 
agency’s views.”214 The guidelines also exempt “adjudicative processes.”215  
 
Thus, the one law that might be used to discipline modern agency announcements has, in 
some situations, been construed as not applying to many agency announcements.216 
207 Id. at 4. 
208 See, e.g., OIRA, OMB, Information Quality: A Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2003, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/fy03_info_quality_rpt.pdf (last 
visited June 12, 2015). In this 2003 report, requests to correct or retract press releases were denied by the 
NIH (pp. 50-51) and FDIC (p. 122). Requests to address press releases were agreed to by the National 
Toxicology Program (p. 50). 
209 Id. at 50. 
210 Id. at 50-51. 
211 44 U.S.C. § 3504(d)(1). 
212 67 Fed. Reg. at 8458-59. 
213 Id. at 8460. 
214 67 Fed. Reg. at 377. 
215 Id. 
216 On a related point, it remains doubtful that the Information Quality Act creates judicially-
enforceable rights, such that a party could sue an agency for violating its own information quality 
guidelines, or for denying a request to correct or retract information. Every court considering the question 
has answered it in the negative. See, e.g., Harkonen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2012 WL 6019571 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d) (see analysis of Prime Time at *31-32); Styrene Information and 
Research Center, Inc. v. Sebelius, 944 F. Supp. 2d 71, 82 (D.D.C. 2013); Family Farm Alliance v. Salazar, 
759 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1095  (E.D. Cal. 2010); Prime Time Int’l Co. v. Vilsack, 599 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (only court to reach merits of a claim under the IQA, but finding no cause of action); Salt. Inst. v. 
Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 158-59 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the IQA in depth, but finding no cause of action). 
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IV.  CASE STUDIES 
 
I evaluate in detail the policies and practices of three agenciesthe FDA, the FTC, and 
the CFPB. These case studies offer a more granular picture of how agencies try to 
balance competing public and private interests when issuing various forms of publicity, 
including newer forms like social media and online databases. 
 
A.  U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
 
The FDA featured prominently in earlier studies on agency publicity.217 It was one of the 
only agencies to propose a rule in response to Recommendation 73-1,218 and is a frequent 
litigant in cases challenging agency publicity. 219 As the earlier studies observe, FDA 
publicity can devastate products, companies, or even entire industries. Yet, more than 
most agencies, FDA publicity is an essential tool for alerting the public to serious health 
risks, often in the face of factual and scientific uncertainty.  
 
Benefits and uses of publicity. The FDA uses publicity to warn consumers about 
hazardous products or “gross economic deception.”220 The agency also uses publicity to 
educate consumers, solicit public comments, clarify the agency’s views on matters of 
public interest, and report on FDA studies, investigations, and enforcement activities.221 
FDA officials describe two overarching goals of publicityto educate the public, and to 
further its public health mission. 222  FDA officials also note that publicity aimed to 
educate the public can, for example, help consumers make smarter purchasing decisions 
and avoid potentially adulterated or unsafe products. In litigation, the FDA vigorously 
defends its discretion to warn the public of health and safety risks, even with incomplete 
factual and scientific information.223 Former FDA officials emphasize that publicity is a 
very powerful tool for protecting public health because the agency has direct access to the 
media and enjoys credibility on product-specific warnings. 224  Current FDA officials 
carefully consider whether to make announcements, given the potential impact of FDA 
publicity.225 In short, the FDA can directly affect how, and indeed whether, the public 
uses regulated products. 226 The agency has long been aware of this power, and such 
awareness may temper any inclinations to abuse it.227 
 
217 See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 7; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1401-15. 
218 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436. 
219 See Appendix C (Table of Federal Cases: 1974-2014). 
220 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,436. 
221 Id. 
222 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34; Interview with Ann Wion, Senior Advisor to the Chief 
Counsel, FDA Office of the Chief Counsel (Aug. 5, 2015). 
223 See, e.g., Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. U.S., 46 F.3d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 1995). 
224 Interview with Wayne Pines, President, Regulatory Services and Health Care, APCO Worldwide 
(Jul. 7, 2015) (former FDA Chief of Press Relations (1975-78) and Associate Commissioner for Public 
Affairs (1978-82)).  
225 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
226 Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. 
227 Id. 
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Publicity as a regulatory tool. In the past, FDA has used publicity as a regulatory tool, 
treating both publicity and Warning Letters as a form of informal enforcement. 228 
Although the statute gives the FDA discretion to not report “minor violations” for 
prosecution if the agency “believes that the public interest will be adequately served by a 
suitable written notice or warning,” 229 the agency does not limit Warning Letters or 
publicity to such “minor violations.” Wayne Pines, former FDA Chief of Press Relations 
and Associate Commissioner for Public Affairs, explains that FDA senior leadership has 
long believed that Congress authorized FDA “to use publicity as an enforcement tool.”230 
Current FDA officials stress that FDA no longer views publicity as an enforcement tool. 
 
The burdens of publicity. Academics have observed that FDA sometimes wields publicity, 
or merely the threat of it, as a regulatory weapon.231 Former FDA officials also recognize 
that “publicity from the FDA is a very, very powerful tool.”232 For example, in 2003 the 
FDA published a “Talk Paper” to criticize an allegedly misleading press release by a drug 
company about its cancer drug.233 The agency reportedly did not notify the company of 
its objections beforehand, and the company’s stock price fell 25% within hours.234 There 
are also documented cases of FDA publicity leading directly to the closure of 
manufacturing plants, employee layoffs, and products being removed from retail stores 
nationwide.235As Gellhorn noted, publicity by the FDA can be particularly damaging 
because consumers have a very low tolerance for perceived risks to the safety of food and 
drugs.236 FDA officials have long been aware that the agency’s power of publicity can be 
“infinitely larger than any other power” the FDA possesses, and cite instances in which 
“FDA has come out publicly and just eliminated products from the market.”237 Thus, 
although FDA usually is justified in warning the public of product hazards, former 
officials worry that the risk of abuse of agency discretion is greater with publicity than in 
any other area.238 
 
FDA’s current position. The FDA no longer views publicity as an enforcement tool. 
Rather, the FDA views publicity as necessary for providing relevant health information to 
the public, given its statutorily-mandated mission to promote and protect the public 
228 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1414; 21 C.F.R. § 100(j)(1); State Enforcement Provisions of the Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 2457, 2457 (Jan. 6, 1993). 
229 21 U.S.C. § 336 (2013). 
230 Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. 
231 See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 7, at 1402; Noah, supra note 37, at 890. 
232 Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. 
233 FDA Talk Paper, supra note 58. 
234 Vodra et al., supra note 59, at 649; FDA Responds in Kind to SuperGen, supra note 59, at 6. 
235 Dickinson, supra note 181, at 24; O’REILLY, supra note 89, at § 22.42; FDA QUARTERLY REPORT, 
FIRST QUARTER 1987, at 20 (1987); Cortez, supra note 7, at 1404. 
236 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1410; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1403. 
237 Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP (Nov. 7, 2014) (Hutt 
was Chief Counsel at FDA from 1971-75). In 1966, for example, the FDA announced that Borden’s Starlac 
Powdered Milk had tested positive for salmonella. The company refused to recall the product, and there 
were no positive cases of salmonellosis linked to Starlac. But FDA’s announcement effectively removed 
Starlac from the marketit was never marketed again. See, Infectious Diseases: Salmonella and Starlac, 
TIME (Nov. 11, 1966), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843035,00.html (subscription 
required).  
238 Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 237. 
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health, and given the broad scope of consumer products the FDA regulatese.g., drugs, 
medical devices, foods, and tobacco. FDA views its disclosure of public health 
information as being governed by applicable laws and regulations, including 21 U.S.C. § 
331(j) and 18 U.S.C. § 1905. The FDA is sensitive to potential economic harm that may 
result to regulated entities. However, the agency has procedures in place to ensure the 
information it provides to the public is accurate. Moreover, there is a public health need 
for FDA to provide information essential to the public about a particular health risk. 
 
Statutory authority. Because FDA publicity can be so damaging, its authority to issue it 
has been questioned. However, more than most agencies, the FDA can claim explicit 
statutory authority to issue publicity. 239 Section 705 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (titled “Publicity”) grants the FDA broad authority to disseminate 
information about regulated products that, in the agency’s opinion, present an “imminent 
danger to health or gross deception to the consumer.”240 The same section requires the 
FDA to publish “reports summarizing all judgments, decrees, and court orders,” 
including “the nature of the charge and the disposition thereof.”241 The statute makes 
clear that nothing prohibits the FDA from reporting the results of investigations.242 Thus, 
the statute authorizes FDA to publish complaints, for example, as long as the agency 
explains the nature of the charge and clarifies that the charges have not been 
adjudicated. 243  Other parts of the statute explicitly authorize FDA to notify health 
professionals and consumers of product risks,244 which would justify broad publicity in 
most cases.  
 
Implicit authority. The FDA has also asserted that it has broad, implicit authority to 
issue publicity. The Public Health Service Act requires FDA to publish information about 
the products it regulates.245 Moreover, the FDA cites the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Barr v. Matteo for the proposition that publicity is a core discretionary function of 
agencies.246 The FDA has long viewed these powers expansively.247 Former FDA Chief 
Counsel Peter Barton Hutt once remarked that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
“must be regarded as a constitution” that gives the agency broad discretion to protect 
public health. 248 And in legal challenges to FDA publicity, the agency argues that it 
enjoys almost unreviewable discretion to warn the public249arguments viewed with 
skepticism by some courts and scholars. The D.C. District Court, for example, wrote that 
239 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1405; Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1408. 
240 FDCA § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. § 375(b) (2013). 
241 FDCA § 705(a), 21 U.S.C. § 375(a) (2013). 
242 FDCA § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. § 375(b) (2013). 
243 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1405. 
244 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 360h(a), (e)(2)(B) (allowing FDA to warn individuals and health 
professionals of risks for specific medical devices). 
245 PHSA §§ 301, 310, 42 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242o. 
246 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437; Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
247 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1406. 
248 Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 28 
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177, 178 (1973). 
249 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1441-47. 
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the FDA’s publicity practices might allow it to “effectively regulate industry without ever 
exposing itself to judicial review.”250 
 
Litigation. Although litigation challenging agency publicity remains somewhat rare, FDA 
is one of the most frequently sued agencies, along with the FTC and the CPSC.251 Like 
most other agencies, FDA frequently takes the position that agency publicity is not 
subject to judicial review under the APA,252 and is protected by sovereign immunity and 
executive privilege.253 As with other agencies, courts generally agree.254 As noted above, 
FDA in the past had viewed publicity as a form of informal enforcement.255 But again, 
some courts and scholars have been uncomfortable with publicity yielded this way. One 
district court, considering arguments that the FDA had targeted specific companies with a 
publicity campaign, wrote that the FDA could not have it both ways: 
 
This Court cannot now say that a focused effort such as this may be is immune 
from judicial review because the agency says its decision is tentative and open to 
reconsideration. If the FDA’s view is, in fact, so tentative that it is not yet ripe for 
judicial review, it may not be appropriate to take actions which directly result in 
harm to those private parties who dare to disagree with them.256 
 
The court observed that it would be “inherently unfair” to allow FDA to use publicity to 
“enforce its determination without allowing the affected party an opportunity to prove 
that the FDA’s position is wrong.”257 Although the district court’s opinion is an outlier, it 
expresses a common frustration with the lack of redress for agency publicity. Indeed, a 
former lawyer in the Office of Chief Counsel concludes that “there is relatively little a 
company can do in most circumstances to significantly diminish the effect of [an FDA] 
release.”258  
 
Proposed rule. Given the widely-recognized power of FDA publicity, the agency 
proposed a rule in 1977 that would have set standards and procedures for issuing it.259 
The proposal was an attempt to codify FDA’s existing practices and implement both 
Recommendation 73-1 and a 1976 rule by its parent agency, then the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 260  The preamble cites the usual benefits of 
250 Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995); Cortez, supra note 7, at 
1441. 
251 See Appendix C: Table of Federal Cases (1974-2014). 
252 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1414; Noah, supra note 37, at 887. 
253 See, e.g., Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F.Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d, 513 F.2d 625 
(3d Cir. 1975). 
254 See Appendix C: Table of Federal Cases (1974-2014). 
255 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1414; State Enforcement Provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 2457, 2457 (Jan. 6, 1993). 
256 Den-Mat Corp. v. FDA, No. MJG-92-444, 1992 WL 208962, at *5 (D. Md. 1992); Cortez, supra 
note 7, at 1415. 
257 Id. at *5; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1415. 
258 Levine, infra note 288, at 277; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1415. 
259 FDA, Administrative Practices and Procedures: Publicity Policy, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,440-41 
(Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
260 Id. The proposed rule was part of a larger initiative at FDA to promulgate rules governing its 
practices. FDA was one of the first agencies to propose rules implementing the Government in the 
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publicitywarning and informing the publicbut also acknowledges that publicity can 
interfere with ongoing criminal and civil cases, and may “cause economic harm” to the 
parties identified. 261  The rule would have set distinct standards and procedures for 
publicizing criminal trials, civil litigation, investigations, and administrative hearings.262 
The rule also would have given advanced notice to parties identified in publicity and 
allowed them to request corrections or retractions for any information that was 
“materially erroneous or misleading.”263 In the end, FDA never finalized the rule, and 
withdrew it summarily years later.264  
  
HHS rule. Without its own publicity policy, the FDA was left with the 1976 rule by HEW 
(now the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)). The rule, “Release of 
Adverse Information to News Media,”265 endorses Recommendation 73-1 and tracks it 
closely. 266  For example, the rule applies to “adverse information,” defined as “any 
statement or release by the Department or any principal operating component made to the 
news media inviting public attention to an action or a finding by the Department or 
principal operating component of the Department which may adversely affect persons or 
organizations identified therein.”267 The rule’s basic principle is that such information 
“shall be factual in content and accurate in description,” avoiding “[d]isparaging 
terminology not essential to the content and purpose of the publicity.”268 The rule also 
requires the Department and its sub-agencies to take reasonable precautions to assure that 
the information is accurate and fulfills an authorized purpose, again tracking 
Recommendation 73-1. 269  Information released should provide context, including the 
nature of any studies performed, the sources of any data, and whether the information is 
based on allegations that have yet to be fully adjudicated. 270  In response to public 
comments, the Department emphasized that FDA would retain broad discretion to issue 
publicity “when necessary to protect public health or safety.”271 
 
HHS guidelines. Perhaps more important than the HHS rule are the HHS Guidelines 
on the Provision of Information to the News Media, which apply to “information in any 
form provided to news and information media, especially information that has the 
potential to generate media attention, public interest, or inquiry.”272 As FDA officials 
Sunshine Act and FOIA. Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 237 (Hutt was Chief Counsel at FDA 
from 1971-75). 
261 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,436. 
262 Id. at 12,440-41. 
263 Id. at 12,441. 
264 Withdrawal of Certain Pre-1986 Proposed Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440, 67,446 (Dec. 30, 1991). 
265 45 C.F.R. pt. 17. 
266 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Release of 
Adverse Information to News Media, 39 Fed. Reg. 28,643 (Aug. 9, 1974); Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Policies: Part 17 – Release of Adverse Information to News Media, 41 Fed. Reg. 2 
(Jan. 2, 1976). 
267 45 C.F.R. § 17.1.  
268 45 C.F.R. § 17.2.  
269 45 C.F.R. § 17.3.  
270 45 C.F.R. § 17.5. 
271 41 Fed. Reg. at 3. 
272 HHS, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA), Guidelines on the Provision of 
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explain, the Guidelines articulate the basic philosophy and operating principles used by 
HHS and its sub-agencies.273 The FDA’s News Media web site links to the Guidelines.274 
Several parts of the Guidelines emphasize that communications must be “accurate.”275 
They also encourage employees to “[a]ct promptly to correct the record or erroneous 
information, when appropriate.” 276 The Guidelines describe the responsibilities of the 
HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA), News Division, and 
how it should coordinate with other offices, divisions, and programs.277 The Guidelines 
also prescribe, very broadly, that the ASPA News Division “will coordinate the review 
and clearance of departmental press materials by appropriate officials,” but describe no 
detailed procedures for this process. 278  FDA officials explain that all press 
announcements are reviewed by the FDA’s Office of Chief Counsel and HHS.279 
 
Publicizing preliminary actions. In addition to announcing the results of enforcement 
actionsconsent decrees, settlements, judgments, and criminal sentencesFDA also 
regularly publishes press releases announcing unresolved actions, including 
investigations, civil complaints, and criminal charges and indictments.280 The HHS rule 
limits announcements of investigations or “pending agency trial-type proceedings” to 
cases where there is a significant risk to public health or substantial economic harm.281 
Moreover, the rule allows HHS or its sub-agencies to withhold releasing adverse 
information if “public harm can be avoided by immediate discontinuance of an offending 
practice.”282  
 
Advanced notice. The HHS rule allows agencies to provide advanced notice of 
publicity to identified parties “if practicable and consistent with the nature of the 
proceeding.”283 This provision gives parties a chance to prepare a public response in 
advance, but does not create a right to edit or object to the agency’s announcement.284 
The FDA recognized in its 1977 proposal that identified parties are generally aware that 
they are on the agency’s radar285a notion reiterated by current officials.286 Sometimes, 
FDA will contact the company to verify certain facts before publishing a press release, 
Information to the News Media (March 2012), http://www.hhs.gov/news/media_policy.html (last visited 
August 5, 2015). The Guidelines, by their terms, apply to “press releases” and “blogs and other Internet 
postings used to convey news or items of public interest.” 
273 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
274 FDA, News Media Policies, 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/NewsEmbargoPolicy/default.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
275 HHS, Guidelines, supra note 272. 
276 Id. 
277 Id.  
278 Id. 
279 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
280 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1408. 
281 45 C.F.R. § 17.4.  
282 Id.  
283 45 C.F.R. § 17.6. 
284 Id. 
285 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,439; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1407-08. 
286 Interview with Jarilyn Dupont, Director of Regulatory Policy, FDA Office of Policy (Aug. 5, 2015). 
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but will not share the contents of the release with the company.287 Thus, the FDA “does 
not negotiate with the company about the text of the FDA announcement” or “share the 
text of a press communication with a company in advance.”288 Long ago, FDA adopted a 
policy that doing so would be inconsistent with the agency’s FOIA policies.289 
 
Corrections and retractions. The HHS rule allows parties to request that the agency 
correct or retract information that is inaccurate or misleading, and provides that the 
response will be made “in the same manner” as the original announcement.290 Similarly, 
as noted above, HHS Guidelines encourage employees to “[a]ct promptly to correct the 
record or erroneous information, when appropriate.”291 FDA’s 1977 proposed rule would 
have allowed private parties to file a citizen petition to the Assistant Commissioner for 
Public Affairs requesting the agency to correct or retract publicity, including procedures 
for expediting requests. 292  But current FDA officials believe that informal 
communications are likely to be more effective than formal filings.293 
 
FDA Manuals. Apart from HHS rules and guidelines, a variety of FDA employee 
manuals address publicity. The most significant seems to be the Regulatory Procedures 
Manual, which addresses publicity in several sections, particularly those dealing with 
recalls and emergencies.294 (Note, however, that FDA indicates that some parts of the 
Manual are outdated and are thus undergoing review and revision.) Additionally, some 
FDA product centers mention publicity in their own manuals. The FDA’s Center for 
Veterinary Medicine states that staff should avoid “[p]remature publicity concerning 
investigations and adverse reactions.” 295  My previous research evaluated a detailed 
manual by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research that included one section 
(4112.1) with detailed policies for issuing press releases, Talk Papers, and other 
announcements, but the section was deemed obsolete by FDA and is no longer published 
online.296 Finally, FDA officials describe internal policies and procedures that are not 
publicly available, but these were not produced at the time of our interview.297 
 
287 Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. 
288 Arthur N. Levine, FDA Enforcement: How it Works, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG 
LAW AND REGULATION 277 (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 2d. ed. 2002). 
289 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,439; Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. 
290 45 C.F.R. § 17.7. 
291 HHS, Guidelines, supra note 272. 
292 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,441. 
293 Interview with Ann Wion, and Heidi Rebello, supra notes 222, 34; Interview with Mark Raza, 
Principal Deputy Chief Counsel, FDA Office of the Chief Counsel (Aug. 5, 2015). 
294 FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, 
http://www.fda.gov/iceci/compliancemanuals/regulatoryproceduresmanual/default.htm (last visited July 17, 
2015). 
295 FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine, PROGRAM POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 1240.3520. 
296 The manual, titled CDER, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (MAPP) 4112.1, CDER/FDA 
Press Office Interactions in the Preparation and Clearance of Written Documents for the Public (2001); 
Cortez, supra note 7, at 1406-07, 1407 n.222. 
297 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
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Publicizing recalls. One of the FDA’s most important public health duties is to notify 
the public of recalls.298 Although the FDA has been criticized in the past for publicizing 
inaccurate recall information or using recalls in lieu of more appropriate sanctions,299 the 
agency must retain maximum discretion to warn the public.300 Courts generally protect 
this discretion.301 And, to the agency’s credit, it generally “reserves publicity for products 
that pose the most serious risks.” 302  The Regulatory Procedures Manual discusses 
procedures for notifying the public and other government agencies of recalls,303 although 
the FDA notes that some parts of the Manual are outdated and are currently undergoing 
revision. The Manual explains that recall notices are superintended by the Associate 
Commissioner for Public Affairs. 304  (Note this position no longer exists. The FDA 
currently has an Associate Commissioner for External Affairs and an Assistant 
Commissioner for Media Affairs.) The Manual also states that “[a]gency policy gives the 
recalling firm the first opportunity to prepare and issue publicity concerning its recall.”305 
FDA also provides guidance to industry for notifying the public. 306  The guidance 
emphasizes that FDA will issue its own press release for a recall if the firm fails to do so 
or if the firm’s press release is inadequate.307 In the past, FDA had to rely heavily on 
publicity during food recalls because it lacked mandatory recall authority. 308  When 
Congress granted this authority, it also specified what types of information the FDA 
should provide to the public during a recall. 309  Although the FDA necessarily must 
publicize recalls with incomplete information, recalls are based on the best available 
scientific information, often including Health Hazard Evaluations. 
 
Publicizing enforcement actions. The Regulatory Procedures Manual provides 
detailed procedures for issuing press releases regarding agency enforcement actions,310 
though again agency officials stress that the Manual’s outdated provisions are undergoing 
review and revision. Nevertheless, the Manual states that enforcement staff can 
298 Id. 
299 See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1410-16; Noah, supra note 37, at 874-75, 888. 
300 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1411. 
301 Id. (citing Sperling & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 625, 626-27 (1978) (finding that 
FDA had a rational basis for warning the public about excessive levels of lead in dishware)). 
302 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1411; FDA, For Consumers, FDA 101: Product RecallsFrom First Alert 
to Effectiveness Checks, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm049070.htm (last 
updated May 18, 2010). 
303 REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 294, at § 7-7. 
304 Id. at § 7-7-3. 
305 Id. 
306 FDA, Guidance for Industry: Product Recalls, Including Removals and Corrections (Nov. 3, 2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/IndustryGuidance/ucm129259.htm (see the section “Public 
Notification”). 
307 Id. at § B.1.  
308 Interview with Richard Williams, Vice President for Policy Research, Mercatus Center, George 
Mason University (Nov. 12, 2014) (Williams was at the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition (CFSAN) for 27 years, and was formerly its Director for Social Sciences); Interview with Ann 
Wion, supra note 222 (noting that FDA now has mandatory recall authority for foods under the Food 
Safety Modernization Act, or FSMA). 
309 Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) § 206, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885, 3941 (2011) 
(amending FDCA § 423), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350l(g) (“Mandatory Recall Authority”). 
310 REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 294, at § 6-2-17; Exhibit 6-10. 
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recommend that FDA issue a press release, but the decision rests with the Office of 
Public Affairs (which was renamed the Office of Media Affairs, a part of the Office of 
External Affairs).311 The press release should describe the enforcement action, including 
the type of action, the basis for the action, and the firm’s name, location, product(s) 
implicated, and the relevant geographical market.312 FDA staff must coordinate with any 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys working on the case.313 There seems to be a relatively clear set 
of procedures for drafting and clearing FDA press releases. The Office of External 
Affairs writes the first draft based on model press releases and routes it first to the 
appropriate product center,314 then to the Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA), and then to 
the lead case attorney from the Office of Chief Counsel (OCC).315 Sometimes, one of the 
FDA’s product centers writes the first draft, then seeks review. Once these three offices 
review the press release for accuracy, the Office of External Affairs will “route it through 
… standard press release clearance process, which involves top agency officials.” 316 
After this, the Office of External Affairs solicits final edits from the offices.317 
 
FDA practices. I interviewed Heidi Rebello, the Acting Assistant Commissioner for 
Media Affairs in the FDA’s Office of External Affairs, who described FDA practices. 
Although former FDA officials recalled that FDA employees followed informal customs 
rather than written policies, 318 current FDA officials stress the importance of written 
policies.319 According to Rebello, FDA press officers are “intimately aware” of these 
policies. 320  Staff are required to follow standard operating procedures, and their 
performance evaluations consider how well they do so.321 The internal policies are very 
detailed, and Rebello makes minor updates frequently.322 New employees are trained on 
these procedures and given hard copies as part of their orientation packets.323 Rebello 
also noted that FDA’s internal policies and procedures for issuing press releases are 
consistent with the other federal agencies at which she has worked (the EPA and 
USDA).324  
 
311 Id. at § 6-2-17; FDA, About FDA: Office of External Affairs Organization, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OrganizationCharts/ucm380930.htm.  
312 Id. at Ex. 6-10. 
313 Id. 
314 The FDA has six product “centers”: the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN); 
the Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM); the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER); the 
Center for Tobacco Products (CTP); the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER); and the Center 
for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). See FDA, About FDA, FDA Organization Overview, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OrganizationCharts/ucm380930.htm.  
315 Id. at Ex. 6-10. 
316 Id.  
317 Id. 
318 Interview with Richard Williams, supra note 308; Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224 
(speaking to FDA practices when he was at the agency). 
319 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
320 Id.  
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Forms of publicity. FDA publicity is packaged in several different forms, perhaps due to 
its obligation to warn the public of product risks. My earlier review found that FDA 
makes announcements about specific products or companies in 28 different forms,325 
most of which read as product warnings. The agency’s Newsroom site houses its press 
announcements, including news releases, statements, and transcripts of press conferences. 
It also lists other resources, including Warning Letters, the weekly “tip sheet” for media, 
and the FDA’s blog.326 But beyond these five forms, the FDA uses at least 23 other forms 
(undoubtedly there are more) to warn the public about specific products: 
 
Forms of FDA Product Announcements 
• Advice for Patients; 
• Consumer Updates; 
• Field Action Notification; 
• Field Correction; 
• Frequently Asked Questions; 
• Important Information; 
• Important Customer Notification; 
• Important Notice; 
• Important Safety Information; 
• Information Alert; 
• Information for Health Care Professionals; 
• Market Withdrawal; 
• Notice of Field Correction; 
• Notice to Readers; 
• Product Withdrawal; 
• Public Health Advisory; 
• Public Health Notification; 
• Recall; 
• Safety Communication; 
• Urgent Instruction Correction; 
• Urgent Removal; and 
• Urgent Notification. 
 
Some of these labels suggest different intended audiences, and some labels have legal 
significance. For example, product “corrections,” “recalls,” and “withdrawals” have 
different regulatory meanings.327 Moreover, these announcements may not be mutually 
exclusiveeach could be accompanied by a separate press release, Warning Letter, or 
the like. In short, the FDA often uses multiple overlapping announcements to 
communicate product risks. The point is not to question how the FDA labels these 
announcements, but simply to note their volume and variety. FDA publicity, broadly 
construed, comes in many forms.328  
 
Warning Letters. Some of these forms, such as Warning Letters and Talk Papers, 
have long caused confusion. Both have been used to publicize FDA’s objections to 
specific products or conduct. For example, FDA publishes hundreds if not thousands of 
Warning Letters on its web site that identify specific objections to specific products or 
practices.329 Warning Letters are not formal enforcement action; they typically precede it. 
The letters are used to notify individuals and firms of alleged violations, often based on 
inspectional findings, and give firms “an opportunity to take voluntary and prompt 
corrective action” before FDA initiates enforcement.330 Although FDA explains that it is 
not required to warn companies before taking enforcement action, “most individuals and 
325 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1410. 
326 FDA, Newsroom, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/default.htm.  
327 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1410. 
328 Id. at 1409. 
329 FDA, Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations: Warning Letters, 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ (last visited July 20, 2015). 
330 FDA, REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 294, at 4-1-1. 
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firms will voluntarily comply with the law.”331 The agency emphasizes that “[a] Warning 
Letter is the agency’s principal means of achieving prompt voluntary compliance” with 
the statute and regulations. 332 Less frequently, and not recently, FDA has used Talk 
Papers to publicize its objections to company conduct, even though Talk Papers were 
ostensibly designed to guide FDA staff internally. 333 Talk Papers are no longer used, 
according to FDA officials.334 
 
FDA.gov. Perhaps equally important is the massive amount of information that FDA 
publishes about companies and products on its web site, www.fda.gov. Like other 
agencies, the FDA is required to post important information online.335 But perhaps more 
than other agencies, the FDA can publish a large variety of documents with information 
adverse to regulated parties, including legal complaints, inspectional observations, 
product recalls, Warning Letters, and other agency objections that have not been fully 
resolved or adjudicated.336 (Note, however, that comments submitted to the docket on 
FDA’s Transparency Initiative indicated public interest in receiving such information.337) 
Although the FDA has long tried to distinguish active publicity versus passive 
disclosure,338 the distinction has eroded during an era of sprawling agency web sites that 
post thousands of documents that are readily available to the media and trade press.339 
 
Survey of FDA press releases. A major feature of my earlier research was a substantive 
review of all “press announcements” posted on the FDA’s web site between 2004 and 
2010.340 A chart with my findings is reproduced in Appendix D. I found that during this 
331 Id.  
332 Id. 
333 The public was long confused about what a “Talk Paper” signified from the agency. I described this 
confusion and the FDA’s changing explanations for Talk Papers in my 2011 article. Cortez, supra note 7, at 
1410 n.243. Originally, FDA explained that Talk Papers were intended for internal use as a way to ensure 
that agency staff responded consistently to public questions on current topics of interest. However, the FDA 
later explained that it distributed Talk Papers to the media. Wayne Pines explained during our interview 
that Talk Papers were designed to allow FDA to make external, public announcements without having to go 
through the HHS process for clearing press releases. Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. Thus, a 
document ostensibly created for internal uses was used externallywhich might be the case with much of 
the material published on FDA’s web site. 
334 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
335 See, e.g., Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 
Stat. 3048 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552); Cortez, supra note 7, at 1392. Note, also, that Congressional 
directives require FDA to post information such as “signals of safety concerns” even if not “proven” at the 
time of publication. 
336 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1411. 
337 FDA, FDA Transparency Initiative, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/TransparencyInitiative/ (last updated Apr. 22, 2014).  
338 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,436-37 (distinguishing adverse publicity from the FDA Consumer 
magazine, the Drug Bulletin, and other publications reporting actions taken by FDA); Cortez, supra note 7, 
at 1411-12 n.252. 
339 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1412. 
340 Id. at 1412-13. The agency seems to use the terms “press announcement” and “press release” 
synonymously, and still posts them on its web site. FDA, Press Announcements, 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/default.htm (last visited July 21, 2015). 
The site contains an archive of press releases back to 2004. See, e.g., FDA, News and Events, 2004 Press 
Announcements, http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/2004/default.htm (last 
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seven-year period, FDA issued 1,542 unique press releasesa little less than one every 
business day. 341  Of those, 65% (1,009) identified a specific product, company, or 
individual.342 Of this group, 62% (622) were negative or adverse in some way; most of 
the positive announcements publicized product approvals by FDA.343 And of the 622 
press releases that both identified a specific product or party and were adverse in some 
way, 74% (463) involved some sort of preliminary or pending agency action that had not 
yet reached a final, determinative conclusion.344 Thus, around 30% of all press releases 
during this time (463 out of 1,542) qualified as adverse publicity involving a pending or 
preliminary agency action.345  
 
Of course, many of these announcements involved product recalls, which are often based 
on Health Hazard Evaluations and other scientific analyses. And many other 
announcements undoubtedly involved actions that concluded with successful judgments, 
orders, or settlements for the agency, or voluntary compliance by the firm.346 Although 
the practice of issuing such announcements certainly is understandable given FDA’s duty 
to alert the public to health risks, the sheer volume of early-stage adverse announcements 
may raise the risk of errors.347  
 
Scientific uncertainty. As noted in my earlier research, “FDA is understandably 
protective of its duty to warn the public of dangerous products and other health risks,” 
and “routinely emphasizes that it must warn the public of health risks, even when acting 
on limited information and scientific uncertainty.”348 During interviews, FDA officials 
emphasized that the agency uses its best judgments of the science and public health risks 
when deciding to communicate with the public.349 Indeed, courts have recognized that 
FDA and other agencies must exercise judgment to decide when “it is more desirable to 
make a decision based on the currently available information than to wait for more 
complete data or more confirmation of the existing data.”350 After the FDA rescinded a 
1971 warning that canned green beans might contain botulism, Commissioner Charles 
Edwards defended the agency’s decision to warn the public before reaching a definitive 
conclusion: “In dealing with life or death problems like botulism, there are times when 
the public interest demands action before the scientific case is complete. The decision 
always must be made in favor of consumer protection.”351 This stance is consistent with 
other FDA disclosure and reporting practices, including its adverse event reporting 
visited July 21, 2015). 
341 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1413 (this number excludes duplicate press releases issued in foreign 
languages). 
342 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1413. 
343 Id. at 1413; Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224 (noting that a high proportion of FDA 
press releases announce product approvals). 
344 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1413. 
345 Id. at 1413-14. 
346 Id. at 1414. 
347 Id. 
348 Id. at 1403. 
349 Interview with Ann Wion, supra note 222. 
350 Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 287. 
351 HEW Release No. 71-67 (Nov. 1, 1971); Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1415 n.142; Cortez, supra note 
7, at 1403. 
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system, which requires reports of adverse events “associated” with a product even before 
causation can be established.352 Today, FDA officials explain that the agency has made 
great strides improving its ability to investigate the sources of foodborne illnesses, for 
example, which also improves the agency’s confidence in the accuracy of early 
announcements.353 In short, the FDA generally engages in significant scientific analyses 
and review before publicizing problems with products. 
 
Risk communication. Along these same lines, FDA is improving its understanding of 
how to communicate risk information effectively. The agency has a Risk Communication 
Advisory Committee that has published guides and strategic plans discussing how best to 
communicate risks associated with regulated products.354 Thus, the FDA actively self-
reflects on its communications practices. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Social media. FDA public outreach is prolific, no more so than on social media. In 
addition to a blog, email alerts, videos, and podcasts, the FDA maintains social media 
accounts on Facebook, Pinterest, Flickr, YouTube, and Twitter.355 Currently, the FDA 
maintains 17 different Twitter accounts, including FDA Drug Information, 356  FDA 
Food,357 and FDA Recalls.358 FDA Recalls and FDA MedWatch identify products and 




Other FDA Twitter accounts use company-specific information more sparingly. For 
example, FDA Tobacco includes a string of public health messages, 359 and the FDA 
Twitter account for medical devices includes a string of notices for new guidance 
documents and upcoming workshops.360 The FDA’s account on the photo sharing site 
Flickr includes recalls, with photos of the labels of products being recalled.361  
 
352 21 C.F.R. § 314.80; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1403. 
353 Interview with Ann Wion, supra note 222. 
354 FDA, Risk Communication Advisory Committee, 
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/RiskCommunicationAdvisoryCom
mittee/default.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
355 FDA, Interactive Media, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/InteractiveMedia/default.htm (last 
updated Apr. 15, 2015).  
356 FDA, FDA Drug Information, https://twitter.com/FDA_Drug_Info (last visited July 22, 2015). 
357 FDA, FDA Food, https://twitter.com/fdafood (last visited July 22, 2015). 
358 FDA, FDA Recalls, https://twitter.com/FDArecalls (last visited July 22, 2015). 
359 FDA, FDA Tobacco, https://twitter.com/FDArecalls (last visited July 22, 2015). 
360 FDA, FDA/CDRH Industry, https://twitter.com/FDACDRHIndustry (last visited July 22, 2015). 
361 See, e.g., FDA, Recalled – 0.9% Sodium Chloride Injection, USP; 50mL and 100mL, 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/fdaphotos/19837034796/ (July 17, 2015). 
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HHS social media policies. Social media is handled primarily by the Web and Digital 
Media Staff within the FDA’s Office of External Affairs.362 As with press releases and 
other communications, FDA follows HHS guidelines. HHS identifies well over a dozen 
federal policies that apply to HHS agencies’ use of social media, including policies 
governing internal agency approvals, information security, privacy, and “Linking, Liking, 
Following, and Endorsement.”363 The policies emphasize that all “official uses of social 
media must be approved” and that the “decision to use a social media tool (or 
combination of tools) must be based on a strategic communications plan and must 
address the commitment of resources necessary to manage and maintain the public 
engagement.”364 HHS also requires that “[a]ll content posted to third-party sites should 
also be verifiable through an agency’s official site,” and “provide a link back to the 
agency’s official site.”365 Finally, HHS urges employees to consider whether “following 
an organization [on social media] may convey endorsement of the entire entity, while 
retweeting or reposting content from another entity may only imply endorsement of the 
content that is being reposted.”366 FDA staff also noted that the GSA guidelines apply to 
the agency’s use of social media. 367  In short, there are many different HHS and 
government-wide rules and guidelines that apply to FDA social media use. 
 
*  *  * 
 
FDA databases. The FDA maintains several databases that track problems with products 
and/or manufacturers. For example, the FDA Enforcement Report database displays 
recalls for all regulated products, including biologics, cosmetics, devices, drugs, food, 
and veterinary drugs.368 The FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS) includes a 
database of medication errors and adverse drug events reported to the agency. 369  A 
similar, searchable database exists for medical devices. 370  FDA also maintains a 
searchable database of inspection result classifications for manufacturing facilities,371 and 
a list of people debarred from submitting drug product applications. 372 There are, of 
362 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34; FDA, Web and Digital Media Staff, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofExternalAffairs/ucm342971.htm (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2015). 
363 HHS, Policies that Apply to Social Media, http://www.hhs.gov/web/socialmedia/policies/ (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
364 Id.  
365 Id. 
366 Id. 
367 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34; GSA, DigitalGov, supra note 11. 
368 FDA, Enforcement Reports, http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/default.htm 
(last visited July 22, 2015). Although reports are separated by week, users can search the entire database, 
dating back to 2004. 
369 FDA, FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/
default.htm (last visited July 22, 2015). 
370 FDA, MAUDE – Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/search.cfm (last visited July 22, 2015). 
371 FDA, Inspection Classification Database Search, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/inspsearch/ 
(last visited July 22, 2015). 
372 FDA, FDA Debarment List (Drug Product Applications), 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/inspsearch/ (last visited July 22, 2015). 
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course, databases that do not necessarily focus on the negative. For example, the FDA 
maintains searchable databases of product approvals. Other representative FDA databases 
are included in Appendix E. 373  FDA officials explain that some of these databases 
include information that must be published by statute.374 
 
Open FDA. The FDA is beginning to publish these and other databases in more user-
friendly formats on its Open FDA site.375 Currently, Open FDA has separate pages for 
drugs, devices, and food. All three include an Enforcement Reports database.376 The drug 
and device sites also include adverse event databases. 377  Open FDA publishes both 
individual reports and trend analyses. For example, it noted that as of July 2015, the 
adverse drug event database contained nearly five million reports since 2004, with an 
interactive chart showing the number per year.378 To former FDA officials, these “open 
data” initiatives are nothing new to the FDA,379 which has maintained an adverse event 
database in some form since 1967,380 and has probably published it online for nearly two 
decades. A former official explains that the new “Open FDA” initiative 381 takes for 
granted that FOIA long ago “opened the FDA.”382 Current FDA officials emphasize that 
the agency is trying to make public information that could be subject to FOIA requests, or 
otherwise are required to be published by statute.383 
 
Disclaimers. Some of the FDA’s online databases include noteworthy disclaimers about 
the accuracy and reliability of the data. For example, FDA publishes a large database of 
reports from hospitals, manufacturers, and others who suspect that a medical device may 
have caused or contributed to death or serious injury. Below the search fields are several 
disclaimers, including the following two: 
 
Although [Medical Device Reports] are a valuable source of information, this passive 
surveillance system has limitations, including the potential submission of incomplete, 
inaccurate, untimely, unverified, or biased data. In addition, the incidence or prevalence 
of an event cannot be determined from this reporting system alone due to potential under-
reporting of events and lack of information about frequency of device use. 
 
* * * 
 
Confirming whether a device actually caused a specific event can be difficult based 
solely on information provided in a given report. Establishing a cause-and-effect 
373 This site also includes searchable product databases. FDA, For Industry: Search Databases, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/FDABasicsforIndustry/ucm234631.htm (last updated Apr. 13, 2015).  
374 Interview with Jarilyn Dupont, supra note 286. 
375 FDA, Open FDA, https://open.fda.gov/ (last visited July 23, 2015). 
376 Id. 
377 Id. 
378 FDA, Adverse Drug Event Reports Since 2004, OPEN FDA, https://open.fda.gov/drug/event/ (last 
visited July 22, 2015). 
379 Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 237. 
380 Dr. David Gortler, Adverse Event Database (AERS Database), 
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/dg298/adverse-event-database.html (last visited July 22, 2015). 
381 FDA, Open FDA, https://open.fda.gov/ (last visited July 22, 2015). 
382 Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 237. 
383 Interview with Mark Raza, supra note 293. 
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relationship is especially difficult if circumstances surrounding the event have not been 
verified or if the device in question has not been directly evaluated.384 
 
Similarly, the FDA’s adverse drug event database notes that the “data does have 
limitations”: 
 
First, there is no certainty that the reported event (adverse event or medication error) was 
actually due to the product. FDA does not require that a causal relationship between a 
product and event be proven, and reports do not always contain enough detail to properly 
evaluate an event. Further, FDA does not receive reports for every adverse event or 
medication error that occurs with a product. Many factors can influence whether or not an 
event will be reported, such as the time a product has been marketed and publicity about 
an event. Therefore, FAERS data cannot be used to calculate the incidence of an adverse 
event or medication error in the U.S. population.385 
 
Thus, the FDA seems to appreciate the value of providing context for negative data. It is 
less clear whether public audiences read or appreciate the FDA’s disclaimers. However, 
FDA officials do reiterate these caveats to reporters who use these databases to write 
stories, and work with reporters to help them understand the nature of the data.386 FDA 
officials cited significant interest by the media and other groups in adverse events 
associated with childhood vaccines.387 FDA staff spent extensive time and resources in 
the 1990s explaining the nature of the information posted in its adverse event databases, 
including basic concepts like numerators and denominators and what kinds of 
conclusions could fairly be drawn from the data.388 
 
Objections to FDA databases are rare. FDA officials could not recall instances in which 
manufacturers objected to information published in one of its databases.389 Perhaps this is 
because the FDA regularly posts physician labeling for each product online shortly after 
the agency approves the product. 390  The approved physician labeling includes a 
significant amount of negative information uncovered from extensive clinical testing, 
including specific warnings, precautions, and adverse reactions (which often include data 
related to deaths and other serious complications).391 Thus, adverse events posted in the 
FDA’s online databases may replicate dangers and deaths that are forecasted in the 
approved labeling already published online. 
 
*  *  * 
 
384 FDA, MAUDE – Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/search.cfm#disclaimer (last visited July 23, 
2015). 
385 FDA, FAERS, supra note 369. 
386 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
387 Interview with Mark Raza, supra note 293. 
388 Id. 
389 Interview with Ann Wion, Mark Raza, and Heidi Rebello, supra notes 222, 293, 34. 
390 Interview with Ann Wion and Heidi Rebello, supra notes 222, 34. 
391 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56, 201.57. 
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Best practices. FDA officials are in favor of the Conference’s identifying best 
practices.392 They stress that the FDA prides itself on maintaining good procedures and 
ensuring that employees know and understand these procedures.393 The agency takes a 
very “intentional approach” to its internal procedures.394 Ann Wion, Senior Advisor to 
the Chief Counsel, noted that without such procedures, agencies may be more likely to 
make mistakes in issuing publicity; having procedures in place does not completely 
eliminate mistakes, but makes them less likely.395 Former FDA officials seem to agree. 
The former Associate Commissioner for Public Affairs supports the Conference’s 
recommending that agencies adopt written policies governing their publicity practices.396 
He explained that, after leaving the agency, he thought it would be worthwhile for FDA 
to develop a rule or guidance on its publicity practices.397 However, he cautioned that 
such a document must be formulated properly, noting that it can be difficult to commit 
agency practices to writing.398 Like other agency officials, he also cautioned that any 
written policy would have to define practices and procedures broadly.399 Highly-specific 
requirements might be difficult to follow, might unnecessarily constrain the agency, and 
would require numerous exceptions.400 Unforeseen circumstances will always arise.401 
He suggested that recommendations express broad statements of principles rather than 
technical details.402 More importantly, if the agency does adopt written policies, it should 
take care to train officials on the policy and ensure that they understand the power of 
publicity to affect companies and products.403 These lessons are not necessarily passed 
down from generation to generation at the agency, and each new generation should not 
have to re-learn these lessons anew.404 My interview with Heidi Rebello suggests that the 
FDA currently meets many of these recommendations.405 
 
Information Quality Act. The FDA adopted its own information quality guidelines,406 and 
is also subject to those of HHS and OMB.407 Like many other agencies, both FDA and 




396 Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. 
397 Id.  
398 Id.  
399 Id.  
400 Id.  
401 Id.  
402 Id.  
403 Id.  
404 Id.  
405 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
406 HHS, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), HHS Guidelines for 
Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated to 
the Public (Oct. 1, 2002), http://aspe.hhs.gov/report/hhs-guidelines-ensuring-and-maximizing-quality-
objectivity-utility-and-integrity-information-disseminated-public/f-food-and-drug-administration. 
407 HHS, HHS Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity 
of Information Disseminated to the Public, http://aspe.hhs.gov/report/hhs-guidelines-ensuring-and-
maximizing-quality-objectivity-utility-and-integrity-information-disseminated-public. FDA also maintains 
its own standards for peer review of scientific information. See FDA, Peer Review of Scientific 
Information and Assessments, 
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HHS guidelines narrow the OMB’s exemption for press releases. FDA exempts press 
releases “unless they contain new substantive information not covered by previous 
information dissemination,” and HHS guidelines “do not apply to … press releases that 
support the announcement or give public notice of information that the agency 
disseminates elsewhere.” 408 Although the HHS guidelines do not explicitly state that 
press releases are exempt only if they include new information not covered by the IQA, 
that seems to be the intent of the exemption. Also, like some other agencies, HHS 
exempts “opinions, when the agency’s presentation makes clear that what is disseminated 
is someone’s opinion rather than fact or agency views.” 409  This language might 
reasonably be construed as exempting the FDA’s adverse event databases, which include 
reports from patients, physicians, facilities, and other users. HHS guidelines emphasize 
that disseminating timely and accurate information to the public “is a critical component 
of the missions of many HHS programs,” and thus HHS and its agencies play “a major 
role in information dissemination.”410 HHS guidelines, more than most, emphasize these 
core functions and explicitly retain discretion to protect public health, particularly during 
emergencies. 411  FDA guidelines also emphasize that the agency “may need to 
disseminate information without fully applying the principles for assuring the quality, 
objectivity, utility, and integrity of the information” disseminated, particularly in public 
health emergencies.412 
 
IQA litigation. Recently, the FDA and HHS were sued to correct a 2001 statement to 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that marijuana had no accepted medical 
usesa highly contested assertion that is periodically reconsidered by the agencies. The 
plaintiffs, Americans for Safe Access, petitioned HHS in 2004 to correct its public 
statements to this effect. In 2007, a district court granted the agencies’ motion to dismiss 
on the grounds that the IQA does not provide judicial review.413 In 2010, the 9th Circuit 
affirmed the decision, finding that both courts lacked jurisdiction because the failure of 
HHS to respond immediately to the petition did not constitute final agency action (the 
issue had been pending in a rulemaking petition).414 
 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/PeerReviewofScientificInformationandAssessments/de
fault.htm (page last updated July 17, 2015). 
408 HHS Guidelines, supra notes 407, at § 3; FDA Guidelines, supra note 406, at Part II. 
409 HHS Guidelines, supra note 407, at § 3. 
410 Id. at § 4.b. 
411 Id. at § 4.h. (“Several HHS agencies are responsible for dissemination of authoritative health, 
medical and safety information on a real time basis in order to protect the health of the public against 
urgent and emerging threats. Accordingly, nothing in these guidelines relating to reproducibility or peer 
review shall be construed to limit or delay the timely flow of vital information from agencies to medical 
providers, patients, health agencies, and the public. HHS reserves the right to waive information quality 
standards temporarily for agencies addressing urgent situations (e.g., imminent threats to public health or 
homeland security) in accordance with the latitude described in both the OMB and agency specific 
guidelines.”). 
412 FDA Guidelines, supra note 406, at Part VIII. 
413 Americans for Safe Access v. HHS, 2007 WL 2141289, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The court granted 
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint because HHS and FDA did not respond to their IQA petition in a 
timely manner. See also Americans for Safe Access v. HHS, 2007 WL 4168511 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
414 Americans for Safe Access v. HHS, 399 Fed. Appx. 314 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Ombudsman. Like other agencies, the FDA has an Office of the Ombudsman, housed 
within the Office of Scientific Integrity.415 But perhaps unlike other agencies, FDA also 
has ombudsmen in five of its six product centers.416 If the center ombudsmen cannot 
resolve a problem, it will be escalated to the main Office of the Ombudsman.417 The FDA 
Office of the Ombudsman helps coordinate complaints under the IQA,418 and the various 
FDA ombudsman offices do handle complaints about FDA publicity. Most offices report 
that they receive one or two such complaints per year. 
 
Corrections. FDA officials explain that parties should have an opportunity to request 
corrections from FDA or otherwise express their objections to FDA publicity. 419 
However, they believe informal discussion would be more effective than formal requests, 
such as filing a Citizens Petition. 420  Jarilyn Dupont, Director of Regulatory Policy, 
explained that an FDA press release usually occurs at the end of a long process and after 
“hours of meetings” with the company; it is not the initial contact.421 Thus, FDA press 
releases rarely will be a surprise to companies, and companies will have several points of 
contact if they do have complaints. The Office of Media Affairs does field objections 
regarding press announcements, but these are rare.422 
415 FDA, The FDA Ombudsman, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofScientificandMedicalPrograms/ucm197508.ht
m (last updated Apr. 16, 2015). 
416 FDA, Product Center Ombudsmen, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofScientificandMedicalPrograms/ucm2005612.ht
m (last updated Mar. 18, 2015). Only the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) 
lacks its own product center ombudsman. 
417 Id.  
418 FDA, FDA’s Office of the Ombudsman: Dispute Resolution and Problem Solving, at 2, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/centersoffices/oc/officeofscientificandmedicalprograms/ucm1643
30.pdf (last visited July 22, 2015). 
419 Interview with Ann Wion, supra note 222. 
420 Id. 
421 Interview with Jarilyn Dupont, supra note 286. 
422 Interview with Heidi Rebello, supra note 34. 
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B.  U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 
The FTC is worth examining for a few reasons. First, it was a focus of Professor 
Gellhorn’s report that formed the basis for Recommendation 73-1. Gellhorn praised the 
FTC for having “the most sophisticated publicity policies and practices of the regulatory 
and executive agencies examined.”423 By 1973, not only had the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
FTC’s practices, 424  but the Commission had already articulated its policies “in 
continually evolving agency rules, manuals, and guidebooks.” 425  Thus, it is worth 
reexamining whether the FTC remains a useful model for other agencies. Second, as a 
classic enforcement agency, the FTC’s approach to publicizing investigations, complaints, 
and settlements is worth revisiting, as is its use of social media. Finally, the 
Commission’s database practices are worth examining. The FTC maintains the Consumer 
Sentinel Network (“Sentinel”), a massive, nonpublic database of consumer complaints 
made available to law enforcement organizations.426 The Commission resists open-ended 
requests to publicly disclose complaints in Sentinel,427 but makes discrete disclosures in 
response to particularized FOIA requests. In this part I examine the FTC’s publicity 
practices, database practices, social media practices, and potential reforms. 
 
Statutory authority. Like other agencies, the FTC can make a strong case that it has broad, 
implicit statutory authorityand perhaps even explicit authorityto issue publicity.428 
Section 46(f) of the FTC Act authorizes the Commission “[t]o make public from time to 
time such portions of the information obtained by it … as are in the public interest” and 
“to provide for the publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as 
may be best adapted for public information and use.” 429  Long ago the D.C. Circuit 
interpreted this language as authorizing the FTC “to alert the public of suspected 
violations of the law by factual press release,” noting that “Congress obviously has been 
long aware of and acquiesced in the Commission’s press release procedures.”430 More 
recently, district courts have interpreted this language as “explicitly authoriz[ing] the 
FTC to make news releases.”431  
 
Benefits of publicity. The FTC’s public information policies are based on the premise that 
the public has a “right to know what the Commission is doing, tempered by the 
423 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1388. 
424 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (refusing 
to grant review of an FTC news release announcing that the Commission had “reason to believe” that 
several companies were engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices). 
425 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1388; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1416. 
426 FTC, Consumer Sentinel Network, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network 
(last visited July 6, 2015). 
427 Complaint, Ayuda, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 1:13 Civ. 1266 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 20, 2013). 
428 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1416. 
429 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) 
430 Cinderella, 404 F.2d at 1314. See also, Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), in which the D.C. Circuit found that the FTC “is specifically authorized by statute to publicize 
information acquired by it”; Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
431 FTC v. Freecom Communications, 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Utah 1997); Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. 
Supp. 2d 281, 290-91 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Cinderella and Bristol-Myers). 
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parameters established by the FTC Act and the Commission’s Rules.”432 FTC officials 
also emphasize that the Commission is not only a law enforcement agency, but also 
conducts consumer education and outreach. 433 Thus, warning consumers of unfair or 
deceptive business practices is a core function of the Commissionone long intended by 
Congress and recognized by courts. In FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, 
Inc., the D.C. Circuit explained:  
 
If the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected in any measure from deceptive 
or unfair practices, it is essential that he be informed in some manner as to the 
identity of those most likely to prey upon him… Certainly advice through news 
media as to actions being taken by a government agency in his behalf constitutes 
a prophylactic step….434  
 
The FTC’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA) drafts press releases to be understandable to 
ordinary consumers and works with journalists to explain complex Commission 
actions.435 The director of OPA emphasized that his office wants the public to clearly 
understand the Commission’s work.436  
 
Operating Manual. Gellhorn applauded the FTC’s Public Information Policy Guidebook, 
published in 1972, 437 as being “both sensible and sensitive,” revealing “a thoughtful 
attempt to balance administrative efficiency, the public’s need for warning, and private 
interests.” 438  Now, the Commission articulates some of its policies in an Operating 
Manual, published online.439 The Manual addresses “news releases” in various chapters, 
but focuses on them in Chapter 17 (Public Information and Education). The section on 
news releases is brief: 
 
News releases are issued to inform the public of actions taken by the 
Commission, such as the issuance of complaints, decisions and orders, 
acceptance of consent agreements, promulgation of trade regulation rules, and 
other significant actions. When a memorandum recommending such action is 
forwarded to the Commission, a copy will also be circulated to OPA. That Office 
will, after consultation with staff and review by the appropriate Bureau Director, 
Office Head, or designee, prepare a news release appropriate to the Commission 
action, not necessarily the staff recommendation.440 
 
432 FTC Operating Manual (Release 14-01), at Ch. 17.2.1. 
433 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
434 See, e.g., Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, supra note 30, at 1314. 
435 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
436 Id. 
437 ACUS maintains on file a version of the FTC’s Public Information Policy Guidebook updated in 
1975. However, only two pages of the policy are included (pages 14-15), and the document seems to be 
incomplete. 
438 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1388; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1416. 
439 See FTC, FTC Administrative Staff Manuals, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/foia-resources/ftc-
administrative-staff-manuals.  
440 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 432, at Ch. 17.2.2. 
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Limited use of Operating Manual. Although my interview with FTC officials suggests 
that the Commission roughly follows the procedures above, officials emphasize that other 
sections of the Operating Manual are outdated in parts and may not be closely followed 
at all times.441 They describe the Manual as a “framework” for staff rather than a “step-
by-step guide” on how to do something.442 In fact, many FTC staff may not have looked 
at the Manual recently, as they are aware that more updated procedures may be available 
elsewhere.443 It was written in the late 1970s, and some parts have not been updated since 
then.444 However, Chapter 17, which focuses on news releases, was updated in 2014; at 
that time and periodically since then, the Commission has reminded its staff about the 
FTC press policy.445 In addition, OPA has a small staff and all of them are familiar with 
the Manual and the press policy.446 OPA placed an emphasis on having the press releases 
be “accurate” and “fair.”447 
 
Press release practices. The OPA director described Commission practices for issuing 
press releases. When drafting a press release related to an enforcement action, for 
example, OPA will receive supporting documents from the Commission’s litigating team, 
and will draft a one- to two-page press release based on these documents.448 If the press 
release announces the initiation of a law enforcement proceeding, OPA explains the 
nature of the Commission’s action and makes clear that the complaint involves 
allegations and not proven violations. OPA will try to use plain language to explain the 
Commission action being announced.449 OPA sends a first draft to the litigation staff, 
who will review for accuracy. 450  This back-and-forth editing process continues until 
relevant Commission staff are satisfied with the language of the release.451 FTC officials 
could not recall disagreements between staff; the drafting and vetting process eventually 
produces a consensus.452 If there were a disagreement, OPA and the Chairwoman both 
have “final say.”453 The process can be quite simple or quite prolonged depending on the 
case.454 All press releases deal with public actions taken by the Commission through a 
vote, the announcement of a public event held by the agency, or other Commission 
activities.455 Then OPA will send the press release to the Chairwoman for approval, and 
once approved, will post it publicly.456 The OPA director emphasized that “the system 
has checks and balances” to ensure the content of announcements is accurate.457 Officials 





446 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
447 Id.  




452 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
453 Id. 
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in the Office of General Counsel explained that the published press release is based 
closely on the public documents such as a complaint or settlement document, and that the 
web version of the announcement will link to the original documents, supplemental 
documents, and any Commissioners’ statements as well. 458 Officials in the Office of 
General Counsel added that the press release would contain “no new information” outside 
the public documents. 459  Sometimes, FTC bureau directors or the Chairwoman are 
quoted in press releases.460 Litigation staff rarely are quoted.461 
 
Investigations. FTC investigations are nonpublic unless otherwise directed by the 
Commission.462 Thus, according to the Manual, the existence of the investigation, the 
identity of the parties, the facts, and any other nonpublic information “can be disclosed 
only in accordance with the Commission’s directive and procedures.” 463  Those 
procedures, described in the Manual, state that “the Commission may issue a news 
release announcing a nonpublic industrywide investigation or an investigation of 
practices involving a risk to public health or safety or a significant risk of economic 
harm.”464 The Commission may also announce “public investigations.”465 However, FTC 
officials explained that references to “public investigations”466 are dated, and refer to a 
time decades ago when the Commission initiated large rulemaking proceedings and 
announced fact-gathering investigations.467 The officials explained that the Commission 
no longer conducts “public” investigations.468 Nevertheless, the Manual cites the risk of 
“premature adverse publicity” 469  and seems sensitive to longstanding concerns with 
publicizing investigations. Later, the Manual dictates that “Staff should not initiate media 
contacts about investigations or other non-public law enforcement matters under any 
circumstances” and “should not respond to any press inquiry” about non-public 
enforcement matters without first notifying OPA to get clearance.470 FTC officials were 
not aware of the FTC’s ever publicizing investigations, explaining that the Commission’s 
blanket policy is “very careful” not to disclose them.471 It is probably important, however, 
that the Manual includes language to allow the Commission to announce investigations 
when there is a significant risk to public health or economic harm.472 
 
458 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
459 Id. 
460 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
461 Id. 
462 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 432, at Ch. 3.1.2.3.  
463 Id. at Ch. 3.1.2.3. 
464 Id. at Ch. 3.3.3.1.  
465 Id. at Ch. 3.3.3.2.  
466 Id. 
467 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
468 Id. 
469 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 432, at Ch. 3.3.3.1. 
470 Id. at Ch. 17.2.5. 
471 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
472 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 432, at Ch. 3.3.3.1. The Manual also permits the 
Commission to issue a news release announcing closure of an investigation when directed by the 
Commission, particularly when a news release announced the investigation. Id. at Ch. 3.3.7.4.6.  
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No publicity absent enforcement action. FTC officials explained that the Commission 
does not identify companies or individuals in press releases absent an enforcement 
action.473 The FTC may broadly warn consumers about a specific practice (for example, 
alerting consumers to donation scams shortly after a natural disaster), but will publish 
these as “consumer alerts” or “scam alerts” rather than press releases. 474  When it 
publishes these alerts, the Commission will not name specific firms or individuals.475 
 
Timing press releases. Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, the 
Commission occasionally will time press releases to minimize capital market 
reactions. 476  Most press releases are issued during business hours. 477  FTC officials 
explained that with global capital markets and after-hours trading, it would be difficult to 
avoid at least some capital market reactions.478 The Commission times press releases to 
coincide with Commission votes and court filings, and takes care to issue the press 
release only after the filing or the votes are public. 479  Sometimes the subject of an 
enforcement action will ask to see the Commission’s press release in advance, but the 
FTC declines such requests.480 
 
Corrections or retractions. FTC officials explain that the subjects of press releases do not 
necessarily want or need to request corrections or retractions. 481  Commission staff, 
including bureau directors, will often meet with the subject prior to filing a complaint, 
and the subject will be aware of any ongoing investigation.482 Thus, by the time the 
Commission publishes a press release, the subject will have several points of contact 
within the agency if they do object.483 
 
Litigation against the FTC. Despite the FTC’s sensitivity to concerns with adverse 
publicity, it is one of the most frequently sued agencies.484 The Commission has been 
sued four times since 1974. 485  However, courts uniformly reject challenges that the 
Commission is violating its statutory authority or acting ultra vires.486 Moreover, in the 
few instances in which parties have charged the FTC with violating its own publicity 
policies, courts have rejected these challenges without much discussion.487 Aside from 
the occasional lawsuit, FTC officials could not recall any instances in which the subject 






479 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
480 Id. 
481 Id. 
482 Id. (noting an exception for fraud cases, in which the FTC must act quickly). 
483 Id. 
484 See Appendix C, infra; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1417. 
485 Appendix C, infra. 
486 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1417. 
487 Id. (citing FTC v. Magui Publishers, Inc., No. CV 89-3818-RSWL, 1990 WL 132719 at *1-2 (C.D. 
Cal. 1990) (rejecting a claim that the FTC violated its Operating Manual, § 17.2.5).  
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of an FTC press release objected to it.488 The last objection was by Kevin Trudeau a 
decade ago.489 
 
Trudeau v. FTC. The D.C. Circuit has addressed FTC publicity practices from time to 
time over the last five decades.490 The latest opportunity was in Trudeau v. FTC, a case 
involving the Commission’s longstanding dispute with an infomercial marketer.491 The 
Commission had filed several complaints against Trudeau for marketing sham treatments 
for a variety of health conditions, including obesity and cancer.492 Five days after a court 
entered a final order prohibiting Trudeau from participating in infomercials, the FTC 
described the order in a press release on its web site.493  
 
Trudeau sued the Commission after it refused to remove the press release from its site, 
arguing that the announcement mischaracterized the settlement and retaliated against him 
for criticizing the FTC, in violation of both the APA and section 46(f) of the FTC Act.494 
The press release was titled “Kevin Trudeau Banned from Infomercials” and quoted an 
FTC official who said that Trudeau had “misled American consumers for years” and was 
a “habitual false advertiser.” 495 Trudeau’s objections were numeroushe objected to 
what he deemed to be inaccurate media reports based on the press release, objected that 
the FTC’s announcement was the second result on Google searches for his name, and 
claimed that the announcement damaged his ability to contract with vendors, citing a 
contract rescinded by Ed McMahon.496  
 
Both the D.C. district and circuit courts engaged in lengthy analyses of the merits, 
focusing on whether the FTC’s press release was reviewable as “final agency action” 
under the APA and whether the APA provided a cause of action. The District Court 
granted the FTC’s motion to dismiss on both grounds,497 which the D.C. Circuit largely 
upheld.498 Although the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that agency publicity may constitute 
“final agency action” in certain circumstancesnotably, when the announcement is false 
or misleading, or when it is intended as a sanctionit found that this was not such a case, 
and noted that the D.C. Circuit had never encountered such a case.499 Trudeau presented 
no evidence that the FTC’s press release was false or misleading.500 The court evaluated 
488 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs and FTC Office of General Counsel, 
supra notes 34, 16. 
489 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
490 See, e.g., FTC v. Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (1968). 
491 Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
492 Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 180. 
493 Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 284-85. 
494 Id. at 282-83. 
495 Id. at 285; Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 195. 
496 Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 285-86; Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 196. 
497 Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 288-90. 
498 Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 183-87. Note that the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s 
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction because the press release was not “final agency action” under APA § 
704, explaining that a lack of “final agency action” would not cost federal courts their jurisdiction but 
would prevent the plaintiff from asserting a cause of action under APA § 704. Id. at 183-87. 
499 Id. at 188-97. 
500 Id. at 191-97. 
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each of Trudeau’s objections, parsing the language that the FTC used versus the language 
Trudeau wanted the FTC to use. The court found that “no reasonable person could 
misinterpret the press release in the ways that Trudeau suggests.”501 The D.C. Circuit 
concluded: “In the end, … it comes down to whether Trudeau has the right to take a red 
pencil to the language of the FTC’s press release. He does not.” 
 
Thus, although the FTC has had to defend its publicity practices more than most 
agencies, such challenges remain relatively infrequent and uniformly unsuccessful. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Consumer Sentinel Network. The FTC also maintains the Consumer Sentinel Network, a 
secure, nonpublic database of over 10 million consumer complaints, 502 accessible by 
roughly 1,000 different federal, state, local, and international law enforcement bodies.503 
Sentinel receives complaints from roughly 40 different law enforcement agencies and by 
certain nongovernmental organizations like the Better Business Bureau. 504  Federal 
agencies like the CFPB and the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center also feed it 
complaints.505 The FTC has long been a repository for consumer complaints, and in 1997 
the Commission created Sentinel to track complaints of fraud and identity theft.506 Now, 
the FTC sorts complaints into 30 different categories, including identity theft, debt 
collection, telephone and mobile services, and many others. 507 The Sentinel network 
includes three different databasesone for identity theft complaints, one for complaints 
about the Do Not Call Registry, and a large database for fraud and other consumer 
complaints.508 
 
Uses. Sentinel is an enforcement tool for the FTC and other agencies. For example, FTC 
enforcement staff will query Sentinel to uncover complaint trends in different product or 
service categories, or to research complaints against an existing enforcement target.509 
The Commission publishes aggregate data from Sentinel, organized by product code or 
service code, but does not publish information concerning specific firms or 
501 Id. at 196-97. 
502 The FTC has a five-year data retention policy, and so purges older complaints. Thus, aggregate 
complaint data does not include complaints received from 2001 to 2009. See FTC, DATA BOOK, infra note 
503, at 5 n.1. The total number of complaints in Sentinel, including older complaints, is estimated to be 
over 20 million. See Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16.  
503 FTC, Consumer Sentinel Network, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network; 
FTC, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY – DECEMBER 2014 (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-
december-2014/sentinel-cy2014-1.pdf (last visited July 9, 2015); Interview with officials from the FTC 
Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
504 FTC, DATA BOOK, supra note 503, at 2; Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General 
Counsel, supra note 16. 
505 FTC, DATA BOOK, supra note 503, at 2. 
506 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16; FTC, DATA BOOK, 
supra note 503, at 2. 
507 FTC, DATA BOOK, supra note 503, at 6 (listing 30 complaint categories by volume). 
508 Ayuda, Inc. v. FTC, 2014 WL 4829574 at *1 (D.D.C. 2014). 
509 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
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individuals.510 The annual Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book does not seem to name 
companies. 511  As such, FTC officials report that companies do not object to being 
included in Sentinel, and the Commission does not share information with companies 
who are the subject of complaints, except to the extent they might request the information 
via FOIA.512 
 
Unverified complaints. The FTC explains that Sentinel “is based on unverified 
complaints reported by consumers” and “is not based on a consumer survey.”513 The 
Commission does not verify complaints. 514  If the Commission does initiate an 
enforcement action, it might use data from Sentinel to gather facts or seek affidavits.515 
But entries in Sentinel are simply data points and do not form the major basis for FTC 
complaints.516 FTC officials do recommend that any agencies considering establishing 
their own complaint databases use quality controls to ensure the accuracy of the 
complaint intake process by outside contractors.517 FTC officials also recommend that 
agencies effectively manage consumer expectations and make clear that the agency will 
not necessarily act on individual complaints.518 
 
Nonpublic database. As a nonpublic, inward-facing database, Sentinel should be 
distinguished from public-facing counterparts like the CFPB’s Consumer Complaint 
Database. 519  As such, the FTC generally opposes open-ended requests to publish 
information in Sentinel.520 Any disclosure by the Commission is passive, again contrary 
to public databases that actively disclose information about identified firms or individuals. 
The FTC only affirmatively discloses information in Sentinel in very broad, aggregated 
formats. Individual complaints are only disclosed in response to particularized FOIA 
requests.521 After the Commission created Sentinel in the late 1990s, it considered at 
length what information might have to be disclosed under FOIA. 522 Although FOIA 
exempts “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,” 523  the 
Commission determined that there was no basis for withholding Sentinel complaints 
except when the Commission could show that a particular disclosure was going to 
impede an investigation in some non-conjectural fashion, or when another FOIA 
510 Id.; FTC, DATA BOOK, supra note 503. 
511 See, e.g., FTC, DATA BOOK, supra note 503. 
512 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
513 FTC, DATA BOOK, supra note 503, at 2. 





519 See, CFPB, Part IV.C. infra. 
520 FTC officials have noted that open-ended disclosures would require substantial expenditures of 
limited agency resources. 
521 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
522 Id. 
523 FTC, FOIA Exemptions, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/exemptions (Exemption 7). The 
Commission indicates in its annual FOIA reports that it also denies FOIA requests for complaints under 
Exemption 6 (personal privacy). See FTC, Freedom of Information Act Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2014 
(Oct. 1, 2013 – Sep. 30, 2014), at 3, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/foia-report-
fy14/2014r-fo.pdf.  
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exemption applied.524 FTC officials estimate that the Commission receives roughly 1,400 
FOIA requests every year, and that requests for information in Sentinel are “some 
measurable percentage.” 525  Officials report that when the Commission does disclose 
information from Sentinel, it is much easier to release auto-filled fields in complaints 
than free-form fields that require individual review.526 The Commission’s main concern 
is releasing consumers’ personal information.527 
 
Ayuda v. FTC. By and large, the FTC has not been asked to make Sentinel broadly 
available to the public. 528 One exception was a request by several non-profit groups, 
including Ayuda and Catholic Charities, which submitted several FOIA requests for data 
about all the complaints in Sentinel, including company names, contact information, and 
consumers’ comments.529 The FTC’s FOIA Unit initially denied the request due to the 
burden of individually reviewing millions of complaints and redacting personal 
information.530 After an administrative appeal, the Commission granted access to the data 
fields that could be released without individual review because they do not elicit free-
form responses (except ZIP code fields), but denied their request for all free-form fields-
including company name and contact informationbecause they must be reviewed to 
identify and redact personal information that is exempt from disclosure under FOIA.531 
The FTC’s FOIA Unit also denied access to company names and contact information.532 
 
Ayuda’s lawsuit argued that the subjects of the complaints in Sentinel do not have any 
privacy interest in the accusations against them. But the D.C. District Court held for the 
Commission on summary judgment on this issue, noting that “individuals accused of 
wrongdoing also have a substantial privacy interest in their names and addresses not 
being disclosed” because the “database contains allegations of illegal conduct, and there 
is no filter for weeding out the legitimate complaints from those completely lacking in a 
factual or legal basis.” 533  The court also emphasized the reputational and privacy 
implications of being included in a government enforcement database: 
 
[B]y having one’s personal information included in a complaint, that person is 
both accused of an illegal activity and associated with a federal agency’s crime 
enforcement effort. Cf. Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & 
Records Serv., 485 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1978) (“An individual does not lose his 
right to privacy simply because he has been investigated and subsequently not 
charged with any offense. Indeed, such an individual may require even greater 
protection, especially where … the mere connection of an individual’s name with 
524 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
525 Id. at 9. Note that the FTC’s annual FOIA report does not indicate what percentage of FOIA 
requests seek Sentinel information. FTC, FOIA Annual Report, supra note 523. 
526 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
527 Id. 
528 Id. 
529 Ayuda, Inc. v. FTC, 2014 WL 4829574 at *2 (D.D.C. 2014). 
530 Id. at *3-4. 
531 Id. at *2. 
532 Id. at *3-4. 
533 Id. at *10.  
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a well-known investigation may be both embarrassing and damaging.”).534 
 
The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in convincing the court that the public interest 
outweighed the privacy rights of individuals whose information might be released. In 
particular, the court rejected the argument that a broad release of Sentinel complaints 
would help the public evaluate the FTC’s performance, noting that the plaintiffs’ 
proposed purpose for the data, which included the creation of “a consumer review tool 
akin to Yelp.com,”535 “serve purely private interests disassociated from monitoring the 
agency’s functioning.”536 The court also agreed with the FTC that Sentinel complaints 
qualify as law enforcement records under FOIA Exemption 7(c).537 
 
*  *  * 
 
Social media. Like other agencies, the FTC uses social media to communicate with the 
public. The Commission currently uses Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn.538 It 
has nine separate Twitter accounts, five of which are personalized for the four 
Commissioners and Chairwoman.539 FTC announcements on Twitter seem to be geared 
primarily towards alerting consumers to unfair or deceptive practices, without identifying 
specific violators. Although the FTC does use Twitter to highlight enforcement actions, it 




FTC officials explained that social media can be important for reaching younger 
audiences.541 Over half of all visitors to the FTC’s web site visit on smart phones or from 
social media sites.542  
 
Challenges of social media. FTC officials recognized that social media can present 
problems due to their truncated formats.543 They also note that once a post is made public, 
534 Id. at *11 (quoting the Supreme Court in Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773). 
535 Id. at *11. 
536 Id. at *12. 
537 Id. at *15. 
538 FTC, Social Media, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/social-media (last visited July 8, 2015). 
539 Id. 
540 FTC, Twitter, https://twitter.com/FTC (screenshot captured on July 8, 2015). 
541 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
542 Id. 
543 Id. 
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“it is very hard to take back.”544 Thus, the FTC was one of the last agencies to join social 
media, and did so only after the Commission had created policies to ensure its proper use 
and compliance with federal obligations like the Federal Records Act.545 These written 
policies are not public546 and were not provided at the time of our interview. Finally, 
although FTC officials are aware of fake FTC social media accounts, or accounts that use 
the FTC’s name, the Commission assumes that audiences can distinguish them from 
authentic accounts and thus does not pay much attention to them.547 One reason for this 
assumption is the use by many social media platforms of procedures to verify the identity 
of account holders, marking verified accounts with check marks or other notations. 
 
Social media practices. FTC officials emphasized that the Commission tries to be very 
careful using social media, explaining that posts can reach large audiences 
immediately.548 The Commission uses “security protocols” to limit unauthorized access 
to Commission accounts, and strictly limits the Commission staff who are authorized to 
post from these accounts. 549  The staff who are authorized are subject to strict 
protocols.550 FTC officials emphasized that its policies are “careful” and “robust.”551 The 
Office of Public Affairs has a dedicated staff member responsible for social media.552 
 
Social Media Task Force. The Commission maintains a Social Media Task Force with 
representatives from various FTC offices and bureaus, including the Office of General 
Counsel, the Office of Public Affairs, and staff who handle enforcement and consumer 
education.553 The Task Force evaluates whether social media platforms are appropriate 
for Commission use, assessing potential audiences, legal requirements, security protocols, 
and the like.554  
 
*  *  * 
 
Information/Data Quality Act. Like other agencies, the FTC posts its Information Quality 
Act guidelines online,555 as required by the OMB. More importantly, like some other 
agencies,556 the FTC exempts press releases, but not if they “contain new substantive 
544 Id. 
545 Id. 
546 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
547 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
548 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs and Office of General Counsel, 
supra notes 34, 16. 




553 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs and Office of General Counsel, 
supra notes 34, 16. 
554 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
555 FTC, Data Quality Act, https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/website-policy/data-quality-act (last 
visited July 9, 2015); FTC, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and 
Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Federal Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/data-quality-
act/guidelines-for-ensuring (last visited July 9, 2015). 
556 See Appendix G, infra. 
 59  
                                                 
information not covered by a previous information dissemination covered by the 
guidelines.”557 Again, this narrows the broad exemption for press releases in the OMB 
guidelines. 558  However, Commission guidelines also exempt information that derives 
from adjudicatory processes, including factual allegations, evidence, analyses, findings, 
determinations, rulings, and opinions.559 Thus, a press release announcing a complaint 
filed by the FTC would be exempt. Similarly, there seem to be several grounds under 
FTC guidelines for exempting information in Sentinel. For example, complaints in 
Sentinel would be exempt if “the agency’s presentation makes clear that what is being 
offered is someone’s opinion rather than fact or the agency’s views.” 560  Moreover, 
because Sentinel is a non-public database intended for law enforcement bodies, it might 
also be exempt because distribution is “limited to government employees or agency 
contractors or grantees” and the information is “intended merely for intra- or inter-agency 
use or sharing.”561 In contrast to press releases, Sentinel complaints are non-public and 
thus present a very weak case for coverage under the IQA. 
 
Best practices. FTC officials support the Conference’s recommending best practices for 
agencies.562 FTC officials welcomed recommendations that would improve the practices, 
procedures, and transparency of government agencies, and help the Commission provide 
more useful information to consumers. 563  FTC officials believe that because the 
Commission is a relatively small agency, it is somewhat easier for staff to be trained on 
new policies. 564 For example, FTC staff receive guidance on the Commission’s rules 
governing the treatment of nonpublic information, and are mostly aware that Section 10 
of the FTC Act imposes criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures. 565  The 
Commission also reminds its staff periodically about the FTC’s press policy. 
 
Judicial review. FTC officials would oppose any Conference recommendation that 
Congress amend the APA or any other statutes to make press releases judicially 
reviewable.566 They note, in any event, that judicial review might be available under 
current doctrines, under some circumstances. 567  Still, FTC officials think that more 
readily-available judicial review could interfere with agencies’ missions to provide the 
public with useful information. 568  FTC officials also are concerned that defending 
lawsuits would divert limited agency resources.569 
 
Inspector General or OMB review. FTC officials would support Inspector General review 
of the Commission’s publicity practices if there is any doubt about the propriety of 
557 FTC, Data Quality Act Guidelines, supra note 555, at § V.B.5. 
558 67 Fed. Reg. at 377. 
559 FTC, Data Quality Act Guidelines, supra note 555, at § V.B.9. 
560 Id. at § V.A. 
561 Id. at §§ V.B.1, V.B.2. 
562 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
563 Id. 
564 Id. 
565 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 50; 16 C.F.R. §§ 4.09-4.11. 
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agency actions.570 The Inspector General can provide independent analysis, as it has done 
for other FTC practices.571 However, FTC officials did not necessarily favor review by 
the OMB, expressing concern about adding layers of pre-publication review and diverting 
scarce agency resources.572 
 
Ombudsman. The FTC does not have an ombudsman. FTC officials explained that the 
Commission is a small agency with a structure that makes it easy to identify who within 
the Commission can be contacted. Officials had no position on whether an ombudsman 
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C.  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
The CFPB deserves special attention because it is a new agency operating under a new 
statute and is on the forefront of the “open data” trend. As Katherine Porter notes, “the 
CFPB is a unique agency, born of a crisis and being designed in a world of new 
technology.”574 Created by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010,575 the Bureau is responsible for regulating consumer financial 
products and services. 576  Though the Bureau is an independent executive agency, it 
resides within the Federal Reserve for budget purposes.577 Over 12% of the Bureau’s 
budget is dedicated to the Office of Consumer Response,578 which operates the formal 
consumer complaint process. The most notable feature of this process is that complaints 
are published in a massive, searchable, sortable Consumer Complaint Database online.579  
 
Complaint Database. The Bureau’s database currently allows consumers to submit 
complaints for 11 categories of financial products, including mortgages, student loans, 
auto loans, bank accounts, credit cards, debt collection services, and others.580 Bureau 
procedures for publishing complaints are described exhaustively in Policy Statements 
published in the Federal Register.581 Consumers can submit complaints in several ways, 
including through the Bureau’s web site.582 The intake process prompts consumers to fill 
in a series of data fields, including their contact information, the name of the company 
involved, the type of product or service involved (including any relevant account 
numbers), and the type of issue or problem.583 The Bureau authenticates this information 
574 Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint Mechanism, 7 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 86 (2012). 
575 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The germinal idea for a consumer financial protection 
agency comes from a 2007 essay by Elizabeth Warren, then a Harvard Law Professor and now a U.S. 
Senator. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY (Summer 2007). 
576 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).  
577 Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall, & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the 
CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343, 347 n.6 (2014) (citing Arthur 
Delaney & Shahien Nasirirpour, Dodd Unveils Financial Regulatory Reform Bill with ‘Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau,’ HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/15/dodd-unveils-financial-re_n_499569 (last visited July 2, 2015). 
578 CFPB, Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and Report (Mar. 2014) 14 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan-and-report-FY2013-15.pdf 
(roughly $73 million of the Bureau’s $583 million budget for FY 2015) (last visited July 2, 2015). 
579 CFPB, Consumer Complaint Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last 
visited July 2, 2015). 
580 See CFPB, Consumer Complaint Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last 
visited May 5, 2015). The database began by posting credit card complaints only, see CFPB, Disclosure of 
Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,628 (Dec. 8, 2011), before broadening the database to 
all products and services regulated by the Bureau. CFPB, Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 37,616 (Jun. 22, 2012). 
581 See, e.g., CFPB, Notice of Final Policy Statement: Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint 
Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558 (Jun. 22, 2012).  
582 CFPB, Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,616 (Jun. 22, 2012). 
583 Id. at 37,616-17. The database includes the following fields: 
(i)  Bureau-assigned unique ID number; 
(ii)  Channel of submission to Bureau; 
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and then forwards the complaint to the company for response.584 In essence, the database 
is a public window into the Bureau’s case management system. 585  The database is 
searchable and sortablelisting for each complaint the type of product, the primary and 
secondary complaints, the name of the company, the company’s response, and whether 
the company’s response was timely and further disputed by the customer.586 
 
Company responses. Companies respond to complaints through a secure online Company 
Portal,587 guided by a Company Portal Manual. 588 Companies can choose one of ten 
response categories:  
 
Closed with monetary relief; Alerted CFPB; 
Closed with non-monetary relief; Incorrect company; 
Closed with explanation; Duplicate CFPB case reported; 
Closed; Redirected to related company; 
In progress; Sent to regulator.589 
 
Responses categorized by companies as “In progress” indicate that the company could 
not close the complaint within 15 days, giving the company a total of 60 days to 
respond.590 Late responses not categorized by companies as “In progress” are tagged by 
the Bureau as “Past due.”591 Those without a response after 30 days are tagged as “No 
response.”592 These responses are published. 
 
Publication criteria. The Bureau will withhold publication unless a complaint meets each 
of the publication criteria. For example, the Bureau’s policy is to exclude complaints that 
(i) are missing critical information, such as the name of the company or product category, 
(iii)  Date of submission to Bureau; 
(iv)  Consumer’s 5-digit zip code; 
(v) Product or service; 
(vi) Sub-product; 
(vii) Issue; 
(viii)  Date of submission to company; 
(ix) Company name; 
(x) Company response category; 
(xi) Whether the company response was timely; and 
(xii) Whether the consumer disputed the response. 
78 Fed. Reg. at 21,225. 
584 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,616. 
585 Interview with Darian Dorsey, Chief of Staff, Office of Consumer Response, CFPB (May 28, 2015). 
586 A screenshot of credit card complaints listed in the database is attached in Appendix F. 
587 CFPB, Sign Up to Address Complaints, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/company-signup/ (last 
visited July 2, 2015). 
588 CFPB, Company Portal Manual (Version 2.14) (May 2015), 
http://www.cfjblaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Resources/cfpb-company-portal-manual-may-2015.pdf 
(last visited July 2, 2015). 
589 Id. at 19. 
590 Id. at 24. 
591 Id. 
592 Id. 
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(ii) have been referred to other agencies, (iii) are duplicative, (iv) would reveal trade 
secrets, (v) are fraudulently submitted, or (vi) identify the incorrect company.593 
 
Publishing complaint narratives. Initially, the Bureau decided not to publish consumers’ 
narrative comments in their complaints,594 expressing concern that personally identifiable 
information could not be redacted sufficiently to ensure privacy. 595  But the Bureau 
reversed course, proposing in July 2014 to publish narratives,596 finalizing the proposal in 
March 2015.597 For a narrative to be published, the consumer must give consent and the 
narrative must be scrubbed of personal information. 598  Industry members “nearly 
uniformly opposed” the proposal, 599 questioning the Bureau’s statutory authority and 
raising other concerns about unnecessary harm to company reputations, echoing 
longstanding concerns with adverse publicity.600 Industry commenters also objected that 
the Bureau did not verify complaints. However, the Bureau’s screening and 
authentication process gives companies ample opportunity to object before a complaint is 
published.601 Acknowledging industry concerns over publishing consumer narratives, the 
Bureau proposed to allow companies to publish their own narrative responses.602 But 
financial industry commenters preferred to respond with pre-set, “structured” responses 










593 Id. at 26; 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,225. 
594 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,568. 
595 Id. at 37,566. 
596 Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Narrative Data, Notice of Proposed Policy Statement with 
Request for Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,765 (Jul. 23, 2014). The privacy concerns are addressed with 
relatively robust “scrubbing standards.” See CFPB, Office of Consumer Response, Narrative Scrubbing 
Standard (March 2015) (copy on file with author). 
597 CFPB, Final Policy Statement: Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Narrative Data, 80 Fed. Reg. 
15,572 (Mar. 24, 2015). 
598 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,583. 
599 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,224. 
600 See, e.g., Public Interest Comment, Mercatus Center, George Mason University (Sep. 10, 2014), 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Peirce-Soliman-CFPB-Consumer-Complaint-PIC-091014.pdf; see 
also 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,581. 
601 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,576-77. 
602 79 Fed. Reg. at 42,768. Consumer groups pushed to allow companies to respond with narrative 
comments. 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,224. 
603 Companies seemed opposed to posting their own narrative responses for several reasons, including 
legal, business, and practical. 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,577. Companies also cited reputational concerns as a 
disincentive to respond. 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,578, 15,581. 
604 Company Portal Manual, supra note 588, at 29. Companies, again, are not obligated to choose a 
narrative response. 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,583. 
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Category Description displayed in Consumer Complaint Database 
Company acted 
appropriately Company believes it acted appropriately as authorized by contract or law. 
Factual dispute Company disputes the facts presented in the complaint. 
Unable to verify facts Company can’t verify or dispute the facts in the complaint. 
Misunderstanding Company believes the complaint is the result of a misunderstanding. 
Discontinued policy or 
procedure Company believes complaint relates to a discontinued policy or procedure. 
Opportunity for 
improvement 
Company believes complaint represents an opportunity for improvement to 
better serve consumers 
Isolated error Company believes complaint is the result of an isolated error 
Third party Company believes complaint caused principally by actions of third party outside the control or direction of the company 
No public response Company chooses not to provide a public response 
 
Benefits of publishing narratives. Public comments from consumer groups, open 
government groups, privacy groups, and individuals favored publishing complaint 
narratives.605 Indeed, major news organizations and press associations favored publishing 
narratives even without consumer consent.606 Sean Moulton and Scott Klinger from the 
Center for Effective Government noted that narratives are more compelling than sanitized 
data and can help concretize otherwise anonymous problems. 607  Bureau staff also 
stressed the value of giving context to complaints, citing as one example a woman in 
Columbus, Ohio, who had been waiting months for a mortgage servicer to send her 
$66,000 after her house burned down.608 After months of unsuccessful haggling, she 
submitted a complaint to the Bureau, which prompted the company to send her check 
overnight.609 Without this narrative, the database would indicate merely that a complaint 
had a been submitted about a mortgage servicing company in Columbus, Ohio, and that 
monetary relief had been the responsewith no sense that the complaint process had 
resolved months of being displaced from home.610 
 
Benefits of the database more generally. Disclosing complaints even without narratives 
confers several public benefits. The intended beneficiaries are consumers, the Bureau, 
other regulators, researchers, and even the companies identified in complaints.611 But the 
main intended beneficiaries are consumers.612 The Bureau and consumers groups note 
that publishing complaint data is a “public service” and helps “fulfill the Bureau’s 
affirmative disclosure requirements under FOIA.”613 Consumer advocates argue that the 
605 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,576. 
606 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,576 (citing comments by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press). 
607 Interview with Sean Moulton & Scott Klinger, supra note 16. 
608 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
609 Id. The woman gave the Bureau permission to use her story after she sent a written Thank You note 
to the agency. 
610 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
611 Id.; 76 Fed. Reg. at 76,630-631. 
612 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,225. The Dodd-Frank Act tasked the Bureau with providing consumers “timely 
and understandable information to make responsible decisions about financial transactions” and help the 
market “operate transparently and efficiently.” 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(1), (5). 
613 CFPB, Final Policy Statement: Disclosure of Consumer Complaint Data, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,218, 
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database can “empower” consumers to better understand financial services and avoid 
“bad actors.”614 They also argue that “disclosure is one of the best tools government 
agencies can use” and that complaint data can help “detect trends of unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts and practices.”615 Although the Bureau itself analyzes complaint data to 
make mandated reports to Congress,616 the database is meant for external consumption. 
Director Richard Cordray encouraged “the public, including consumers, the companies 
that serve them, analysts, data scientists, civic hackers, developers, policymakers, 
journalists, and academics, to analyze, augment, and build on the public database.”617 
Academics have begun to publish empirical studies based on complaint data.618 Public 
interest researchers like U.S. PIRG are using the database to produce reports on specific 
financial products, such as credit cards and debt collection.619 Bureau staff hope that third 
parties develop mobile apps and other information products based on complaint data.620 
U.S. News and World Report published in August 2015 a ranking of credit cards based in 
part on data from the Bureau’s database.621 Firms like Deloitte are publishing reports 
based on complaint data, encouraging companies to “turn what they hear from the 
CFPB’s consumer complaint database into a business advantage.”622 Indeed, Bureau staff 
report that companies are addressing potential problems, such as long customer phone 
trees, in response to consumer complaints. 623 One of the original aspirations for the 
database was to encourage upward competition on customer service and complaint 
handling.624 Indeed, Bureau staff tell anecdotes that companies are comparing themselves 
to competitors based on database metricswith some companies tying executive bonuses 
to how well the company responds to complaints.625 The Bureau occasionally analogizes 
its database to federal airline data, which is used by third parties to create ratings systems, 
21,220 (Apr. 10, 2013). 
614 Id. at 21,220. 
615 Id. 
616 12 U.S.C. § 5496(c)(4). 
617 Richard Cordray, Director, CFPB, Remarks at the Consumer Response Field Hearing (Mar. 28, 
2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-of-director-richard-cordray-at-the-
consumer-response-field-hearing/ (last visited July 2, 2015). 
618 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall, & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis 
of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343 (2014). 
619 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. See, e.g., U.S. PIRG, Reports: The CFPB Gets 
Results for Consumers, http://www.uspirg.org/page/usf/reports-cfpb-gets-results-consumers (last visited 
June 30, 2015) (linking to several reports). (U.S. PIRG is the federation of state public interest research 
groups (PIRGs)). 
620 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585 (citing as an example the mobile app Hipmunk, 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/hipmunk-flight-hotel-search/id419950680, which uses government data on 
flight delays to help customers book flights). 
621 U.S. News & World Report, How U.S. News Ranks the Best Credit Cards, 
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2015/08/13/how-us-news-ranks-the-best-credit-
cards?page=3 (Aug. 13, 2015). 
622 Deloitte, Analysis: CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database: Deloitte’s Analysis Reveals Valuable 
Insights, http://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-cfpb-consumer-complaint-database.html (last visited June 30, 2015). 
623 Interview with Darian Dorsey, at 2. 
624 CFPB, Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,628, 76,630 n.9 (Dec. 8, 
2011). 
625 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
 66  
                                                                                                                                                 
and by airlines to distinguish themselves from competitors.626 The Bureau concludes that 
after complaint data is made public, “The marketplace of ideas then does the rest.”627  
 
Industry concerns. The complaint database has been controversial, of course, to the 
companies identified in it. Industry members have filed a cascade of public comments 
opposing Bureau proposals.628 These are the most salient industry objections and how the 
Bureau addresses them: 
 
1. Lack of complaint verification. Industry comments object that because the Bureau 
does not verify complaints, the database publishes complaints that lack factual support or 
legal merit and thus represent mere opinion.629 Industry members also argued that it is 
unfair to publish complaints resolved without any showing of company fault, perhaps in 
violation of their due process rights. 630  Industry also objected that publication by a 
government agency would give complaints the “appearance” of being validated by the 
Bureau.631 
 
Although the Bureau agrees that it does not fully verify claims made in complaints, it 
emphasizes that the Bureau “authenticates” complaints to confirm a commercial 
relationship between the consumer and the company. 632  The current system for 
authentication seems to be robust. Companies can respond to complaints via the secure 
online Company Portal, which allows companies to deny a commercial relationship or 
otherwise respond to valid customers.633 As such, Bureau staff report that the number of 
complaints posted without either company confirmation or a response within 15 days is 
“very, very low.”634 Of the roughly 600,000 complaints the Bureau has processed, only 
around 380,000 have been published in the database.635 In 2014, 62% of the complaints 
submitted (roughly 156,600 of 250,700) were sent to companies for review.636 The 38% 
not sent to companies were referred to other agencies (25%), were incomplete (10%), or 
were still pending (3%).637 Companies responded to roughly 94% of the complaints sent 
to them.638 In short, there are several opportunities for companies to interject before a 
626 76 Fed. Reg. at 76,631. 
627 Id. 
628 See, e.g. CFPB, Notice of Final Policy Statement: Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint 
Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558, 37,559 (Jun. 22, 2012); Public Comments to Docket No. CFPB-2011-0040, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!searchResults;rpp=25;po=0;s=cfpb-2011-0040 (last visited July 2, 2015). 
629 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,561. 
630 Id. 
631 80 Fed. Reg. 15,572, 15,581. 
632 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,561; 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,221. 
633 Company Portal Manual, supra note 588, at 7. 
634 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
635 Id. Note that the Consumer Response Annual Report for 2014 states that the CFPB has “handled 
approximately 558,800 consumer complaints” as of February 28, 2015. See CFPB, Consumer Response 
Annual Report: January 1 – December 31, 2014 (Mar. 2015), at 6, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report-2014.pdf (last visited 
June 30, 2015). 
636 Consumer Response Annual Report: January 1 – December 31, 2014, supra note 635, at 40; 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 21,221. 
637 Consumer Response Annual Report: January 1 – December 31, 2014, supra note 635, at 40 n.18. 
638 Id. at 40 n.19 (roughly 147,100 out of 156,600). 
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false or fraudulent complaint is published. Bureau staff believe that the only way such a 
complaint would be posted is if the company failed to respond to the complaint.639 
 
Bureau staff emphasize that information published in the database is provided directly 
by consumers and companies rather than the Bureau.640 The Bureau sees the database as 
a record of consumers and companies speaking to each othershining a light on how 
companies treat their customers.641  
 
Nevertheless, the Bureau responded to industry concerns by noting that it “plans to 
specifically disclaim the accuracy of complaints when the data are made available.”642 
Currently, the Bureau web site includes the disclaimer: “We don’t verify all the facts 
alleged in these complaints but we take steps to confirm a commercial relationship 
between the consumer and company.”643 Consumer groups commented that “the lack of 
verification presented only minimal risks to companies because of the controls in place to 
ensure that complaints must come from actual customers … [and] that companies are 
given adequate time to challenge the customer/company relationship.”644 The benefits of 
disclosure, they argued, outweigh the “speculative harm of unverified complaints.”645 My 
review confirms that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that false or fraudulent 
complaints can be identified well before publication.646 
 
2. Non-representative complaints. Industry commenters also objected to the Bureau 
publishing self-selected complaints, arguing that a non-random database would provide 
consumers, academics, and researchers with unreliable information.647 In response, the 
Bureau replied that it would “inform consumers and any other public database users that 
the data reflect only the … complaints that consumers submit to the Bureau.”648 The 
Bureau explained that it would work with commenters to identify ways to normalize the 
data,649 but Bureau staff explained the difficulty of gathering sufficient information to do 
so effectively.650 
 
639 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585; 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,223 (“No company will be 
associated with a complaint if it demonstrates a reasonable basis to challenge a commercial relationship 
with the consumer.”). 
640 Interview with Darian Dorsey, at 3. Bureau staff emphasized any Bureau information added to the 
case management system is used only internally and not presented to the public. Id. 
641 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
642 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,561; 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,221. 
643 CFPB, Consumer Complaint Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
644 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,221. 
645 Id. 
646 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. The Bureau refers multiple times to allegations by a 
company commenter that at least one outside party had used the company’s name unlawfully to defraud 
customers and generate complaints against that company. See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,576. 
647 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,561. 
648 Id. 
649 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,222. 
650 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
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3. Lack of context. A related objection is that the complaint data lacks context and 
thus might lead consumers and the media to overlook its limitations.651 Commenters also 
argued that audiences might believe that the information was being endorsed by the 
Bureau, even with disclaimers to the contrary. 652  The Bureau did not find these 
arguments convincing, but solicited suggestions on how best to provide context. Bureau 
staff commented on the difficulty of normalizing the data to better reflect, for example, 
what proportion of consumer accounts were the subject of complaints between banks of 
different sizes.653 
 
4. Manipulation. Industry commenters also objected that the database would be 
susceptible to manipulation, for example by third parties submitting false complaints. The 
Bureau responded that the burden of filing complaints was not negligible and that several 
procedural barriers, such as the requirement of providing a real customer account number, 
and the procedures for seeking company responses before publication, would deter or 
detect false complaints.654 The Bureau itself can also intervene if it observes anomalies in 
mass complaint submissions, for example.655 
 
5. Reputational harms. Industry commenters objected that identifying company 
names in the database would harm their reputations, which might be compounded by 
“viral media” or serve as “fodder for plaintiffs’ lawyers.”656 Commenters also argued that 
company names should be exempt from disclosure under FOIA because disclosure would 
cause the companies substantial competitive harm.657 The Bureau responded that any 
“unwarranted public criticism, reputational harm, and perhaps even a loss of existing or 
prospective customers” would be a burden shared by all companies, and that disclaimers 
could “warn consumers that the public database contains data reflecting unverified 
complaints.” 658  Consumer groups commented that disclosing company names was a 
significant feature of the Bureau’s proposal, noting that “other complaint databases that 
disclose the identity of specific companieslike NHTSAhave created pressure on 
companies to improve whatever metrics are measured by the public database.”659 Finally, 
responding to arguments that publishing complaint narratives would harm companies’ 
reputations, the Bureau noted that more information is usually better in the marketplace 
of ideas.660 
 
6. Overinclusiveness. The complaint database is intended to increase the transparency 
of markets for various financial products and services, and thus includes complaints that 
651 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,562. 
652 Id. 
653 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585; 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,222. 
654 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,562; 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,222. 
655 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,222. 
656 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,564; 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,222. 
657 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,562-63. Note that Exemption 4 of FOIA allows agencies to withhold trade 
secrets or confidential commercial information if it would result in competitive harm to the business, 
among other things. The Bureau cites several cases interpreting the scope of Exemption 4 in favor of 
disclosure. 
658 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,563. 
659 Id. at 37,564 (quoting the Bureau’s characterization of the consumer groups’ comments). 
660 80 Fed. Reg. 15,572, 15,581. 
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are not necessarily violations of the law. 661  The Bureau defines “complaints” as 
“submissions that express dissatisfaction with, or communicate suspicion of wrongful 
conduct by, an identifiable entity related to a consumer’s personal experience with a 
financial product or service.” 662  Thus, the database includes not only potential legal 
violations, “but also vague expressions of being wronged.” 663 As one observer notes 
astutely, “Dissatisfied consumers can be widespread in lawful industries; indeed, 
financial services may be a poster child for such an industry.”664 To combat a one-side 
presentation of this dissatisfaction, companies are permitted to review and respond to 
complaints before publication. Although consumer dissatisfaction can help inform future 
legislation and rulemaking efforts,665 it is also used as a pressure point or enforcement 
lever, much like traditional agency publicity. 
 
7. Statutory authority. The Bureau cites several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act as 
authorizing public disclosure of consumer complaint data. 666  Dodd-Frank clearly 
authorizes the Bureau to maintain a centralized database of consumer complaints.667 But 
industry members have questioned the Bureau’s statutory authority to make this database 
public. 668 Several sections of the Dodd-Frank Act clearly contemplate publication of 
individual complaint data so long as confidential information is not published.669 Indeed, 
Congress emphasized that the “primary functions of the Bureau” include “collecting, 
investigating, and responding to consumer complaints” and “publishing information” on 
consumer financial markets.670 If the Bureau may use complaint data to guide its own 
activities, the Bureau reasoned, then “there is good reason to allow consumers and 
outside researchers to weigh the importance of complaint data in their own research, 
analysis, and decision-making.”671 The Bureau justifies its public database by pointing to 
three statutory provisions: the requirement that the Bureau make reports to Congress;672 
the authority to provide consumers with information to make financial decisions and help 
the market operate transparently; 673  and the broad authority to make public non-
confidential information “as is in the public interest” and via “appropriate formats.”674 
Bureau staff also report that information in the database was the subject of frequent FOIA 
661 Porter, supra note 574, at 78. 
662 CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 17 n.13, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/01/Congressional_Report_Jan2012.pdf.  
663 Porter, supra note 574, at 78. 
664 Id. 
665 Id. at 79-80. 
666 See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 76,629. 
667 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
1013(b)(3)(A), 12 Stat. 1376, 1969 (2010), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A) (requiring the Bureau to 
“establish a unit whose functions shall include establishing a single, toll-free telephone number, a website, 
and a database or utilizing an existing database to facilitate the centralized collection of, monitoring of, and 
response to consumer complaints regarding consumer financial products or services…”). 
668 See, e.g., 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,560-561. 
669 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1013, 1022, 1034; 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,561; 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,575. 
670 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(2), (3). 
671 78 Fed. Reg. at 21,223. 
672 Dodd-Frank Act § 1013(b)(3)(C). 
673 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(1), (5). 
674 12 U.S.C. §§ 5492(a); 5512(c)(3)(B), (c)(8). 
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requests from the outset and would be sought repeatedly were it not made public.675 
Posting the information systematically is much more efficient than responding to 
repeated FOIA requests, according to Bureau staff.676 
 
Responsive to industry concerns. My review of these objections shows that although 
the Bureau and companies certainly disagree on important points, the Bureau has been 
painstakingly transparent and relatively responsive to industry concerns. The long 
process of proposing, building, and refining the complaint database, detailed in numerous 
Federal Register discussions, shows that the Bureau has been sensitive to industry input, 
granting companies more time to respond, varying standards between industries that 
operate differently, and repeatedly soliciting industry input.677 
 
*  *  * 
 
Traditional publicity. Like other agencies, the CFPB publicizes complaints filed against 
alleged regulatory violators. For example, the Bureau published a press release in May 
2015 explaining that it filed suit against the firm Nationwide Biweekly Administration 
for misleading consumers about savings from biweekly loan payoff programs.678 The 
news release clarifies that “The Bureau’s complaint is not a finding or ruling that the 
defendants have actually violated the law” and includes a link to the full complaint. A 
quick review shows that the Bureau frequently publicizes complaints like this 679I 
found seven web pages’ worth of “enforcement” press releases.680  
 
The press release process. The Bureau’s Office of Communications drafts press releases, 
working with the Office of Enforcement to publicize enforcement actions and the Office 
of Consumer Response to alert consumers that might be affected. 681  I interviewed 
Jennifer Howard, Assistant Director for the Bureau’s Office of Communications, who 
described agency practices. Howard explained that her office is careful to ensure the 
accuracy of press releases (often through multiple rounds of edits with the input of 
Bureau counsel and enforcement staff), strike the appropriate tone, and include necessary 
caveats for publicizing pending and unresolved legal actions.682 Bureau staff report that 
they have a written process to clear press announcements.683 My interview with Bureau 
staff suggested that written policies and procedures are not closely followed, but that 
press announcements are carefully written by the Office of Communications with clear 
675 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
676 Id. at 9. 
677 Id. at 10. 
678 CFPB, CFPB Files Suit Against Nationwide Biweekly for Luring Consumers with False Promises 
of Mortgage Savings (May 11, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-files-suit-against-
nationwide-biweekly-for-luring-consumers-with-false-promises-of-mortgage-savings/.  
679 See, e.g., CFPB, “CFPB and State of Maryland Take Action Against “Pay to Play” Mortgage 
Kickback Scheme” (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-and-state-of-
maryland-take-action-against-pay-to-play-mortgage-kickback-scheme/.  
680 CFPB, Newsroom, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/?topic=enforcement (narrowed by 
selecting “Enforcement” under “Topic”). 
681 Interview with Jennifer Howard, Assistant Director, supra note 34. 
682 Id.  
683 Id.  
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lines of review and approval.684 Bureau staff also expressed concern that an additional 
written policy might challenging to execute in practice if not drafted with sufficient 
flexibility. 685 However, staff were interested in identifying best practices culled from 
other agencies.686  
 
Naming companies in press releases. It is not Bureau practice to name companies in 
press announcements in the absence of an enforcement action, unless the announcement 
is positive (and even then it is rare).687 Bureau staff indicated that the agency does not 
want to “pick winners and losers.”688 When the Office of Communications does issue a 
press release on a “widespread” problem, it will focus on the industry or the specific 
market and not “call out a particular company.” 689  The Bureau does publicize its 
database, including on social media, 690  but generally does not spotlight specific 
companies. Specific Bureau offices, such as the Office of Students and the Office of 
Servicemember Affairs, will issue periodic reports based on trends identified in the 
database, and these reports will name specific companies.691 For example, a mid-year 
report on student loan complaints identified the five companies with the highest volume 
of complaints.692 The report notes that “Due to the lack of publicly-available data on 
private student loans, these tables are not indexed for market share.”693 Notwithstanding 
these congressionally-mandated reports, Bureau staff emphasize that the agency is “very 
leery of naming companies.”694 
 
Benefits of publicity. Bureau staff emphasized the importance of using press 
announcements to reach the general public, noting that press releases can “reach 
Americans where they are, at the airport or at home,” and that few people follow the 
Bureau on Twitter, for example.695 Bureau staff also emphasized that both press and 
social media announcements are written to be understandable to regular consumers. 
Identifying the appropriate audience can be a struggle, given the Bureau’s many 
constituents (industry, consumers, Congress). 696  For example, Howard observed that 
highly technical legal language in press releases “doesn’t mean anything” to 
684 Id.  
685 Interview with Jennifer Howard and Darian Dorsey, supra notes 34, 585. 
686 Id. 
687 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34 (using as an example a Bureau announcement that 
credited Discover with disclosing free consumer credit scores on their credit card bills). 
688 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
689 Id. 
690 CFPB, Twitter, https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/614153117630861314 (last visited July 1, 2015). 
691 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
692 See, e.g., CFPB, Mid-Year Update on Student Loan Complaints (June 2015) at 7, Tbl. 2, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201506_cfpb_mid-year-update-on-student-loan-complaints.pdf (last 
visited July 1, 2015) (identifying five companies with the highest volume of student loan complaints).  
693 Id. at 5-6. 
694 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. Note that Howard acknowledged that the Office of 
Students does “list student loan servicers” in its periodic reports on database complaints. Id. at 9. 
695 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
696 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
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consumers.697 In her words, “consumer education is the priority” so “plain language is 
unbelievably critical.”698  
 
Publicizing enforcement actions. In publicizing enforcement actions, the Office of 
Communications works with Bureau counsel and enforcement staff to ensure the 
accuracy of the announcement. 699  Often, announcements will go through “multiple 
rounds of edits.”700 Companies are not notified in advance of a press release, although 
Bureau staff suggest that companies are aware that announcements usually follow 
publication of a complaint.701 A press release is issued concurrently with the Bureau 
filing an enforcement action, and is meant to communicate the action in plain language 
for lay audiences.702 Bureau staff could not recall any objections by companies to such 
announcements.703 The Bureau does not publicize investigations.704 
 
Timing press releases. The Bureau does not embargo or otherwise time press 
announcements to avoid influencing stock markets.705 Bureau staff explained that a press 
embargo on a potentially market-moving announcement might encourage early leaks, 
given the large size of the Bureau’s press list.706  
 
*  *  * 
 
Social media. The Bureau maintains social media accounts on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, 
and YouTube.707 The Bureau’s Office of Consumer Education and Engagement handles 
social media rather than the Office of Communications.708 Bureau staff explain that the 
agency uses social media more as “an opportunity to engage directly with consumers” 
rather than a “publicity platform.”709 A very cursory review of the Bureau’s Twitter feed 
confirms this use.710 The Bureau did not identify policies or procedures governing its use 
of social media.711 
 




699 Id.  
700 Id. 
701 Id. Bureau regulations on “Disclosure of Records and Information” at 12 C.F.R. part 1070 do not 
seem to address publication of complaints and enforcement actions. 
702 Interview with Jennifer Howard and Darian Dorsey, supra notes 34, 585. 
703 Id. 
704 Bureau regulations at 12 C.F.R. part 1080 state that Bureau investigations are non-public. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1080.14(b). 
705 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
706 Id. 
707 CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ (last visited July 1, 2015). 
708 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
709 Id. 
710 CFPB, at https://twitter.com/CFPB (last visited July 1, 2015). 
711 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
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The CFPB should be credited for being exceedingly transparent in its operations and 
solicitous of industry concerns in constructing its complaint database. Like other agencies, 
the Bureau’s publicity practices seem to be sensitive to longstanding concerns but lack 
the discipline that might come with written policies and procedures. The Bureau is still a 
young agency, but staff report that the Bureau has never been sued over entries in its 
complaint database. 712  Thus, I briefly consider other potential checks on Bureau 
practices: 
 
Information Quality Act. It is not clear whether the IQA applies to the Consumer 
Complaint Database, and the Bureau has not taken a position on this question.713 The 
Bureau has adopted its own Information Quality Guidelines pursuant to the Act and 
OMB guidelines,714 which state that the guidelines apply to “information that the Bureau 
posts on the internet” and to “Bureau-sponsored distribution of information” (meaning 
“any information distributed by a third party at the direction of the Bureau or information 
the Bureau has the authority to review and approve prior to release”). 715 This broad 
language would seem to apply to the Consumer Complaint Database. But the Bureau’s 
Guidelines do not make clear whether they exempt the database, as they exclude 
“archival records, public filings, subpoenas, or adjudicative processes.”716 Similarly, the 
OMB’s guidelines exclude information posted by agencies that “makes [] clear that what 
is being offered is someone’s opinion rather than fact or the agency’s views.”717 These 
provisions could be read to exclude the Consumer Complaint Database from the IQA. 
Industry members, like the American Bankers Association, have argued that the IQA 
should apply to the database. 718  The Bureau’s Information Quality site includes 
documents relating to one request719 that the Bureau retract a white paper on payday 
loans.720 Though the request did not relate to the complaint database, it demonstrates how 
Bureau reports and analyses of complaint data might inspire requests for correction or 
retraction under the IQA. In light of my review above, requests to correct or retract 
712 Interview with Scott Everett, Examiner, Midwest Region, CFPB Division of Supervision, 
Enforcement & Fair Lending (May 28, 2015). 
713 Id. 
714 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554; 
OMB, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of 
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
715 CFPB, Information Quality Guidelines, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/informationquality/.  
716 Id. Note that the Bureau does not make any kind of determination as to the merits of the consumer’s 
complaint, and thus entries in the Complaint Database may not represent “adjudicative processes.” 
717 OMB, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8460. 
718 See, e.g., Letter from Wayne A. Abernathy of the American Bankers Association to Hon. Mark 
Bialek, Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2015/01/LTC-ConsCompDatabase2015Jan.pdf (last visited July 2, 
2015). 
719 Petition of Community Financial Services Association of America, Ltd. for Retraction of “Payday 
Loans and Deposit Advance Products: A White Paper of Initial Data Findings” (Jun. 20, 2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201308_cfpb_cfsa-information-quality-act-petition-to-CFPB.pdf (last 
visited July 2, 2015). 
720 CFPB, Payday Loans and Deposit Advance Products: A White Paper of Initial Data Findings (Apr. 
24, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_payday-dap-whitepaper.pdf (last visited July 2, 
2015). 
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database entries under the IQA would seem to be redundant given the opportunities 
companies have to respond via the Company Portal. 
 
Ombudsman. The Bureau has an Ombudsman,721 which has received complaints about 
the database, among other things.722 Some companies that disagree with Bureau decisions 
will contact the Ombudsman in addition to utilizing notice-and-comment periods, writing 
letters to Director Cordray, and using the press. 723 In fact, some companies will file 
complaints with the Ombudsman that track closely the public comments they file.724 Staff 
report that the Bureau’s Office of Consumer Response meets monthly with the 
Ombudsman. 725  In some other agencies, the ombudsman receives most consumer 
complaints; in the Bureau, the Office of Consumer Response serves that role.726 The 
Ombudsman might be an effective restraint if the Bureau were to ever turn more 
aggressive with its publicity or database practices. 
 
Inspector General. The Federal Reserve’s Office of Inspector General has oversight 
responsibility for the CFPB. 727  For example, it is auditing the Bureau’s complaint 
database “to assess the effectiveness of the CFPB's controls over the accuracy and 
completeness of the public complaint database.”728 Inspectors General provide another 
avenue for industry members to voice their preferences and pursue complaints.729 
 
721 CFPB, Ombudsman’s Office, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ombudsman/ (last visited July 1, 
2015). 
722 CFPB, Ombudsman’s Office, Annual Report to the Director (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201411_cfpb_report_ombudsman-office.pdf (last visited July 1, 2015). 




727 Office of Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, CFPB Activity, 
http://oig.federalreserve.gov/cfpb-activity.htm (last visited July 3, 2015). 
728 See Federal Reserve, OIG, Work Plan (Current as of June 5, 2015), 
http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/work-plan-full.htm#CFPBOngoing (“Audit of the CFPB’s Public 
Consumer Complaint Database”). 
729 For example, the American Bankers Association encouraged the Federal Reserve OIG’s audit of the 
CFPB’s database, arguing that the Bureau has become “an official purveyor of unsubstantiated, and 
potentially false, information.” Letter from Wayne A. Abernathy of the American Bankers Association to 
Hon. Mark Bialek, Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2015/01/LTC-ConsCompDatabase2015Jan.pdf (last visited July 2, 
2015). 
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UPDATED REFORMS 
 
Agency publicity remains a conundrum four decades after Conference Recommendation 
73-1. Agencies must retain wide discretion to inform the public, but sometimes exercise 
this discretion in damaging ways. Part II detailed how agency publicity can be 
problematic when it is premature, excessive, inaccurate, or used as a sanction. This latter 
use, a technique sometimes called “naming and shaming,” can be particularly 
problematic. As Eric Posner notes, “shaming is the very antithesis of the law.”730  
 
In this spirit, I consider recommendations directed to all three branchesexecutive, 
legislative, and judicial. Most important are the recommendations to agencies. I urge 
agencies to make their publicity practices more transparent and to conform not only to 
existing law, but also to principles of good governance. The recommendations to 
Congress are mostly to clarify existing law. Finally, after much careful thought, and a 
change of opinion,731 I do not recommend judicial review of agency publicity absent the 
exceptional circumstances already recognized by courts. 
 
A.  Improving Agency Practices 
 
In 1973, the Conference recommended that agencies “balance the need for adequately 
serving the public interest and the need for adequately protecting persons affected by 
adverse agency publicity.” 732  Thus, Recommendation 73-1 was directed solely at 
agencies. Today, several groups, both in and out of agencies, said they would support 
Conference recommendations for best practices.733 In light of these discussions, and in 
light of the research above, I recommend the following ten best practices: 
 
1.  Written policies. Agencies should adopt written policies that address the content of agency 
announcements and the procedures for issuing them. 
2.  Publication of policies. Agencies should publish their written policies online. 
3.  Advanced notice. Agencies should consider giving advanced notice to subjects identified in 
publicity, but only when the subject is not already aware of an ongoing agency action, unless 
such notice would be impracticable or inconsistent with the nature of the proceeding 
4.  Corrections and retractions. Agencies should adopt procedures for correcting and retracting 
materially inaccurate statements, subject to exceptions in the public interest. 
5.  Publicizing investigations, complaints, and other preliminary actions. Agencies should not 
publicize investigations except in rare circumstances as required by the public interest, and 
should publicize complaints and other preliminary actions only with a clear explanation that 
the action is tentative and non-final. 
730 Eric Posner, A Terrible Shame: Enforcing Moral Norms Without the Law Is No Way to Create a 
Virtuous Society, SLATE.COM (Apr. 9, 2015) (noting that, on the whole, the law on using shame as a 
sanction is ambivalent and incoherent). 
731 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1441-53 (arguing for judicial review of agency publicity). 
732 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
733 See, e.g., Interview with Sean Moulton & Scott Klinger, supra note 16; Interview with officials 
from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16;  
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6.  Capital market reactions. Agencies should consider the potential capital market reactions to 
their announcements and should, when practicable and subject to exceptions in the public 
interest, try to minimize potential capital market shocks. 
7.  Social media. Agencies should incorporate into their social media policies best practices and 
procedures that apply to traditional types of agency publicity, such as clear lines of 
responsibility for publishing information via agency accounts and safeguards to ensure the 
accuracy of statements. 
8.  Database disclosures. Agencies should adopt written policies governing online databases 
that contain adverse information about identified parties. Those policies should ensure that 
(i) the data are accurate, (ii) that users are informed of the source(s), context, and any 
limitations of the data, and (iii) that subjects are given the chance to post responses or 
request corrections or retractions, subject to reasonable exceptions in the public interest. 
9.  Clarifying the Information Quality Act. The OMB should clarify that the Information 
Quality Act applies to new substantive information in press releases that is not covered by 
previous information dissemination subject to the Act. The OMB should also consider 
updating its guidelines to account for the different types of databases published by agencies. 
10.  Fielding objections. Agencies that are not subject to the Information Quality Act, and do not 
otherwise have post-publication procedures for requesting corrections to information should 




1. Written Policies 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should adopt written policies that address the content of 
agency announcements and the procedures for issuing them.  
 
This recommendation is not new. Gellhorn’s 1973 article found that very few agencies 
had established written policies.734 ACUS thus recommended that “Each agency should 
state in its published rules the procedures and policies to be followed in publicizing 
agency action or policy, and internal operating practices should assure compliance.”735 
However, few agencies implemented this recommendation. The ACUS files contain a 
1974 letter from John Cushman, who observed: “I suspect you will find a number of 
agencies who say in effect that they agree with [the] Recommendation in principle but 
who are not willing to state their policies in regulations or even a policy statement.”736 
His letter viewed the need for a written policy as probably “vital” to Recommendation 
73-1, “since it may be the only way to test whether [an] agency will do anything.”737 My 
non-exhaustive review identified only the following written policies, some of which may 
be outdated or not followed: 
 
734 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1384. 
735 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
736 Letter from John F. Cushman to Ed Leahy of Jan. 4, 1974) (internal quotations omitted) (on file 
with ACUS). 
737 Id. 
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Agency Written Publicity Policy Public? 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms (ATF)738 
ATF Directive O 1200.7 No739 
Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) 
Information Disclosure Under Section 6(b) of the 
Consumer Product Safety Act, 16 C.F.R. part 1101 
Yes740 
Federal Power Commission 
(FPC)741 
18 C.F.R. §§ 1.6 and 1.36 Yes742 
Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) 
Operating Manual, Chapter 17 § 2.5 Yes743 
Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) 
Release of Adverse Information to News Media, 45 
C.F.R. part 17 
Yes744 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 
SEC Administrative Regulations on “Press Relations 
Policies and Procedures” 
Yes745 
 
The need for written policies. Even agencies staffed with professionals of immense 
goodwill can benefit from adopting written policies. Although agency practices may be 
constrained by internal protocolsor by what Gellhorn called “custom, habit, and natural 
bureaucratic caution”746the four-decade interim shows that agencies sometimes breach 
these self-restraints. Moreover, agencies with written policies are probably less likely to 
abuse publicity than agencies without them.747 Further, written publicity policies can be 
an important way to preserve best practices. As one former FDA official explained, the 
lessons of the 1960s and 1970s have not necessarily been passed down to later 
generations at agencies, and without written policies, agency staff might have to re-learn 
those lessons through trial and error.748 Of the three agencies examined in detail, the FTC 
seems to have the clearest publicly-available written policies, although FTC officials are 
quick to note that the agency’s policies are not always embedded in the Operating 
Manual.749 Yet, the FTC’s publicity policy was updated in 2014 and is included in the 
Operating Manual, perhaps indicating that the earlier FTC policies praised by Gellhorn 
have survived in some form. 
 
738 Today, the agency is named the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. 
739 This policy was at issue in Banfi Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107 (1997). I could 
not find the policy on the current ATF web site. See ATF, https://www.atf.gov/ (last visited July 24, 2015). 
740 16 C.F.R. part 1101. 
741 The FPC is now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
742 Currently, publicity practices are not addressed in FERC regulations. Sections 1b.9 and 1b.20 
address the confidentiality of FERC investigations. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 1b.9, 1b.20. 
743 FTC, Administrative Staff Manuals, Operating Manual, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/foia-
resources/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals.  
744 45 C.F.R. part 17. 
745 SECR 18-2, Section B(15)(c).  
746 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1419. 
747 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1429; Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1423 n.174 (comparing the FTC’s record 
with written policies to the EEOC’s record without them). 
748 Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224. 
749 See Part IV.B, supra. 
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The need to observe written policies. Just as important as establishing written policies, it 
is important that agencies make staff aware of these policies and provide training. Both 
current and former public affairs officials noted that their agencies issued publicity 
without following any written guidelines. 750 Again, staff may be completely unaware of 
such policies, leaving them to rely on custom, habit, and self-restraint. Several current 
and former officials emphasized that written policies would be most useful if drafted with 
sufficient generality; but they worried that adopting highly specified policies and 
procedures might unnecessarily constrain agency discretion, frustrate attempts to notify 
the public, and possibly lead to non-compliance. The most useful written policies, many 
noted, would express broad principles and procedures, preserving agency discretion, 
particularly in emergencies and when otherwise required in the public interest.  
 
Content guidelines. Written policies should address the content of agency announcements. 
In 1973, the Conference recommended that “All adverse agency publicity should be 
factual in content and accurate in description,” and that “Disparaging terminology should 
be avoided.”751 The Conference also urged agencies to take “reasonable precautions to 
assure that the information stated is accurate and that the publicity fulfills an authorized 
purpose.” 752  These recommendations remain relevant today. The three agencies 
examined in Part IV seem to recognize the power of their publicity and take care to 
ensure that announcements are accurate. But again, occasional disputes over the language 
used by some agencies shows that content guidelines remain useful.753 Still, courts are 
correct in declining to demand perfection of agencies in formulating announcements, and 
agencies “cannot be blamed because certain media reports inaccurately reported an 
accurate press release.” 754  FDA once defended its discretion “even if there is the 
possibility that the information may be ignored, misinterpreted, oversimplified, 
overstated, or misunderstood by the media or by the public.”755 
 
Still, agencies should strive for press releases that will not, in fact, be misinterpreted.756 A 
best practice followed by many enforcement agencies is to provide prominent links to 
underlying documents in a case, such as complaints, settlements, and orders. Applying 
the Information/Data Quality Act to new information published in press releases, as many 
agencies do,757 may also help ensure that the content of announcements is accurate and 
not unnecessarily pejorative. Finally, agency guidelines should require agencies to clarify 
the preliminary nature of investigations, complaints, and other actions that have not been 
resolved.758 
 
750 See, e.g., Interview with Wayne Pines, supra note 224; Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 
34. 
751 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
752 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
753 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1430 (citing instances in which parties objected to pejorative language used 
by the FDA and FTC, though courts largely rejected these challenges). 
754 Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 293. 
755 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437. 
756 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1432. 
757 See Part III.E, supra. 
758 See Part V.A.5, infra. 
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Procedural guidelines. With all the different ways agencies can reach the public 
todayincluding press releases, social media posts, and countless types of 
announcements on agency web sitesit is more important than ever that agencies 
articulate clear procedures.759 Rather than specifying such procedures here, it is probably 
more useful to identify broad principles and best practices for agencies to follow. Of 
course, agencies adopting procedures would have to tailor them to their own needs. 
 
Policies for who may issue publicity. Gellhorn recommended that agencies adopt 
policies that clarify who within the agency may issue publicity and answer media 
inquiries.760 By and large, the agencies I studied seem to observe protocols on these 
matters, though the protocols may not be in writing.  
 
Procedures to ensure accuracy. Second, agencies should establish procedures to 
ensure the accuracy of publicity. For example, the FTC uses a painstaking, multi-tiered 
process to review and clear press releases that discuss enforcement actions.761 The CFPB 
also subjects press releases to multiple rounds of edits with clear stages of review and 
approval.762 The HHS rule requires its agencies like FDA to take reasonable precautions 
to assure the information in announcements is accurate, per Recommendation 73-1.763 
Agencies should also consider not only the technical accuracy of their statements, but 
also the impression left by the announcement as a whole.764 Thus, for example, an agency 
should not suggest in the title of an announcement something that is not fully supported 
in the body of the text.765  
 
Likelihood of harm and alternatives. Both Gellhorn and ACUS recommended that 
agencies use publicity only as necessary and consider alternatives that might be equally 
effective.766 Gellhorn also urged agencies to consider the likelihood of causing severe 
harm to the subject.767 It might be difficult to prescribe this consideration in writing, 
other than to include a general statement in agency policies emphasizing that adverse 
publicity can cause harms that can be indeterminate and difficult to calibrate.  
 
Exceptions in the public interest. Agencies should consider adopting reasonable 
exemptions in their publicity policies for emergencies and the like, tailored to the 
agency’s individual needs and statutory authorities. For example, the FDA should 
maintain significant discretion to warn the public of product risks that might cause death 
or severe injuries, or gross economic losses. Several agency officials emphasized the 
need for flexibility and warned that strict policies might chill important agency 
announcements. 
759 Cortez, supra note  
760 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1430. 
761 See Part IV.B, supra. 
762 See Part IV.C, supra. 
763 See Part IV.A, supra. 
764 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1432. 
765 See, e.g., Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d, at 292. Note, however, that the court rejected Trudeau’s claim 
that the title of the press release was false or misleading. 
766 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1426; 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
767 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1427-28. 
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2. Publication of Policies 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should publish their written policies online.  
 
If few agencies have adopted written publicity policies, even fewer have published them. 
However, in an era of sprawling agency web sites, when many agencies publish detailed 
employee manuals, handbooks, and other internal policies online, reasons for not 
publishing a written publicity policy seem scarce. Indeed, the FDA publishes its 
extensive Regulatory Procedures Manual online, as does the FTC its long Operating 
Manual. 768 As Peter Barton Hutt explained regarding the FDA’s 1977 proposed rule, 
agencies have a duty to tell the public what is and is not permitted.769 Publication of 
written policies not only establishes expectations for regulated parties, but may serve an 
internal prophylactic purpose by encouraging agency personnel to exercise their 
discretion wisely. 770  Moreover, if agencies do offer procedures for subjects to seek 
corrections or retractions, agencies will have to publish these procedures. One model is 
the Information/Data Quality Act. The OMB guidelines implementing the Act require 
agencies to post their guidelines on their web sites.771 It does not appear that agencies are 
inundated with requests under the Act, despite publication of their policies.  
 
3. Advanced Notice to Subjects 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should give advanced notice to subjects identified in 
publicity, but only when the subject is not already aware of an ongoing agency action, 
unless such notice would be impracticable or inconsistent with the nature of the 
proceeding.  
 
History. In 1973, the Conference similarly recommended that the subjects of publicity be 
“given advanced notice” and “a reasonable opportunity” to respond in advance “if 
practicable and consistent with the nature of the proceeding.”772 The Conference did not 
recognize an exception for parties who are already aware of an ongoing agency action. 
Some agencies objected to these recommendations.773  
 
Problems with lack of notice. The lack of advanced notice can be particularly 
damagingand seem particularly unfairto the subjects of agency publicity. When 
agencies take enforcement actions, both due process and the APA typically require that 
agencies give the targets prior notice and an opportunity to respond. 774  But when 
agencies issue publicity, they sometimes do not provide these basic procedural 
protections. For example, in 2003, the FDA publicized objections to a drug company’s 
768 See Parts IV.A and IV.B, supra. 
769 Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 237. 
770 Noah, supra note 37, at 940; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1429-30. 
771 OMB, Guidelines, supra note 714 OR 203 ?; OMB, Agency Information Quality Guidelines, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_agency_info_quality_links/ (last visited July 24, 2015). 
772 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
773 Letters on file with ACUS. 
774 APA §§ 5-8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1383. 
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press release, but did not notify the company of the agency’s objections beforehand.775 
The company’s stock price dropped nearly 25% within hours of the announcement.776 
Courts, however, have not always been sympathetic to parties challenging a lack of prior 
notice. The D.C. District Court held long ago that the FDA did not have to provide a prior 
hearing before issuing adverse publicity condemning a cancer clinic for making illegal 
marketing claims.777 Thus, as Gellhorn emphasized, “usually no protection other than the 
common sense and good will of the administrator prevents unreasonable use of coercive 
publicity.” 778  A former FDA lawyer also observed that “there is relatively little a 
company can do” to stop adverse publicity. 779  Thus, principles of good governance 
probably dictate that agencies provide some basic due process to subjects. 
 
Agency practices. Agency practices on giving advanced notice vary. HHS rules allow 
FDA and other sub-agencies to provide advanced notice “if practicable and consistent 
with the nature of the proceeding.”780 The rule notes that this provision gives subjects an 
opportunity to prepare their own public response, but does not give them a right to edit or 
object to the agency’s announcement.781 FDA’s practice is to notify subjects that a press 
release is coming but to not negotiate over the text of the announcement (or even to 
provide the text prior to publication). 782  As noted above, the SEC failed to make 
sufficient efforts to give advanced notice to Goldman Sachs before filing its complaint, 
contrary to SEC Administrative Regulation SECR 18-2.783 Multiple agencies explained 
that most subjects of adverse publicity are already aware that they are on the agency’s 
radar. 784  The FTC, for example, generally meets with the subjects of investigations 
before filing a complaint, meaning the subject will be aware of the investigation.785 
 
Analogs. Congress has shown sensitivity to agency disclosures without prior notice. The 
Toxic Substances Control Act makes it a crime to publicly disclose confidential 
information that manufacturers have submitted to the EPA unless the agency gives thirty 
days advanced notice.786 Exceptions allow EPA to disclose such information if necessary 
to protect public health or the environment. But even then, the EPA must provide either 
15 days or 24 hours advanced notice, depending on the significance of the threat.787 Other 
laws make it a crime for agency personnel to publicly disclose confidential company 
information.788 Similarly, good database practices support some form of advanced notice. 
775 Vodra et al., supra note 59, at 649. 
776 FDA Responds in Kind to SuperGen, supra note 59, at 6; Vodra et al., supra note 59, at 649. 
777 Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376, 377-78 (D.D.C. 1957). 
778 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1420. 
779 Levine, supra note 288, at 277. 
780 45 C.F.R. § 17.6.  
781 Id.  
782  Levine, supra note 288, at 277. 
783 SEC OIG, supra note 33, at 57-65. Note that the OIG found that SEC staff took differing views on 
whether the Commission should give advanced notice to defendants in advance of filing a complaint, and 
recommended that the SEC consider revising SECR 18-2. 
784 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,439; Interview with Jennifer Howard (CFPB), supra note 34. 
785 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
786 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c). 
787 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2)(B)(i).  
788 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 50; 16 C.F.R. §§ 4.09-4.11. 
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The CFPB’s consumer complaint database, for example, gives companies ample 
opportunity to learn about and verify complaints before they are published online.789 
 
Exceptions. If agencies do adopt a policy to provide advanced notice, they should have 
sufficient leeway to also adopt exceptions relevant to the agency’s mission and statutory 
responsibilities. For example, the EPA and FDA should be able to forego advanced 
notice during emergencies or if otherwise contrary to the public interest. Consumer 
protection agencies like the FTC and CFPB should be able to recognize exceptions if 
there is a risk of significant economic harm. Finally, all enforcement agencies should be 
able to adopt exceptions if prior notice would compromise ongoing surveillance, 
investigations, or other enforcement activities. 
 
4. Corrections and Retractions 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should adopt procedures for correcting and retracting 
materially inaccurate statements, subject to emergencies and other exceptions in the 
public interest. 
 
History. In 1973, the Conference recommended that when agency publicity is erroneous 
or misleading, parties may request corrections or retractions, to be published in as close 
to the same manner as feasible to the original publicity.790 Although agency retractions 
“are infamous for going unnoticed,” 791  providing post-publication procedures should 
ameliorate most disputes over agency publicity.792 Doing so also achieves a measure of 
symmetryfor example, agencies frequently publicize when they bring successful 
enforcement actions, but rarely publicize investigations that found no wrongdoing or 
complaints that failed. 793 Moreover, many suspect that when agencies do make such 
announcements, they do not publicize them with the same vigor, nor do media give them 
the same level of attention.794 Thus, procedures for requesting corrections and retractions 
can help soften criticisms that agencies use publicity unfairly. 
 
Agency practices. Agency practices for corrections and retractions vary. The HHS rule 
discussed above 795 allows parties to request that HHS or its sub-agencies correct or 
retract information that is inaccurate or misleading, and provides that the response will be 
789 Part IV.C, supra. 
790 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
791 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1437 (citing O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 37, at 849). For example, 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) believes that corrective announcements can 
undo the damage from earlier errors. NHTSA, Petitions for Rulemaking, Defect and Noncompliance 
Orders, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,254, 17,257 (1995) (noting that suppliers whose components or parts are 
erroneously identified as defective in recall notices can simply counter “[a]ny adverse publicity that does 
affect a supplier … by publicizing the correct information when it becomes available”). 
792 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1437-38. 
793 Id. at 1437. Note that the FTC will publish a “closing letter” if an investigation finds no violations. 
FTC, Commission Closing Letters, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/closing-letters-and-
other-public-statements/commission-closing-letters (last visited July 27, 2015). 
794 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1391-92; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1437. 
795 Part IV.A, supra. 
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made “in the same manner” as the original announcement.796 The FTC does not make 
clear any procedures for making such requests, and FTC officials explain that the subjects 
of press releases do not necessarily want or need to request corrections or retractions.797 
Nonetheless, FTC officials note that aggrieved parties will have several points of contact 
with the Commission should they object to an announcement.798 Another example that 
also applies to agency databases is the EPA, which designates agency personnel to 
consider objections that data entered on the EPA web site are incorrect.799 EPA will then 
identify the data with yellow flag icons, indicating that the data are disputed.800 
 
Recommended procedures. Agencies should provide clear instructions for parties to 
request that agencies correct or retract information in an agency announcement. Subjects 
seem to prefer that the information be removed completely, but also welcome corrections 
and retractions.801 Because many agencies apply the Information/Data Quality Act to 
press releases that contain new information that is not already subject to the Act, these 
procedures might suffice.802 Other agencies should consider extending the Act to press 
releases in this manner, contrary to the OMB’s guidelines. Second, it should not be 
difficult for agencies that maintain media distribution lists to reach the same audience 
twice. 803 Third, agencies should use the same method of distribution as the original 
announcement. Fourth, agencies should also establish clear deadlines for responding to 
the request, and make available procedures for seeking expedited reviews. 804  For 
example, the FDA’s proposed 1977 policy required subjects to send expedited requests to 
the Assistant Commissioner for Public Affairs.805 Fifth, it is important that agencies tailor 
these procedures to meet their own unique circumstances and needs. Finally, disputed 
requests might be appealed to an agency Ombudsman, Chief Information Officer, or 
Inspector General.806 Providing an appeal mechanism could help agencies generate more 
credibility and perhaps deter litigation.807 
 
5. Publicizing Investigations, Complaints, and Other Preliminary Actions 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should not publicize investigations except in rare 
circumstances as required in the public interest, and should publicize complaints and 
other preliminary actions only with a clear explanation that the action is tentative and 
non-final. 
 
796 45 C.F.R. § 17.7. 
797 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
798 Id. 
799 O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 93, at 514, 533-36. 
800 Id. at 534. 
801 Id. at 534-36.  
802 The Act required the OMB to “establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to 
seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency” that does not meet 
the required standards for quality, objectivity, and the like. 44 U.S.C. § 3516(b)(2)(B). 
803 O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 37, at 536. 
804 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1438; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 93, at 537. 
805 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,440-41. 
806 See, e.g., O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 93, at 538-39. 
807 O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 37, at 848; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1438. 
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History. In 1973, the Conference recommended that agencies publicize investigations or 
“pending agency trial-type proceedings only in limited circumstances” and subject to 
certain criteria.808 For example, agencies should issue such publicity when “there is a 
significant risk the public health or safety may be impaired or substantial economic harm 
may occur unless the public is immediately notified.”809 However, when feasible, the 
Conference recommended that agencies give parties a chance to cease immediately the 
offending practice and avoid public harm in lieu of using adverse publicity. 810 Such 
publicity might also be necessary, according to Recommendation 73-1, when required to 
notify interested parties of pending agency adjudications, or when information about the 
adverse agency action is already public and likely to be covered by the media (but only to 
ensure accurate media coverage and “public understanding”).811 However, a critique of 
Recommendation 73-1 in the media sums up the counterargument well:  
 
The heart of the problem is in the peculiar role of the regulatory agency itself. 
Litigated cases, like those which worry the Administrative Conference, are part 
of the regulatory agency’s broader effort to devise and enforce solutions to 
complex public problems. So these cases are more than private squabbles 
between prosecutor and accused.812 
 
Risks of premature publicity. As noted above,813 agency publicity can be problematic 
when it is premature, such as when an agency publicizes that it has initiated an 
investigation into certain practices without also clarifying that the allegations have not 
been proven yet. Since 1973, numerous parties have sued agencies for publicizing 
investigations or complaints, showing that such announcements remain controversial.814 
There are also well-known instances of early-stage publicity causing significant harm to 
industry. Perhaps the most recent case was the FDA and CDC incorrectly identifying 
tomatoes as the source of a salmonella outbreak in 2008, costing the tomato industry 
roughly $200 million. 815  Of course, publicity of preliminary agency actions may be 
necessary in many cases, particularly when required to alert the public to health or safety 
risks. Again, agencies should retain maximum discretion to make such announcements.  
 
Statutory authority. As explained above, Congress and the White House have not taken a 
consistent stance on whether agencies should publicize investigations and complaints. 
For example, the PTO may publicize complaints against invention submission 
promoters,816 but the FEC is prohibited from publicizing investigations into suspected 
violations of campaign finance laws. 817  And another statute prohibits the Equal 
808 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
809 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
810 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
811 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
812 Stanley E. Cohen, Curbs on Regulatory Press Releases – Would They Hurt or Help Businesses?, 
ADVERTISING AGE (June 18, 1973) (on file with ACUS). 
813 Part II.C.1, supra. 
814 Appendix C (Table of Federal Cases, 1974-2014). 
815 Maki, supra note 61. 
816 35 U.S.C. § 297(d). 
817 Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(B), (a)(12)(A); Common Cause v. FEC, 83 
F.R.D. 410, 412 (D.D.C. 1979); Cortez, supra note 7, at 1435. 
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from “making public” information that it 
obtains while investigating or negotiating with employers suspected of violating federal 
antidiscrimination laws. 818  There are likely several other similar statutes governing 
agencies. 819  Thus, statutory authority for this practice varies. It is likely that most 
agencies do not receive explicit direction one way or the other. 
 
Agency practices. Most agencies “regularly publicize every significant formal action,” 
even when not necessary to warn the public.820 My review of FDA, FTC, and CFPB 
practices show that most agencies are sensitive to the dangers of publicizing 
investigations, but regularly publicize agency complaints. Agencies do, however, use 
disclaimers and links to full court documents to provide context for such announcements. 
 
FDA. Although HHS rules limit announcements of investigations or pending 
proceedings to when there is a significant risk to public health or substantial economic 
harm,821 the FDA regularly publicizes preliminary actions, including investigations, civil 
complaints, and criminal charges and indictments.822 My empirical review of FDA press 
announcements between 2004 and 2010 showed that a high percentage of negative press 
releases that identified specific products or parties involved some preliminary or tentative 
agency determination (74%), rather than a final, determinative action (26%).823 Of course, 
many of these press releases announce product recalls, perhaps one of the FDA’s most 
important functions. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act allows FDA to 
disseminate information about regulated products, and clarifies that nothing prohibits 
FDA from publishing the results of investigations.824 The FDA’s Regulatory Procedures 
Manual includes detailed procedures for issuing press releases regarding enforcement 
actions.825 Note also that the FDA publishes on its web site Warning Letters and records 
of inspectional observations, including company responses. 
 
FTC. The FTC treats investigations as non-public, but regularly publicizes formal 
complaints initiating law enforcement actions.826 As early as 1918, the FTC adopted a 
policy of issuing press releases when it filed complaints,827 and the D.C. Circuit upheld 
this practice in 1968.828 The FTC’s policy is a thoughtful onethe Commission takes 
care when announcing formal complaints to clarify that the case has not yet been 
adjudicated.829 Even though these disclaimers are not always effective,830 they should be 
818 Civil Rights Act §§ 706(b), 709(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Cortez, supra note 7, at 1435. 
819 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 50 (making it a crime for FTC employees to make public confidential 
information). 
820 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1392; see also FTC, Enforcement, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2015) (linking to several pages of enforcement announcements and documents). 
821 45 C.F.R. § 17.4. 
822 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1408. 
823 See Part IV.A, supra; Appendix D (FDA Press Announcements, 2004-2010), infra. 
824 FDCA § 705(b); 21 U.S.C. § 375(b). 
825 Part IV.A, supra. 
826 Part IV.B, supra. 
827 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1388-89. 
828 FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
829 Gellhorn, supra note 7; Interview with Officials from FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
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required at minimum. The FTC’s Operating Manual provides detailed requirements on 
making public both investigations and complaints. FTC officials explain that 
investigations are no longer made public. Both the FTC Manual and agency officials 
describe careful procedures for drafting and approving press releases for FTC complaints. 
These procedures are designed to ensure that the announcement is factual and accurate. 
 
CFPB. One of the CFPB’s most controversial practices is to publish consumer 
complaints in an online database. 831  But the CFPB’s publication criteria, and the 
procedures allowing companies to review and verify complaints before publication, seem 
to provide adequate quality assurance. Moreover, the Bureau disclaims the accuracy of 
the entries, emphasizing that the information is provided by consumers and companies, 
rather than the Bureau. 832  Traditional press releases sometimes announce complaints 
against regulated firms. The CFPB web site includes roughly seven pages of 
“enforcement” press releases.833 Like the FDA and FTC, the CFPB uses a multi-tiered 
approval process to ensure the accuracy of such announcements. However, Bureau 
regulations provide that investigations are non-public.834 
 
Incomplete information. The Conference recognized that agencies must sometimes 
disclose information that “has a limited basis,” such as when allegations are made but not 
fully adjudicated, but urged agencies to “prominently” disclose the limited basis and 
tentative nature of the information.835 Agencies like the EPA and FDA might also have to 
alert the public to potentially dangerous products amid substantial scientific uncertainty. 
Again, as the Conference recommended four decades ago, agencies should clarify when 
the factual or scientific basis for the announcement is tentative and subject to change. 
 
Compliance or publication. Recommendation 73-1 endorsed the practice of agencies’ 
using the threat of publicity to encourage quick compliance.836 The Conference stated 
that “where public harm can be avoided by immediate discontinuance of an offending 
practice, a respondent should be allowed an opportunity, where feasible, to cease the 
practice (pending a legal test) in lieu of adverse agency publicity.” 837  This 
recommendation was criticized as “blackmail,” 838  A magazine article argued that 
agencies could use this leverage to say “Either quietly stop now and avoid publicity … or 
face the kind of publicity you don’t want.”839 It is also interesting to note that public 
criticisms of Recommendation 73-1 frequently invoked the then-recent Watergate 
scandal and the dangers of executive secrecy. However, courts have approved of this use 
of publicity. One court in 1977 noted that the FTC publicizes complaints in part “to 
830 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1431. 
831 Part IV.C, supra. 
832 I discuss recommendations for agency databases more fully in Part V.A.8, infra. 
833 CFPB, Newsroom, supra note 680. 
834 12 C.F.R. § 1080.14(b). 
835 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-1; 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
836 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (Jun. 27, 1973). 
837 Id. 
838 Stanley E. Cohen, Curbs on Regulatory Press Releases – Would They Hurt or Help Businesses?, 
ADVERTISING AGE (June 18, 1973) (on file with ACUS). 
839 Id. 
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induce respondents to agree promptly to remedial orders without the necessity of 
extended legal proceedings.”840 Similarly, HHS rules allow sub-agencies like the FDA to 
withhold releasing adverse information to the public if “public harm can be avoided by 
immediate discontinuance of an offending practice.” 841  Undoubtedly, the threat of 
publicity can be a strikingly effectiveif coerciveregulatory tool.842 
 
Clarifying the nature of the action. Agency policies should require that announcements 
clarify the nature of any agency enforcement action as best as possible. Agencies should 
take particular care when announcing pending or preliminary agency actions via social 
media or other truncated formats. 843  Companies often express concern that agency 
announcements misstate the nature of the agency’s action or mislead the public to believe 
that the allegations are more definitive than they are.844 Agencies press releases are not 
“obliged to repeat every word or phrase in a settlement,”845 but they should avoid using 
language in titles and headings that are likely to be misinterpreted.846 Agencies should 
remain sensitive to these concerns. 
 
Exceptions. There are obvious exceptions in the public interest that must be recognized. 
Agencies do not always have the luxury of waiting for cases to conclude to alert the 
public. For example, agencies like the CPSC, EPA, and FDA must announce product 
recalls or other public health hazards.847 These agencies are often in a Catch-22, as they 
are often criticized for not making these announcements soon enough.848 For example, 
the NHTSA has long been criticized for publicizing vehicle defects months or years after 
they are first suspected. 849  Observers worry that regulated companies might use 
procedures for correcting or retracting publicity to delay important agency 
announcements.850 Thus, agencies should have flexibility to make public announcements 
before notifying or responding to identified parties. 851  Again, agencies should have 
discretion to balance the public and private interests at stake. 
 
840 Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1977). FTC 
officials note that the court appears to have misread the FTC Act and rules on this point, explaining that 15 
U.S.C. § 45 and 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31-32 do not govern the Commission’s procedures for issuing proposed 
complaints. 
841 45 C.F.R. § 17.4. 
842 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1427; Noah, supra note 37, at 875; Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1421. 
843 See Part V.7, infra, for a fuller discussion. 
844 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1061-62 (D. Del. 1976) 
(alleging that the CPSC’s public announcements led the public to believe that the CPSC had made a final 
determination based on more convincing evidence than it really possessed). 
845 Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 292. 
846 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1431. 
847 Id. at 1436. 
848 Id. 
849 Contrast Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1418, with the recent criticism of Toyota and other 
manufacturers. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S2759-60 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Barbara 
Boxer). 
850 O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 93, at 546-47; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1437; 
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act and Environmental Protection: The Perils of Reform by 
Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 339, 358-61 (2004). 
851 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1437. 
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6. Timing Announcements to Avoid Capital Market Shocks 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should consider the potential capital market reactions to their 
announcements and should, when practicable and subject to exceptions in the public 
interest, try to minimize potential capital market shocks. 
 
Hyper-sensitive market reactions. As I explain above, the potential impact of agency 
publicity is magnified by modern capital markets, made hyper-responsive by Internet 
technologies. 852  Company stock prices can be extremely sensitive to agency 
announcements, regardless whether the announcement is inaccurate or misinterpreted. 
Recent incidents involving CMS, FDA, and SEC announcements demonstrate how 
markets can react quickly and hastily to adverse publicity. 
 
Agency rules. Agency publicity policies are largely silent on whether agencies should 
consider or try to avoid capital market reactions to their announcements. One exception is 
a memorandum by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which 
discourages employees from releasing “market sensitive” information that “may have 
stock or bond market implications” during trading hours.853 Otherwise, the HHS rule854 
and the FTC Operating Manual855 are both silent on this issue. The CFPB also does not 
seem to have a written policy on this issue. 
 
Agency practices. Agency practices vary, of course, but also tend to disregard potential 
capital market reactions in favor of other considerations. The FTC publishes press 
releases during business hours (which are roughly coterminous with trading hours) and 
does not try to minimize market reactions.856 Similarly, the CFPB does not embargo 
press releases to avoid influencing capital markets.857 The SEC has refused to give NYSE 
advanced notice of major enforcement actions or to make such announcements during 
non-trading hours. 858 Even CMS, which has a policy on point, made a recent public 
announcement that influenced billions of dollars in trading, seemingly oblivious to the 
potential market response.859 Thus, many agencies seem to make announcements without 
overriding concern for their potential market impact. Agencies cite several reasons for 
not limiting announcements to non-trading hours or otherwise trying to minimize market 
reactions. The CFPB and SEC both cite the potential for early leaks.860 CMS, FDA, and 
FTC officials argue that the agencies cannot predict or control market reactions.861 FTC 
officials explain that global capital markets and after-hours trading make it difficult to 
852 Part III.D, supra. 
853 Memorandum on Employee Nondisclosure Policy from James Webber, supra note 189. 
854 45 C.F.R. part 17. 
855 FTC Operating Manual, supra note 432. 
856 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
857 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
858 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1397 n.151 (citing SEC OIG, supra note 33, at 65-71). 
859 Part III.D, supra. 
860 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1397 n.151 (citing SEC 
OIG, supra note 33, at 65-71). 
861 Schulte, supra note 191, (quoting Aaron Albright from CMS); Interview with officials from the 
FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
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avoid market reactions completely. 862  FTC officials also explain that press releases 
regarding enforcement actions are timed to issue when the complaint is filed or when 
Commission votes are made public, not when markets are closed.863 Thus, although many 
agencies are aware of potential market reactions to their announcements, such reactions 
do not seem to be an overriding concern for them. A more deliberate policy might be 
warranted. 
 
Exceptions in the public interest. Again, agencies should be able to adopt exceptions, in 
the public interest, tailored to their statutory responsibilities. For example, agencies like 
the CPSC, EPA, and FDA should be able to alert the public to health and safety risks 
during trading hours. The risk of substantial harm or death should trump, obviously, the 
risk of causing capital market shocks. The FDA, for example, stresses that public 
announcements can be critical in avoiding deaths or serious injury, citing several recent 
examples, including the 2013 warnings of non-sterile drugs distributed by pharmacy 
compounders, the 2012 peanut products recall, the 2008 recall of heparin, and the 2007 
recall of pet food tainted by melamine. Similarly, consumer protection agencies like the 
CFPB and FTC should be able to alert consumers to fraud and other substantial risks of 
economic harm. Thus, this is a soft recommendationagencies should consider the 
potential capital market reactions to their announcements, balancing public and private 
interests when timing announcements. Agencies should not, for example, restrict 
announcements to non-trading hours when necessary to alert the public, or when the 
announcement truly is routine (notwithstanding the CMS example above). 
 
7. Social Media Announcements 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should incorporate into their social media policies best 
practices and procedures that apply to other types of agency publicity, such as clear lines 
of responsibility for publishing information via agency accounts and safeguards to ensure 
the accuracy of statements.  
 
Agency uses. As explained above, modern agencies use social media platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to communicate with the public.864 These and other 
social media platforms are designed to disseminate information widely and 
immediatelymaking them an important new tool for agencies. Social media can also be 
important for reaching younger audiences.865  
 
Agency challenges. However, social media exacerbate some of the longstanding problems 
with agency publicity. Wide, immediate publication amplifies the reach of agency 
publicity, and short, truncated formats probably increase the risk that audiences will 
misread, misunderstand, or mischaracterize complex regulatory actions. Moreover, the 
volume and variety of social media platformsincluding frequent changes to these 
platformscreate challenges for agencies. Agencies seem to recognize these dangers. 
862 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
863 Id. 
864 Part III.A.2, supra. 
865 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
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The FTC, for example, has been exceedingly cautious with its use of social media, and 
did not establish such accounts until the Commission had created policies to ensure 
proper use.866 
 
Agency practices. Social media practices among agencies are evolving. The federal web 
site USA.gov lists 21 different social media services used by the federal government.867 
As noted above, agencies make prolific use of social media to reach the public. The FDA 
maintains 17 different Twitter accounts, in addition to accounts on Facebook, Pinterest, 
Flickr, and YouTube.868 The FTC maintains nine separate Twitter accounts (including 
five for each of the commissioners and Chairwoman), in addition to accounts on 
Facebook, YouTube, and LinkedIn.869 And the CFPB maintains accounts on Facebook, 
Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.870 My earlier research found that agencies like the EPA 
also maintain over a dozen Twitter feeds.871  
 
Types of announcements. The case studies show that the CFPB, FDA, and FTC all 
use social media to announce enforcement actions. The FDA, for example, operates 
multiple social media accounts solely to announce recalls and other product alerts.872 
However, many agency announcements do not name specific companies or products. A 
large portion of the FTC’s announcements on Twitter, for example, draw attention to 
unfair or deceptive trade practices, but without identifying specific violators. 873 Even 
when the FTC announces enforcement actions on Twitter, it tends not to name companies 
in the post itself.874 The CFPB uses social media more to engage and educate consumers 
rather than to publicize enforcement actions.875 For the most part, agencies seem to use 
social media for a variety of purposes and to reach a variety of audiences. Thus, agency 
practices can be difficult to generalize. 
 
Dedicated personnel. Some agencies designate personnel responsible for social media 
accounts. The organizational chart for the FDA’s Office of External Affairs shows “Web 
and Digital Media” as staffed by Charles Mulieri.876 The FTC’s Office of Public Affairs 
has a staff member responsible for social media.877 And the CFPB handles social media 
through its Office of Consumer Education and Engagement, rather than through its Office 
866 Id. 
867 USA.gov, Federal Government Social Media Registry, supra note 108. 
868 Part IV.A, supra. 
869 Part IV.B, supra. 
870 CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited July 28, 2015) (displaying links to the 
Bureau’s social media accounts). 
871 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1394 (tallying 18 separate Twitter accounts maintained by the EPA). 
872 See FDA Recalls, http://twitter.com/FDArecalls (last visited July 22, 2015); FDA MedWatch, 
http://twitter.com/fdamedwatch (last visited July 28, 2015). 
873 Part IV.B, supra. 
874 Id. 
875 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
876 FDA, Office of External Affairs Organization, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OrganizationCharts/ucm380930.htm (last visited July 28, 
2015). 
877 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
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of Communications.878 Agencies should establish clear internal lines of responsibility for 
using social media on the agency’s behalf. 
 
Written policies. The FTC reportedly uses written policies to govern staff use of 
social media on the Commission’s behalf, but did not produce these policies at the time 
of our interview.879 The FTC also established a “Social Media Task Force” to evaluate 
whether different platforms are appropriate for Commission use.880 CFPB officials could 
not identify policies or procedures that govern social media use by the Bureau.881 The 
FDA is subject to extensive social media rules by its parent agency, HHS.882 All agencies 
are subject to extensive guidelines published by OMB and the GSA, but these guidelines 
largely focus on privacy, security, and other technical recommendations, ignoring the 
unique problems of adverse agency publicity. 
 
Security. As with agency web sites, agencies should take care to limit access to the 
agency’s social media accounts. The FTC makes use of such protocols, and strictly limits 
the staff who are authorized to post from Commission accounts.883 FTC officials said 
they were aware of fake FTC social media accounts, but assume that audiences can 
distinguish them from authentic agency accounts, given account verification symbols 
offered by social media services.884 The U.S. Chief Information Officer (CIO) publishes 
Guidelines for Secure Use of Social Media by Federal Departments and Agencies, which 
includes a mix of technical and common sense recommendations for agencies, focusing 
on cybersecurity.885 The OMB has also published memoranda on the use of social media 
and third-party platforms and web sites by agencies.886 Given the use of agency names in 
social media accounts maintained by non-agency users, agencies should make use of 
account verification features when available on the social media platform. 
 
 
878 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
879 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
880 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs and Office of General Counsel, 
supra notes 34, 16. 
881 Interview with Jennifer Howard, supra note 34. 
882 HHS, Policies that Apply to Social Media, http://www.hhs.gov/web/socialmedia/policies/ (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2015). 
883 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of Public Affairs, supra note 34. 
884 Id. 
885 U.S. CIO Council, Guidelines for Secure Use of Social Media by Federal Departments and 
Agencies (Sep. 2009), https://cio.gov/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/Guidelines_for_Secure_Use_Social_Media_v01-0.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2015). 
886 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, and Independent Regulatory 
Agencies from Cass R. Sunstein, OMB Administrator, “Social Media, Web-Based Interactive Technologies, 
and the Paperwork Reduction Act” (Apr. 7, 2010), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/SocialMediaGuidance_04072010.pdf; 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from Peter R. Orszag, OMB Director, 
“Guidance for Agency Use of Third-Party Websites and Applications” (Jun. 25, 2010) (OMB 
Memorandum 10-23), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-
23.pdf.  
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8. Procedures Governing Database Disclosures 
 
Recommendation. Agencies should adopt written policies governing online databases that 
contain adverse information about identified parties. Those policies should ensure that (i) 
the data are accurate, (ii) that users understand the source(s), context, and any limitations 
of the data, and (iii) that subjects are given the chance to post responses or request 
corrections or retractions, subject to reasonable exceptions in the public interest. 
 
A popular tool for agencies. As noted above, federal agencies now maintain perhaps 
hundreds or even thousands of searchable online databases, many of which contain 
negative information about identified products or parties.887 Data.gov lists 174 different 
federal, state, and local public entities that maintain online datasets, several of which 
publish hundreds of datasets each. 888 Appendix E provides a sample of roughly two 
dozen federal databases that contain negative information about identified parties. These 
include CMS databases that use Medicare data to disclose patient satisfaction surveys, 
rates of complications and deaths, and other quality metrics.889 The CFTC publishes a 
searchable online database of sanctions against regulated firms and individuals.890 The 
CPSC publishes a database of product recalls and other safety problems. 891  The 
Department of Transportation publishes large datasets of airline and airport statistics, 
including on-time departure rates and lost luggage rates. 892  The EPA posts several 
databases online, including its Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) and 
the well-known Toxic Release Inventory Program (TRI).893 Other databases publish large 
amounts of data on government contractors or banned exporters, for example.894 And, of 
course, the databases maintained by the FDA, FTC, and CFPB were described in detail 
above.895  
 
Diversity of databases. The volume and variety of agency databases makes 
generalizations difficult. They vary widely in purpose, scope, design, data sources, and 
other key characteristics. As such, agencies should tailor these recommendations to fit the 
functions of their own databases. Yet, my review also suggests that best practices are 
emerging. For example, when the CFPB began designing its consumer complaint 
database, staff consulted with other agencies to try to identify best practices and potential 
complications. 896  It is in this spirit that I make the following observations and 
recommendations.  
 
887 Part III.A.3, supra. 
888 Id. 
889 CMS, Hospital Compare, Physician Compare, and Nursing Home Compare, Appendix E, infra. 
890 CFTC, Discipline History, Appendix E, infra. 
891 CPSC, SaferProducts.gov, Appendix E, infra. 
892 DOT, Airlines and Airports Data and Statistics, Appendix E, infra. 
893 EPA, Enforcement and Compliance History Online, and Toxic Release Inventory Program, 
Appendix E, infra. 
894 Consolidated Screening List, and System for Award Management (SAM), Appendix E, infra. 
895 See Parts IV.A, IV.B, IV.C, supra. 
896 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
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The need for accuracy. It is paramount that agency databases include accurate 
information. Government agencies are perhaps the most trusted source of information,897 
and agency databases tend to carry the imprimatur of the government. Thus, a court 
recently sustained a challenge against a “materially inaccurate” report on the CPSC’s 
database, SaferProducts.gov, noting that the report “bears the Government’s stamp of 
approval through its publication on an official website that, by its terms, is a repository of 
reports regarding ‘unsafe products.’” 898 Agencies also play an important information-
forcing role in various markets.899 In fact, some believe that agencies can use information 
disclosure to replace traditional command-and-control regulation, citing the EPA’s Toxic 
Release Inventory database as a classic example.900 The Obama Administration endorses 
these ideas,901 as does the occasional statute.902 
 
Problems with database disclosures. Objections to agency databases echo many of the 
longstanding objections to agency publicity. Subjects argue, for example, that complaints 
posted in online databases are unverified, and thus might lack factual support or a legal 
basis. They argue that data are presented without context because they are not 
randomized or normalized. Subjects also note that data can be manipulated during the 
intake process, with parties posting false or fraudulent reports or complaints. Subjects 
describe reputational harms akin to those suffered by the subjects of adverse publicity, 
including competitive harms, the risk of viral publicity, and providing fodder for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.903 Subjects also object that databases give the appearance of being 
endorsed by the government. Even courts recognize that inclusion in an agency database 
may signal the government’s official condemnation. 904 As databases become a more 
popular tool for agencies, it is important that subjects believe they are being treated fairly. 
 
Ensuring accuracy. No database is error-free.905 As such, agencies should try to ensure 
the accuracy of any information that is presented as factual. If the information is not 
presented as accurate and objectivesuch as databases of third party 
complaintsagencies should clearly explain the nature and any limitations of the 
information (see Providing disclaimers, limitations, and context below). Indeed, 
databases containing data only from regulated parties, without review or challenge by an 
agency or by regulatory beneficiaries, might also require explanation of the potentially 
one-sided nature of the information being presented. 
 
Pre-publication procedures. An emerging best practice is to provide the subjects of 
negative database entries with pre-publication procedures to comment on, challenge, or 
897 Interview with Sean Moulton & Scott Klinger, supra note 16. 
898 Company Doe v. Tenenbaum, supra note 133, at 597 (finding that publishing the report online was 
both “final agency action” and “arbitrary and capricious”). 
899 Interview with Sean Moulton & Scott Klinger, supra note 16. 
900 Id. 
901 Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 8 
902 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, supra note 141 (requiring the CPSC 
to create on its web site a searchable product safety database). 
903 CFPB, Part IV.C, supra. 
904 Ayuda v. FTC, supra note 427, at *11; Company Doe, supra note 133, at 597. 
905 Interview with Sean Moulton, supra note 16. 
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correct the information before it is posted. The CPSC, for example, is required by statute 
to allow companies to comment on reports to SaferProducts.gov, and to request that their 
comments be included in the published report.906 The statute also requires the CPSC to 
consider objections that any information is “materially inaccurate,” though it allows the 
Commission to determine what meets that standard.907 The CPSC posts clear procedures 
in the Code of Federal Regulations. 908  Similarly, the CFPB authenticates consumer 
complaints and provides clear procedures for companies to verify a commercial 
relationship with the consumer and post the company’s response.909 The CFPB also has 
adopted clear publication criteria that each complaint must meet before it is published.910 
 
Post-publication procedures. If pre-publication procedures do not ensure the accuracy 
of database entries, then agencies should provide post-publication procedures to subjects. 
Similar to the Information/Data Quality Act, subjects should be able to challenge 
materially inaccurate entries and request corrections and/or retractions. Ideally, agencies 
would provide procedures for expediting requests, as the FDA contemplated long ago. 
Agencies should consider the feasibility of flagging for readers what data is being 
challenged. The EPA, for example, marks disputed data on its web site with yellow flag 
icons.911 
 
Providing disclaimers, limitations, and context. For databases that do not purport to 
contain only objective, verified facts, agencies should take care to provide necessary 
disclaimers and context for the data, including any limitations of the dataset. Doctors, for 
example, have long lamented “surgical report cards” used by state and federal regulators, 
which publish death and complication rates for surgeons, but fail to normalize for riskier 
patient populations. This can create perverse incentives for surgeons to avoid high-risk 
populations who might need surgery the most.912  
 
Several agency databases do disclaim their accuracy. The FDA’s adverse event database 
for medical devices includes a disclaimer that its “surveillance system has limitations, 
including the potential submission of incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, unverified, or 
biased data.”913 Similarly, the FDA’s adverse event database for drugs explains in detail 
the limitations of the data, emphasizing that “there is no certainty that the reported event 
… was actually due to the product.”914 The CFPB complaint database site includes the 
disclaimer: “We don’t verify all the facts alleged in these complaints but we take steps to 
confirm a commercial relationship between the consumer and company.”915 Even the 
906 15 U.S.C. § 2055(c)(2). 
907 15 U.S.C. § 2055(c)(4). 
908 16 C.F.R. § 1102.26.  
909 Part IV.C, supra; CFPB, Company Portal Manual, supra note 588. 
910 Part IV.C, supra. 
911 O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 93, at 534; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1419. 
912 See, e.g., Sandeep Jauhar, Giving Doctors Grades, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/opinion/giving-doctors-grades.html.  
913 FDA, MAUDE, supra note 370. 
914 FDA, FAERS, supra note 369. 
915 CFPB, Consumer Complaint Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/ (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
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aggregated and anonymized data that the FTC publishes about the consumer complaints 
contained in its nonpublic Consumer Sentinel database includes disclaimers that the 
aggregated data is based on “unverified complaints.”916 Sometimes, Congress requires 
the disclaimer. The statute requiring the CPSC to create SaferProducts.gov requires the 
Commission to “provide clear and conspicuous notice to users of the database that the 
Commission does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the contents 
of the database.”917 Thus, SaferProducts.gov includes a disclaimer that tracks the statute 
almost verbatim.918 Note, however, that a court called this language “boilerplate” that 
“would not interest an ordinary consumer.” 919  Thus, the old concern that corrective 
publicity cannot undo erroneous agency publicity probably applies to agency databases as 
well. 
 
Clarifying the source(s) of data. Agency databases are populated with data from different 
sources, which may require different quality controls to ensure accuracy. The CFPB’s 
database, for example, presents information provided directly by consumers and 
companies rather than by the Bureau.920 However, because government agencies are a 
trusted source of information, it is essential that agencies clearly distinguish for readers 
databases that publish objective, government-endorsed data from databases that publish 
consumer complaints, industry accounts, or other subjective or unverified information.921 
Moreover, there may be a reduced risk of publishing inaccurate data if the data comes 
directly from the subject, as in the case of the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory database. 
Databases populated with information from third parties, such as customers, might 
require additional steps to verify the information. For example, the CFPB gives 
companies identified in complaints a chance to verify a commercial relationship with the 
customer and post a response.922 Other databases are populated by data generated by the 
agency itself, such as the numerous enforcement databases listed in Appendix E. These 
databases will include information that is disputed, which makes pre-publication 
verification and post-publication appeals particularly important. Finally, some databases, 
like Medicare’s provider quality ratings, cull data from a number of objective and 
subjective sources, and require more careful explanation.  
 
High-volume databases. Large datasets may be attractive to agencies, but they also create 
challenges. When the CFPB created its consumer complaint handling system, it surveyed 
other agencies to identify best practices, but found that other systems were smaller in 
scale and based on different regulatory models. 923  For example, the Bureau initially 
916 FTC, DATA BOOK, supra note 503. 
917 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5). 
918 SaferProducts.gov, http://www.saferproducts.gov (last visited July 29, 2015) (“CPSC does not 
guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the contents of the Publicly Available Consumer 
Product Safety Information Database on SaferProducts.gov, particularly with respect to information 
submitted by people outside of CPSC.”). 
919 Company Doe v. Tenenbaum, supra note 133, at 598. 
920 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. Bureau staff emphasized any Bureau information 
added to the case management system is used only internally and not presented to the public. Id. 
921 Interview with Sean Moulton & Scott Klinger, supra note 16. 
922 Part IV.C, supra. 
923 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
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looked to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC’s) consumer complaint 
handling system to understand its approach to handling high volumes (around 90,000 
complaints at that time).924 But the Bureau now processes over 25,000 complaints per 
month.925 Agencies with high-volume systems like the CFPB and FTC emphasize that 
other agencies considering their own databases should use quality controls to ensure the 
accuracy of the intake process, particularly by outside contractors.926 
 
Design. Creating databases from scratch, rather than from existing complaint or case 
management systems, seems to be an advantage for agencies. The CFPB was probably 
able to be more thoughtful and open about the data it collects because it designed the 
database from scratch and considered these issues prior to gathering data.927 The CFPB’s 
Consumer Complaint Database, for example, essentially is a small “public window” into 
the Bureau’s case management system. 928  But Bureau staff were able to consider 
carefully how and what information they would collect as they designed the database and 
company response system.929 
 
Timing. Databases that populate automatically probably require more pre-publication 
quality assurance than databases populated manually. For example, fields in the CFPB’s 
database populate in real time and get published nightly, 930  but the Bureau has a 
relatively robust process for verifying commercial relationships and allowing companies 
to respond before a complaint is published.931 Having clear publication criteria probably 
reduces the number of complaints by subjects. 
 
Privacy. A major consideration for agencies that publish consumer reports is maintaining 
consumer privacy. The Privacy Act governs how agencies collect, maintain, use, and 
disseminate personal information.932 CFPB officials report that the Bureau struggled with 
privacy questions as it developed the Consumer Complaint Database. The CFPB now 
uses a three-step process to scrub personal information from consumer complaint 
narratives: (i) a computer program identifies and scrubs personal information; (ii) a 
trained human reviewer reads narratives to scrub additional personal information that 
may have been missed; and (iii) a quality assurance specialist performs a second human 
review, sending narratives back for reprocessing if they still contain personal 
information. 933  Importantly, the CFPB’s scrubbing process removes not just obvious 
personal information, but also related information that might be used to identify the 
consumer, such as medical conditions, employment information, and proper place 
924 Id. The public arm of the OCC’s consumer complaint case management system is 
http://www.helpwithmybank.gov/ (last visited June 30, 2015). 
925 Id. 
926 See, e.g., Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
927 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
928 Id.  
929 Id.  
930 CFPB, Consumer Response Annual Report: January 1 – December 31, 2013 (March 2014) at 8; 
Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
931 Part IV.C, supra. 
932 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
933 CFPB, Office of Consumer Response, Narrative Scrubbing Standard, supra note 596, at 3. 
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names.934 The CFPB said that it “relied heavily on guidance by the Department of Health 
and Human Services regarding de-identification of health data” used for the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule.935 The CFPB, like other agencies, maintains a Chief Privacy Officer.936 
 
The FTC has no plans to make its Sentinel database public (as its purpose is to serve as 
an enforcement tool for the FTC and other agencies), but FTC officials explained that 
doing so would require relatively sophisticated software and substantial human resources 
to scrub each complaint of individually identifiable information.937 Both would require a 
major investment of manpower and budget. 938  In response to FOIA requests for 
particularized information in Sentinel, the FTC’s main concern is to redact individuals’ 
personal information.939 
 
Cybersecurity. A related suggestion is that agencies also consider cybersecurity measures. 
The CFPB considered security measures as it developed its database. 940 The Federal 
Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) requires agencies to develop 
agency-wide information security programs. 941  The Federal Reserve OIG audits the 
CFPB’s information security practices annually.942  
 
Information/Data Quality Act. Agencies should consider whether the Information/Data 
Quality Act should be applied to each database they maintain. As noted above, the Act 
seems better designed for agency databases than press releases. 943 Although the Act 
states that it should apply to agency “dissemination of public information” regardless of 
the form or format, 944 the OMB excludes “opinions” when the agency’s presentation 
makes clear that the information is someone’s opinion rather than fact or the agency’s 
own views.945 Thus, the CFPB’s consumer complaint database and portions of the reports 
on the CPSC’s SaferProducts.gov database might not fall under the IQA guidelinesso 
long as the agencies clearly present the information as opinions by third parties. The 
OMB also exempts “adjudicative processes,” 946  which might exclude many of the 
enforcement databases in Appendix E.  
 
Notwithstanding the legal scope of the Act (or OMB guidelines), it might be appropriate 
in many instances to apply the Act to online databases. The Act helps ensure that the 
934 Id. 
935 80 Fed. Reg. at 15,583. 
936 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1070.50, 1070.51. 
937 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
938 Id. 
939 Id. 
940 Interview with Darian Dorsey, supra note 585. 
941 Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2946. (the short title is the E-Government Act of 2002). 
942 See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of Inspector General, 2014 
Audit of the CFPB’s Information Security Program (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/cfpb-information-security-program-nov2014.pdf (last visited July 2, 
2015). 
943 Part III.E, supra. 
944 44 U.S.C. § 3504(d)(1). 
945 67 Fed. Reg. at 377. 
946 67 Fed. Reg. at 8460. 
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information is subject to minimum standards for accuracy and objectivity, and would 
require procedures for parties to request corrections. Consumer groups were concerned 
that the Act would be used to suppress, delay, or dilute information published by agencies 
and thus should not apply to databases.947 These groups strongly suspected that industry 
would misuse the IQA to protect company interests. 948 Agencies should consider the 
benefits and burdens of applying the Act to each database they maintain. Again, given the 
volume and variety of agency databases, it is difficult to produce a blanket 
recommendation on this issue. 
 
9. OMB Clarifications to the Scope of the Information Quality Act 
 
Recommendation. The OMB should clarify that the Information/Data Quality Act applies 
to new substantive information in press releases that is not covered by previous 
information dissemination subject to the Act. The OMB should also consider updating its 
guidelines to account for the different types of databases published by agencies.  
 
Benefits of applying the IQA. As discussed above, the IQA is well-suited to address some 
of the longstanding problems with agency publicity. The IQA requires agencies to ensure 
the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of certain information they disseminate.949 
These requirements, if applied to agency publicity, would go a long way toward 
addressing many of the longstanding problems with it. The IQA also requires agencies to 
allow affected persons to request that agencies correct information that fails to meet the 
substantive standards.950 This requirement, if applied to agency publicity that contains 
new substantive information, would also mitigate due process and other procedural 
concerns with agency publicity practices. Applying the IQA to agency publicity would 
seem to be palatable to agencies, as the IQA does not create judicially-enforceable rights 
for private parties.951 
 
Unclear scope of the IQA. However, as explained in detail above, it is not clear whether 
the IQA applies to press releases or to agency disclosures that constitute opinions.952 
Again, the IQA by its terms applies very broadly to “agency dissemination of public 
information, regardless of the form or format in which such information is 
disseminated.”953 Although the IQA does not exempt press releases, the OMB’s final 
guidelines inserted such an exemption without elaboration. 954  Compounding the 
confusion, several agencies have drafted their own IQA guidelines to narrow the OMB’s 
exemption for “press releases” to only those that are based on a precursor document that 
is itself subject to the IQA. Appendix G surveys 42 different agency IQA guidelines,955 
947 Interview with Sean Moulton & Scott Klinger, supra note 16. 
948 Id. 
949 44 U.S.C. § 3516(b)(2)(A). 
950 44 U.S.C. § 3516(b)(2)(B). 
951 See Part III.E, n.216, supra (citing cases). 
952 Part III.E, supra. 
953 44 U.S.C. § 3504(d)(1). 
954 67 Fed. Reg. at 8460. 
955 Both the OMB and the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness maintain extensive lists of agency data 
quality guidelines. See OMB, Agency Information Quality Guidelines, supra note 200; Center for 
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finding that most agencies narrow the OMB’s exemption for press releases in this way: 
 
 
Guidelines that narrow the OMB’s exemption for press releases: 23 
Guidelines that adopt the OMB’s broad exemption for press releases: 11 
Guidelines that are unclear or do not address press releases directly: 5 
Guidelines that conflict on whether broad or narrow exemption applies:     3  
TOTAL 42 
 
OIRA seems to have supported narrowing the press release exemption, noting in a 
memorandum that doing so “avoids creating an incentive to misuse press releases to 
circumvent information quality standards.”956 Yet, OIRA has not stopped other agencies 
from applying the press release exemption broadly, rather than narrowly.957 As such, the 
OMB should update its government-wide guidelines to make clear that the IQA applies to 
new substantive information in press releases and other agency publicity that does not 
derive from a precursor document subject to the IQA. 
 
Applying the IQA to agency databases. As explained in the previous section,958 the great 
variety of agency databases deters any blanket recommendations. However, I encourage 
agencies to evaluate whether their data quality guidelines should apply to online 
databases that include negative information about identified products or parties. Again, 
OMB exemptions for “opinions” and “adjudicative processes” might exclude several 
important databases from the scope of data quality protections. Nevertheless, agencies 
should consider using pre- and post-publication procedures to ensure the accuracy of data 
posted online, and should consider using appropriate disclaimers to ensure that users 
understand the context and any limitations of the data. 
 
10. Review by an Ombudsman, Inspector General, or the GAO 
 
Recommendation. Agencies that are not subject to the Information Quality Act, and do not 
otherwise have post-publication procedures for requesting corrections to information should 
direct objections to the agency’s announcement to the Ombudsman or Inspector General, as 
appropriate. 
 
Ombudsman review. In many agencies, the Office of Ombudsman would be well-suited 
to hear complaints regarding inaccurate or unfair agency publicity. The CFPB’s 
Ombudsman, for example, has heard complaints about the Consumer Complaint 
Database. 959  The FDA maintains several product-specific ombudsmen, as well as a 
centralized Office of the Ombudsman, 960  which has handled complaints under the 
Regulatory Effectiveness, Data Quality Guidelines by Agency, http://www.thecre.com/quality/agency-
database.html (last visited July 30, 2015). 
956 Part III.E, supra; Memorandum for President’s Management Council from John D. Graham, supra 
note 204. 
957 Part III.E, supra (citing the NIH guidelines and the Salt Institute case). 
958 Part V.A.8, supra.  
959 CFPB, Ombudsman’s Office, Annual Report to the Director, supra note 722. 
960 FDA, Product Center Ombudsmen, supra note 416. 
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Information/Data Quality Act, 961  and supports review by an Ombudsman. However, 
some agencies, like the FTC, do not have an ombudsman.962 Such agencies would need 
to identify an Inspector General or equivalent to handle such reviews. 
 
Inspector General review. An alternative to using an ombudsman is to use an Inspector 
General to field objections to agency publicity practices. Inspectors General provide 
another avenue for industry members to voice their preferences. 963 For example, the 
SEC’s Office of Inspector General published a thorough review of Commission practices 
when asked to investigate whether the SEC had violated its own policies in publicizing a 
complaint against Goldman Sachs.964 The report provides the most detailed review of an 
agency’s internal deliberations over publicity since Gellhorn’s 1973 report. 965  FTC 
officials said they would support Inspector General review of the Commission’s publicity 
practices if there is any doubt about the propriety of agency practices, citing the Inspector 
General’s capacity for independent analysis and its past evaluation of other FTC practices 
as an analog.966 Another indication that Inspector General review might be suitable for 
agency publicity is the ongoing review of the CFPB’s consumer complaint database by 
the Federal Reserve’s Office of Inspector General.967 The office is auditing the CFPB 
database “to assess the effectiveness of the CFPB's controls over the accuracy and 
completeness of the public complaint database.”968  
 
Review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). GAO review of agency 
publicity practices or incidents may be another way to counterbalance agency discretion. 
An attorney in private practice explained that although GAO review does not always 
change agency behavior, agencies generally take such reviews seriously. 969  GAO 
reviews, in her view, can range from being a “nuisance” to “serious,” and can bring 
unwanted scrutiny to an agency.970 Another benefit of GAO review is that private parties 
harmed by agency publicity might be more willing to complain to the GAO than to the 
agency itself.971 Firms with repeated, ongoing business with agencies may be reluctant to 
challenge agency practices.972 Nevertheless, as an arm of Congress, the GAO may not be 
an appropriate entity to review complaints from parties affected by executive branch 
961 FDA, FDA’s Office of the Ombudsman: Dispute Resolution and Problem Solving, supra note 418, 
at 2. 
962 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
963 For example, the American Bankers Association encouraged the Federal Reserve OIG’s audit of the 
CFPB’s database, arguing that the Bureau has become “an official purveyor of unsubstantiated, and 
potentially false, information.” Letter from Wayne A. Abernathy of the American Bankers Association to 
Hon. Mark Bialek, Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2015/01/LTC-ConsCompDatabase2015Jan.pdf (last visited July 2, 
2015). 
964 SEC Office of Inspector Gen., supra note 33. 
965 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1424 (noting that the SEC OIG reviewed over 3.4 million emails from 64 
separate SEC employees and took sworn testimony from 32 witnesses to produce its report). 
966 Interview with officials from the FTC Office of General Counsel, supra note 16. 
967 Federal Reserve, OIG, Work Plan, supra note 728. 
968 Id.  
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agency action. Congress can request or order the GAO to examine agency policies, 
practices, and procedures, but may not be an appropriate arbiter of complaints by 
regulated parties with executive branch agencies. 
 
B.  Statutory Reforms 
 
Recommendation. Congress should consider amending the Administrative Procedure Act 
or the Information Quality Act to require agencies to publish written procedures 
governing their use of publicity, including procedures tailored to social media, online 
databases, and other new forms of agency disclosure.  
 
Authorizing publicity? Parties aggrieved by agency publicity sometimes argue that the 
agency acted ultra vires or otherwise lacked statutory authority to make the 
announcement. Courts almost uniformly reject such arguments, given broadly-worded 
statutes and the basic need for agencies to communicate with the public.973 In 1973, 
Gellhorn recommended that Congress specify which agencies could issue adverse 
publicity, under which circumstances, and via which procedures. 974  Although 
Recommendation 73-1 asked agencies to ensure that adverse publicity “fulfills an 
authorized purpose,”975 it stopped short of adopting Gellhorn’s full recommendation. My 
prior research concluded that the full recommendation might be too ambitious today, as it 
would require Congress to legislate agency-by-agency, with a fair bit of specificity.976  
 
Administrative Procedure Act. A relatively straightforward alternative would be to amend 
the APA to make clear that agencies do have discretion to issue publicity or otherwise to 
communicate with the public (perhaps a superfluous point), but require agencies to adopt 
written policies. Given how few agencies formally implemented Recommendation 73-
1,977 an amendment to the APA would ensure more optimal compliance. The amendment 
could be very short, and would need to reserve discretion for agencies to tailor 
procedures to fit their regulatory responsibilities. However, because agency authority to 
issue publicity does not seem to be a seriously contested issueand perhaps one not 
appropriately addressed by the APAthe major contribution would be to codify the call 
for agencies to publish written procedures. FTC officials note that a detailed 
recommendation about agency procedures, as this might be, would not be appropriate to 
address via the APA, which contains broader mandates. It is also worth noting that in 
1970, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a resolution that “prejudicial agency 
publicity” may be grounds for setting aside an agency action, and recommended 
amending the APA to provide a cause of action for any person aggrieved by prejudicial 
agency publicity in relation to an agency investigation or proceeding.978 ACUS published 
a statement in 1973 explaining that it “does not favor at this time amending the 
973 See Appendix C: Table of Federal Cases (1974-2014). 
974 Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1435-39.  
975 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. 
976 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1440-41. 
977 Part II.E, supra. 
978 The 12 ABA Recommendations for Improved Procedures for Federal Agencies, 24 ADMIN L. REV. 
389, 410-411 (1970) (reprinting the ABA resolution and recommendation, calling for a new section 560 of 
Title 5 of the U.S. Code). 
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Administrative Procedure Act to treat agency issuance of prejudicial publicity,” as it 
believed there was an “adequate legal remedy for agency publicity which affects the 
integrity of an on-the-record agency proceeding.”979 
 
Federal Tort Claims Act.  Gellhorn also recommended that Congress amend the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA)980 to compensate parties injured by agency publicity.981 Injured 
parties should be compensated, he thought, when the publicity was (i) directed at the 
party, (ii) “materially erroneous, substantially misleading, or clearly excessive,” and (iii) 
“not remedied by the final administrative action.” 982  The academic literatureboth 
before 1973 and sinceconcludes that neither federal statutes nor judicial review 
provides remedies for parties injured by agency publicity.983 As with the APA, courts 
routinely dismiss claims under the FTCA, which specifically excludes libel, slander, and 
other government statements that would qualify as intentional torts, and broadly excludes 
“discretionary functions.”984 Appendix C documents these cases. As explained in the next 
section, I do not endorse this recommendation, as judicial review of agency publicity 
poses several problemslegal and practical.  
 
Information Quality Act. A final target for congressional reform might be the IQA.985 
Amending the Act would allow Congress to resolve several ambiguities with the Act, 
particularly whether it should apply to agency publicity, including newer forms like 
social media and online databases. It would also require consideration of the appropriate 
procedures for requesting corrections, retractions, or disclaimers. Finally, amendments to 
the IQA would also allow stakeholdersCongress, agencies, the subjects of publicity, 
and regulatory beneficiaries986to carefully consider how to balance public and private 
interests. The IQA was passed with little attention, as a rider to an appropriations bill,987 
and might benefit from being more fully ventilated. An alternative, short of amendment, 
would be for the OMB to address these issues via guidance, after soliciting public 
comment. 
 
979 ACUS, Statement # 2, Statement of the Administrative Conference on the ABA Proposal to Amend 
the Administrative Procedure Act at 5 (adopted June 7-8, 1973) (on file with author). 
980 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401–02, 2411–12, 2671–80. 
981 Gellhorn, supra note 7, at 1437-39. 
982 Id.; Cortez, supra note 7, at 1391. 
983 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 37, at 889-91; James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s 
Expanded Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 835, 838 (2002); O’Reilly, Libels on Government Web Sites, supra note 93, at 511-12. 
984 Appendix C: Table of Federal Cases (1974-2014); Cortez, supra note 7, at 1448. 
985 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(d)(1), 3516. 
986 “Regulatory beneficiaries” are those who benefit from the regulation of others. See Nina A. 
Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 401-
02 (2007). 
987 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-154 (2001). Although private parties have been able to comment on many 
of the dozens of IQA guidelines published by agencies, see Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, supra note 
955, more centralized debate might be useful, given the IQA’s relevance to many modern agency 
communications. 
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C.  Judicial Review Reforms 
 
Recommendation. I do not recommend judicial review of agency publicity outside the 
“compelling” circumstances envisioned (but yet to be encountered) by courts. 
 
Survey of cases since 1973. The academic literature uniformly concludes that judicial 
review is not available for parties injured by agency publicity. 988  My 2011 article 
reviewed 26 federal court opinions since 1973 involving agency publicity. Appendix C 
updates this research, showing a total of 33 federal court opinions since 1973, 
representing 30 unique judicial challenges to agency publicity. Twenty of these 
challenged agency press releases. Eight challenged agency press conferences or other 
statements (or leaks) to the media. The other suits involved agency publications, such as 
public warning letter, a guide, and even agency dissemination of a scientific journal 
article written by agency scientists. Two cases involved either the threat or possibility of 
publicity. 989 Finally, the chart includes one “reverse FOIA” case, in which plaintiffs 
challenged a federal statute that prohibits the FEC from making public its investigations 
into suspected campaign finance violations.990 (Note that some of these cases involve 
multiple types of announcements.) 
 
Only three of the 33 opinions are favorable to the challenger. Two of these cases deny 
very early agency motions to dismiss, and thus may be of limited importance.  In Den-
Mat Corp. v. United States, a district court refused to grant the FDA’s motion to dismiss, 
allowing Den-Mat a chance to establish its claims that a Warning Letter and 
accompanying publicity could qualify as final agency action.991 In Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corp. v. CPSC, another district court denied the CPSC’s motion to dismiss, 
finding that CPSC press releases and fact sheets were final agency action.992 The third 
case, Reliance Electric Co. v. CPSC, was a “reverse FOIA” case in which a company 
challenged the CPSC’s releasing roughly 500 pages of investigative documents in 
response to a FOIA request. 993  The D.C. Circuit remanded to require the CPSC to 
respond to the company’s objections that some of the documents were inaccurate. There 
is no record that any of these challengers obtained equitable or monetary relief in these 
cases.  
 
Thus, notwithstanding a few minor victories, the case law since 1973 confirms the 
988 See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 7, at 1441-53; Noah, supra note 37, at 889-91; O’Reilly, The 411 on 
515, supra note 37, at 838; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Web Sites, supra note 93, at 511-12. 
989 First Jersey Securities, Inc. v. SEC, 553 F. Supp. 205 (D.N.J. 1982); Premo Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories, Inc. v. U.S., 1980 WL 588226 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
990 Common Cause v. FEC, 83 F.R.D. 410 (D.D.C. 1979). 
991 Den-Mat Corp. v. U.S., 1992 WL 208962 (D. Md. 1992). See Appendix C for a full description of 
the facts and holding. The holding in this case is an outlier not only with regard to the reviewability of 
agency publicity, but also as to the reviewability of FDA Warning Letters. See, e.g., Holistic Candlers and 
Consumer’s Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding an FDA Warning Letter to not 
constitute final agency action under the APA).  
992 Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm., 414 F. Supp. 1047 
(D. Del. 1976). See Appendix C for a full description of the facts and holding. 
993 Reliance Electric Company v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm., 924 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See 
Appendix C for a full description of the facts and holding. 
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original observation by ACUS that agency publicity “is almost never subject to effective 
judicial review.”994 There are several reasons why this is so. Challengers (and courts) 
struggle to locate appropriate causes of action. Moreover, agency publicity raises 
complicated questions about exhaustion of administrative remedies, ripeness doctrine, 
sovereign immunity, the record to be reviewed, and the lack of suitable remedies.  
 
What cause of action? Aggrieved parties have struggled to find an appropriate cause of 
action for challenging agency publicity. Most parties sue under the APA.995 APA § 704 
offers a generic cause of action to parties aggrieved by agency action.996 And APA § 706 
directs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”997 However, 
most challenges under the APA fail for one of the following two reasons. 
 
Publicity is not “agency action.” Although there is a “strong presumption that 
Congress intends judicial review of administrative action,”998 courts routinely decline to 
review agency publicity on the grounds that it is not “agency action,” or is not “final,” or 
both, under the APA.999 The D.C. Circuit has hinted that agency publicity might be 
reviewable if the agency intended it as a sanction, or if it was false, but the court has yet 
to encounter such a case.1000 The APA defines “agency action” to include “the whole or 
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial 
thereof.”1001 As Appendix C shows, courts sometimes evaluate whether agency publicity 
qualifies as a “sanction.” The APA defines “sanction” as “an agency … prohibition, 
requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of a person[, or] … 
taking other compulsory or restrictive action.” 1002 The legislative history to the APA 
shows that publicity used as a sanction was a “troublesome subject” to Congress, 
particularly when the agency lacked statutory authority for this purpose.1003 Moreover, 
the D.C. Circuit has steadily retreated from its assertion almost 70 years ago that agency 
publicity is never reviewable under the APA.1004 But only one courta Delaware District 
Courthas found agency publicity to constitute “final agency action.”1005 Again, the D.C. 
Circuit and other courts have yet to encounter a suitable case for review. The D.C. Circuit 
has noted that “adverse impact alone would not necessarily make agency publicity 
reviewable as a sanction,” explaining that the aggrieved party would have to show 
evidence that the agency intended to penalize the company or that the publicity was 
994 Recommendation 73-1, supra note 2. 
995 Appendix C, infra. 
996 Md. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1445 n.1 (D.C. 
Circ. 1985). 
997 APA § 706(2)(C), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 
998 Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). 
999 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704. 
1000 Cortez, supra note 20, at 1442. 
1001 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (emphasis added). 
1002 5 U.S.C. § 551(10)(a), (g). 
1003 Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
79-1980, at 40 (1946) (House of Representatives Report on APA)); Cortez, supra note 7, at 1442. 
1004 Hearst Radio v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
1005 Kaiser Aluminum, 414 F. Supp. 1047. 
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false.1006 This might require a showing that the publicity “caused destruction of property 
or revocation of a license.”1007 The most notable recent decision on this issue is Trudeau 
v. FTC, discussed above,1008 in which an infomercial producer challenged a press release 
by the FTC describing their settlement.1009 The D.C. Circuit held that Trudeau did not 
have a valid cause of action under the APA, observing that the circuit had “never found a 
press release of the kind at issue here to constitute ‘final agency action’ under the 
APA.”1010 The D.C. Circuit did not categorically bar such an action, but found that the 
FTC’s press release was neither false nor misleading, concluding that “no reasonable 
person could misinterpret the press release in the ways that Trudeau suggests.”1011  
 
Publicity is not “final.” If a separate statute does not specifically grant judicial review, 
the APA allows courts to review only “final” agency actions rather than tentative, 
intermediate, or interlocutory decisions.1012 Courts have interpreted “finality” to mean 
that the agency’s decision is the consummation of its decision-making process and 
determines a party’s legal rights or obligations, or otherwise has some legal consequence 
for the party.1013 However, agency publicity is rarely intended to represent a final or 
binding determination by the agency.1014 Again, although the D.C. Circuit has hinted that 
adverse publicity that is intended to sanction, or is demonstrably false, could be “final,” it 
has never encountered such a case.1015 The district court in Trudeau noted that courts 
must review agency announcements “with care,” and that they reside “at the outermost 
boundaries of the definitions of both ‘final’ and ‘agency action.’”1016 
 
Other potential causes of action. Aside from the APA, parties have challenged 
agency publicity under the Privacy Act, the Information/Data Quality Act, the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the due process clause of the Constitution. Each of these 
vehicles lacks in some way. For example, the FTCA specifically excludes libel, slander, 
and other statements by the government that would qualify as intentional torts.1017 Courts 
have interpreted these exclusions as covering press releases.1018 The FTCA also includes 
a sprawling exception for discretionary functions, which courts have interpreted as 
1006 Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1119. 
1007 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
1008 Part III.B, supra. 
1009 Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
1010 Id. at 189. 
1011 Id. at 192, 197. 
1012 APA § 704; 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
1013 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-
78 (1997); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 
435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
1014 O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 93, at 512. 
1015 Id. at 1444 (citing cases, including one possible exception, a 1976 case in Delaware District Court, 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1053-54 (D. Del. 1976)). 
1016 Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 290. 
1017 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. 
1018 See, e.g., Fisher Bros. Sales v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1995); Banfi, 41 Fed Cl. at 
583-84; Lance Indus., Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 762, 777-78 (1983). 
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covering not only the initial decision to issue a press release, but also the underlying data 
upon which the press release relies.1019  
 
Only four of the 30 distinct cases in Appendix C involve due process arguments, and 
courts give these claims only superficial treatment. 1020  Plaintiffs have also asserted 
violations of the First Amendment and the Bill of Attainder Clause, but these claims are 
no more successful.1021  
 
As a last resort, several parties have sought relief via private bills in Congress. Private 
bills entail a house of Congress’s adopting a bill asking the Court of Federal Claims to 
determine whether the U.S. government should compensate a party for injuries caused by 
an agency.1022 If the Court of Federal Claims agrees, Congress must adopt a private law 
approving the compensation, and it must be signed by the President.1023 However, as 
Appendix C shows, the Court of Federal Claims routinely denies compensation for 
agency publicity, largely because agency publicity is not compensable under the 
FTCA.1024 As long as the agency has a rational basis for issuing the publicity and did not 
make an error, courts are reluctant to grant compensation.1025 
 
Other barriers to review. Other legal and practical barriers weigh against judicial review 
of agency publicity, at least outside of the “compelling” cases envisioned by some courts. 
 
Exhaustion. Many claims against agencies are frustrated because the challenger failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies. Of course, most agencies provide no such remedies 
for adverse publicity. 1026  Even regimes like the IQA that do provide administrative 
procedures are found not to entail judicial review. 1027  Sometimes, a party can seek 
judicial review before exhausting administrative remedies if the agency’s procedures 
cannot provide effective relief. For example, one court allowed a challenge to proceed 
because the company alleged that the agency’s public statements would continue to cause 
severe damage to the company.1028 Thus, courts might be sympathetic if the harm is 
immediate and agency procedures provide no real remedy. 1029  Otherwise, agencies 
frequently invoke the exhaustion doctrine, even without providing adequate 
administrative remedies. 
 
1019 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Banfi Prods. Corp., 40 Fed. Cl. at 125-26; Fisher Bros. Sales, 46 F.3d at 282. 
1020 Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d at 1121-22 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Impro Prods., 722 F.2d 
845; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 
378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975). 
1021 Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 191 & n.23; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 504 F. Supp. at 270. 
1022 28 U.S.C. § 2509. 
1023 Id. 
1024 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1451-52. 
1025 See, e.g., Sperling & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States, 218 Cl. Ct. 625 (1978). 
1026 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1445. 
1027 See Part III.E, supra. 
1028 Kaiser Aluminum, 414 F. Supp. At 1055. 
1029 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1446. 
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Ripeness. Even if agency publicity constitutes final agency action, it must also be ripe 
for review.1030 Most courts decline to review agency publicity even if it has a significant 
practical effect on the company.1031 However, the district court in Den-Mat rejected the 
FDA’s motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness, finding that FDA threats in a Warning 
Letter essentially demanded “compliance” with the agency’s position and was more 
definitive, final, and harmful than in most cases because the FDA said it would 
recommend that other federal agencies not award contracts to the company unless the 
allegations were resolved.1032 The court noted that FDA had already “utilized the public 
press to enforce its determination.”1033 Under ripeness doctrine, the court found that the 
company was in a Catch-22either comply with the FDA’s demands or risk an 
enforcement action.1034 Still, the opinion in Den-Mat is an outlier with regard to both 
publicity and Warning Letters. Such holdings remain the exception, not the rule, and lack 
of ripeness remains a barrier for most litigants. 
 
Sovereign immunity. Compounding matters for litigants, agencies and agency 
officials that make public statements may be immune from suit. When agency officials 
are sued in their individual capacities to avoid sovereign immunity, the officials can 
invoke executive privilege to make statements to the public. 1035  Moreover, agencies 
might have a First Amendment right to issue publicity. One court emphasized that courts 
“should be hesitant to restrain the Government in speaking out about matters of public 
concern absent some very strong overriding showing of inappropriate harm.”1036 
 
Record for review. Another major barrier for effective judicial review is identifying 
an appropriate record for review. A claim that an agency abused its discretion would need 
to be proven by reference to internal agency documents, such as e-mails, memoranda, and 
the like. Moreover, claims that an agency intended to sanction a company via publicity 
would need to be supported by evidence of such intent. As the Inspector General 
investigation into the SEC’s announcement of its complaint against Goldman Sachs 
demonstrates, such inquiries can be exceedingly difficult. 1037  The Inspector General 
reviewed over 3.4 million emails from 64 separate SEC employees and took sworn 
testimony from 32 witnesses to produce its report. 1038 More readily-available judicial 
review of agency publicity could be a significant burden to agencies and detract 
significantly from their regulatory responsibilities. 
 
1030 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
1031 See, e.g., Relco, Inc. v. CPSC, 391 F. Supp. at 846-47.  
1032 1992 WL 208962 at *4-5. 
1033 Id. at *5. 
1034 Id.  
1035 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (finding executive privilege against a defamation claim 
for a press release issued by the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization announcing his intent to 
suspend employees); Ajay Nutrition Foods, 378 F. Supp. at 216-17 (holding that the FDA Commissioner 
and Secretary of HEW were protected by executive privilege when making public statements and issuing 
press releases critical of regulated industries). 
1036 FTC v. Freecom Communications, 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1070-71 (D. Utah 1997) (acknowledging 
the lack of such an argument from the government). 
1037 Cortez, supra note 7, at 1424 n.330 (citing SEC OIG, supra note 33, at 1-2). 
1038 SEC OIG, supra note 33, at 1-2. 
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Remedies. A final barrier to effective judicial review is the difficulty in crafting an 
appropriate remedy for parties aggrieved by agency publicity. Both courts and scholars 
struggle to identify workable, satisfactory remedies. Indeed, part of the reluctance to 
recognize judicial review in statutes like the IQA probably stems from the difficulty in 
identifying an appropriate, judicially enforceable remedy. 
 
For these reasons, I do not recommend judicial review of agency publicity, absent the 
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